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ABSTRACT
The emergence of broad rural support in West Bengal for the Communist Party of 
India (Marxist) (CPM) is here studied through the history (1960 to present) of two 
villages in Burdwan district. The focus is on the relationship between the dynamics 
of village politics and political and ideological changes of the larger polity. Village 
politics constitutes an important realm of informal rules for political action and public 
participation where popular perceptions of wider political events and cultural changes 
are created. The communist mobilization of the late 1960s followed from an informal 
alliance formed between sections of the educated (and politicized) middle-class 
peasantry and certain groups (castes) of poor. The middle-class peasantry drew 
inspiration from Bengal’s high-status and literary but radicalized tradition. However, 
the establishment and dynamics of the alliance, at the local level, can only be 
understood within the normative framework of the village. The poor appeared 
previously as marginal to public exercise of village affairs, but were nonetheless able 
to manipulate resources available to them (numbers, assertion, norms) and thus 
achieve some leverage vis-a-vis village leaders dependent on man-support or "moral 
economy" sentiments for legitimacy. The interests of these groups of poor, 
particularly of the social or cultural kind since the material resources available were 
very limited, became crucial in the bonds village leaders sought to create to retain 
their support. Following on this practice, also the CPM’s local party leadership, in the 
1980s and 1990s, consistently confirmed social aspirations and status considerations. 
This leads to the conclusions that not only do communist movements too depend on 
considerations of social status, honours, and symbolic displays of respect but that the 
scope for change and the manner in which the communist movement can function at 
the local level derive from popular perceptions, formed and enacted in villages.
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Urbanites tend to regard villagers as dour, slow, and reactionary — as "stupid 
peasants". This stereotype is of course not shared by scholars of agrarian change. 
Instead there tend to be a representation of the rural population as the repositories and 
enactors of structures that are beyond their knowledge or consciousness, as the social 
space where the great forces of history are enacted by an unself-conscious peasantry. 
To take but one example: according to Dipesh Chakrabarty the main reason for the 
Calcutta mill-workers’ inability to unionize, develop a class-solidarity, and relate to 
the mill authorities from a class-perspective, was that they were still basically 
peasants, who had come out of the villages only recently and only for a short while.1 
And the villages, Chakrabarty informs us, were the homeland of a culture of 
inequality, hierarchy and violence. This culture was merely there as the traditional 
normative environment for the rural population of India, and the peasant-tumed-mill 
worker could only re-enact its basic tenets in the new (industrial) environment. The 
unself-conscious peasant is not an autonomous subject-actor, on the contrary, he 
appears as the opposite, "the other", of the self-conscious and reflected scholar.
Of course, I am far from the first to have pointed to the problems in such a conception 
of the peasant, whether in Chakrabarty’s study or in general, nor the first to have 
studied peasant behaviour and village politics from the perspective of the peasant as 
an autonomous subject-actor. Many more illustrious scholars, such as James Scott, 
will be referred to in this study. However, what I have specifically sought to do here 
is to combine a study of village politics with the larger questions of peasant 
mobilization and with socio-cultural changes. This has led to a number of problems, 
primary among which have been the linking of the norms and practices of village 
politics, where the peasant appears as an independent subject-actor, to the historical
Chakrabarty 1989. I have used Chakrabarty here because this is a minor blemish 
on an otherwise excellent and interesting study. Nonetheless, it indicates how even 
a "Subaltemist" can harbour a facile conception of village society.
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developments of the larger polity, where he does not. At this point of potential 
despair I was aided by Jean and John Comaroff s recent book, Of revelation and 
revolution,2 where they suggest that sign systems should be understood as polyvalent, 
and that "consciousness" should be taken not as an on-and-off thing (conscious or 
unconscious) but as a "chain" ranging from the level of articulated discourse to the 
level of the taken-for-granted and unspoken-of. In a word, the peasant, as anyone 
else, is a subject-actor in a limited sense, active within certain confines that are not 
of his making nor of his undoing. Villagers pursue their interests, as they see them, 
within a given normative environment, a given social structure, and a given political 
build-up. But the subject-actor will be able, given the right circumstances, to consider 
some of the confines of society, some of the cultural constructions, if not objectively 
at least subjectively, in a new light. Such considerations may give rise to 
reinterpretations, although within the situation’s historic specificity.
There are two interesting aspects to this. One is with changes that are internal to the 
system, the other one with changes from outside — but the two are closely connected. 
New ideologies may be appropriated because they suit the needs of specific social 
groups. These "needs" have been formed within the existing normative environment. 
However, aims and values may already have changed, before being practised into 
"habitus". This was the case of the initial conversion to communist ideology in the 
two villages under study. Ideological conversions created a new praxis in villages, a 
praxis that did not only grow out of local society. The groups that were involved 
identified themselves with social groups and values outside of village society. They 
came to regard village society and its practice with new eyes.
The ideology which they converted to was at the time about to become a dominant 
ideology. It was shared by the Government, government servants, and most of the 
intelligentsia alike. So, one could argue, that it was a modem phenomenon, grown 
out of the drastic changes of modem world. And, indeed, I shall call it "the modem 
tradition". But there is of course no reason to believe that drastic value changes
2Comaroff and Comaroff 1991.
belong to the contemporary world rather than "traditional" society. India is an ancient 
country, and to postulate, as does Dumont for instance, the absolute hegemony of one 
ideology only, seems to negate the historical and cultural variety that has contributed 
towards creating what we have come to regard as (a unitary) tradition. As I hope to 
show, even where the one (brahminical) ideology appears as dominant, even 
hegemonic in a Gramscian sense, it has nonetheless not displaced all alternative sets 
of values. These alternative sets of values, partly embodied in life-styles, enacted and 
maintained through practice, made appropriation of new ideologies smoother because 
the new ones fitted on to the older ones.
What I have wanted to consider in this study is how alternative values and 
interpretations may not necessarily challenge the existing power-structure or its 
legitimizing ideology. There is a space of practice — the subject’s manipulation of 
categories of hegemonic knowledge — where hegemony is not openly defied or 
challenged but eluded and avoided. This space suggests that hegemony is never 
entirely hegemonic, and that practice is an awkward category which may hide 
alternative, if unarticulated, values. This space not only allows for uncertainty (which 
accords the actor with space), but also contradictions and value-contestations.
fccjuvre.s
Such an angle require much material of an intimate nature, and so during the course 
of its collection my symbolic debt has accrued in many quarters. Most material used 
here was collected through interviews and participant observation while living in the 
neighbouring villages of Udaynala and Gopinathpur (fictitious names). I lived in these 
villages for altogether 11 months in 1992-93, although at the beginning of my field­
work I was already familiar with Udaynala and some of the people there through a 
previous visit (in 1989).
I started by conducting extensive interviews with villagers of all groups, high and low, 
with former and present village leaders and panchayat members. Some material was 
also collected from party people, administrators and politicians from the larger area 
-  although these were not as forthcoming as most villagers were. Much of the 
contemporary statistical material was collected from a survey conducted in 1984 (and
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updated each year ever since) for the Integrated Child Development Scheme. I was 
given access to that material by one of the workers of that scheme, Rizia Begum, who 
lives in Udaynala but is positioned in Gopinathpur.
However, here we come to a crucial point. Most of the material used here was not 
collected in the manners described. Most material and most of the insights were 
gained when I was not enacting the role of the visiting anthropologist-cum-historian, 
but when I was relaxing, chatting and gossiping and exchanging stories and views. 
And my favourite partner in this was the same Rizia Begum. Her extensive and 
intimate knowledge of both villages, of births, deaths, education, illness and health, 
land and loans, and, above all, the latest gossip — about who was doing what, for 
what reason, in collaboration with whom — proved an invaluable source of insight 
into the workings of the village community.
She was my main inform ant for contemporary material. But the extensive historical 
material could be collected due to two other factors. One was the notebook and 
diaries (maintained for a full thirty years period, 1956-1985) by the late "Waselmaster" 
— primary schoolteacher in Udaynala and one of the main actors on its public scene. 
That notebook, on the village, its population and "problems" in the early 1960s, was 
written as part of a teacher-training seminar Waselmaster attended in 1961-2. Both 
the book and the diaries were made available to me by his son, Fajlul.
The second but by far the more important factor was Najir Hosen, poet, party-member 
and village historian. He was one of the main reasons for picking Udaynala in the 
first place, since my project depended on extensive information on village history.3 
His innumerable hand-written books and records filled seven sacks and cover every 
thinkable aspect of the village’s and region’s history and society: peasant movement, 
religious practices, proverbs, records of every marriage and every death since 1958, 
landownership in 1958, near-forgotten agricultural practices, diaries, his own life-
3Later on I discovered that a large number of villages have one or even more 
individuals who maintain extensive records and diaries. However, few would perhaps 
have been willing to share these with a foreign historian.
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history, village and caste myths, etc, etc. He made most of his material available to 
me (except the "juicy" stories), and also helped fill out the rather oblique entries in 
Waselmaster’s diaries. Without his help it would not have been possible to write this 
thesis.
I am in particular grateful to Rizia and Najir-chacha for their friendship and 
dedication, and for their willingness to spend long hours discussing, gossiping and 
assisting in what in the literature is known as "information gathering". In general, 
however, my gratitude extends to all villagers of Udaynala and Gopinathpur for the 
huge amounts of information, but I wish to mention, in particular, Alok Mandal, Kesto 
Sarkar, Shyamsundar Malik, Sakti Dhara, and Rabiel Hak, all of whom generously 
assisted me. Having said this, and in accordance with what I mentioned above, I 
learnt as much from gossiping with friends — Chayna, Chandan, Akram, Ajam, 
Badam, Saiful, Taleb-bhai, Bulu-bhai, Bhadu-bhai and all the others — all of whom 
not only provided insights and information but friendship and a sense of being 
welcome and wanted — not at all a bad feeling on a field-trip. I also wish to 
acknowledge my debt to Haksaheb and kakima for their most generous hospitality. 
Lastly, I would like mention Emanul Hak, whose friendship I cherish and whose 
interest and immediate trust made this study possible.
In Burdwan Town I had the good fortune to enjoy the hospitality of Dr Girindranath 
Chattopadhyay, kakima and Mainak while passing through or staying for some other 
business. It was there I occasionally could discuss aspects of my research, the politics 
of West Bengal, or life in general with the fabulous "gang of four" — while learning 
what Tagore songs are all about. And it was in Burdwan Town I also enjoyed the 
good and stimulating company of LSE alumni Arup and Paramita Maharatna.
My debt has also accrued in other corners of the world. I also to acknowledge my 
gratitude to Dr John Harriss, who got me to the LSE in the first place and introduced 
me to that place more alien than Indian villages. Unfortunately he left the School in 
the middle of my study. Fortunately he did arrange for me to be inherited by two 
most competent supervisors, Professor Chris Fuller and Dr James Putzel. Their lucid
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readings of my confused drafts were indeed clarifying, and their surprisingly detailed 
comments a constant source of both frustration and motivation. I am particularly 
grateful to James for his unfailing encouragement and support.
I would have failed my duties as a true client had I not acknowledged my everlasting
gratitude and debt to my patron and mentor, Dr Pamela Price. She not only
cxcMfctag
introduced me to India but showed me how thrilling it was. Her exiting views, 
thorough scholarship and relentless encouragement plus a never failing and vivid
interest often seemed wasted on that resisting matter that was me.
I
Among the many friends and colleagues that have been subjected to discussions about 
things Indian and historical, there is one milieu I shall forever cherish, that of 15, 
Patina Walk, headed by Razmik Panossian, Light of the East and Maitre du canard 
roti.
My wife, Elisabet, spent much time helping me with the statistics and relentlessly 
haunted me with theoretical questions far beyond my comprehension. This study is 
what it is in spite of her.
All errors, needless to say, arc mine.
To the most charming kids in the world, Titir and Pavel.
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ONE 
INTRODUCTION
Socio-cultural changes through village politics
Most decisions and deliberations concerning and regulating life in village 
communities, whether it is distribution of scarce resources such as irrigation water, or 
the normative regulation of society, are taken within the villages — although affected 
by the larger society. The village scene is also the first and main arena for the public 
participation of the rural population. For these reasons alone the village and its 
political life are important for the study of Indian society. In addition, village politics 
is important because what happens there, and the manner in which it happens, directly 
or indirectly affect the developments of the larger society and its politics. The sheer 
numbers create influence, but villagers’ participation in the larger polity, whether by 
foot or vote, is formed in the village polity, a polity in many ways different from the 
world of interest-based political parties, elected office and independent judiciary. The 
manner in which village politics works, at least as we have learnt to understand it 
(concepts such as factionalist or primordial loyalties, or class or false consciousness 
come to mind), and forms perceptions of parties, ideologies, costs and benefits, for 
translation into action or non-action, is of direct concern to any would-be politician, 
major political party, and student of Indian society.
Thirty years of politics and social changes (ca. 1960-1990) in the two villages I have 
called Udaynala and Gopinathpur, will here be used to illuminate peasant mobilization 
in West Bengal, or what we may call the emergence of rural communism. The 
villages are situated in Raina thana (police station area) in the Dakshin Damodar 
region of Burdwan district, West Bengal. It is a fertile area that lives almost 
exclusively from its agriculture. It has also been a very fertile area for the Communist 
Party of India (Marxist) — CPM for short — the dominant party of West Bengal’s 
Left Front Government (LFG), in power since 1977. As with most of Burdwan, the 
Dakshin Damodar provides firm support for the party,1 both in elections and in the 
running of local affairs. Indeed, the district of Burdwan is known as the CPM’s durga 
(fortress).
The emergence of rural communism was not the only important change to have taken
place in rural West Bengal over the period under study. Rural communism came
alongside drastic changes in the position of women and caste practices, economic
VvvCudfivme-
improvements and "development" efforts, and, crucially, an increase in the incident 
of village poetry recitals. These changes are thought to be connected. Firstly, they 
are connected through association with various social groups, some of which were 
external to village society, an association that was actively embodied by specific 
groups of villagers. Secondly, these changes are connected by forming part of more 
or less clearly understood or articulated bodies of norms and ideologies. These
lMThe party" is here used to refer to the CPM, or the CPI before the 1964 split. 
The CPM is in local parlance known by its acronym or just "the party" (partita). Its 
major opponent, the Indian National Congress, is known, as it is all over India, as 
"Congress" and rarely referred to as a "party".
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represented not only bodies of great symbolic value to would-be village leaders but 
constituted markers for villagers seeking to cope with a changing environment. 
Poetry-recitals may seem peripheral to the main theme of the history, peasant 
mobilization, but both to villagers themselves and to this student, the appropriation of 
symbols through poetry-recitals formed part of a drawn-out history of struggle over 
status and position to command. This could only be possible if command, or 
authority, was not only based in power, the ability to enforce, but also in ability to 
appear (or be) legitimate. Village politics is a transparent arena for public action, 
where motives are not easily hidden and the division of private and public not clear- 
cut.
Because of its day-to-day and intimate face-to-face character, village politics is a very 
informal arena for public participation, where all sorts of sentiments, concerns, 
aspirations and ambitions can be expressed, interpreted, evaluated, and possibly 
translated into action. Both poor and rich villagers are as concerned with their 
economic position as with values, norms, social status and their own personal 
ambitions. All these are matters that influence the individual’s outlook and political 
behaviour. His ability to act publicly from these concerns and influence the selection 
of village leaders is exacerbated by village politics being a struggle over very limited 
material resources. Village politics is mostly not about material resources. Only as 
a struggle over symbolic resources does village politics know no bounds. This will 
become clear as we investigate the potentiality of rumours and gossip and poetry 
recitals on village politics, and the adverse potency of the unmasked use of force on 
village leadership.
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Thus we have a fairly broad understanding of village politics. All activities related 
to struggles over material, social or symbolic resources fall within what I here 
understand as "village politics" because they affect the relationship between 
individuals or groups and their influence in village society.
A somewhat different and more common, although somewhat restricted understanding 
would be to regard village politics as merely a set of principles or social mechanisms 
for the daily regulation of community affairs and distribution of scarce resources. 
This is the approach we meet in "traditional" village politics studies, where concepts 
such as "dominant caste", "faction" and "patron-client relationships" were developed. 
However useful, these concepts do easily land us in an anthropological never-never 
land, where particularly the normative system within which struggles take place is 
seen as largely unchanging. This results in a view of the polity as a set of fixed and 
permanent mechanisms.
A major impetus towards a broader approach came with James Scott’s Weapons o f the 
weak, where village politics acquired another level, the publicly unspoken-of. In this 
approach, norm systems were introduced not only as changing with altered material 
conditions, but as potentially exploited by high and low to defend one’s interests. 
Ideologies and norms were brought down from the pedestal of near-eternity to the 
mud of everyday interaction and struggle. And so, influenced by the notion of 
everyday forms of peasant resistance, a third approach was introduced into Indian 
historiography with the "Subaltern" school, which (initially at least) focused on the 
not-so-everyday forms of peasant resistance. In the occasional eruptions of peasant
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protest, one found expressions of a village-formed peasant "autonomy" from the 
hegemony of the elite, political or otherwise. Later on this school developed a trend 
which sought to understand the subaltern mentalite through the everyday acts of 
submission yet occasional eruption of resistance.
I will return to these approaches in more detail below but shall in this study regard 
all three as representing something which is real, at different levels. Both the 
everyday cooperation (or co-option), the everyday resistance, and the not-so-everyday 
resistance are tangible features that constitute a village’s reality. The three approaches 
represent ways of regarding the formation of the village as a varied, multi-focal and 
multi-voiced polity. Here I employ all three to investigate the formation of the 
normative as well as practical-political environment in which peasant mentalite is 
formed and conditioned and the villager’s political engagement created and acted out. 
The result has been a broad, but, I hope, not unwarranted, conception of village 
politics, one that includes the not-so-everyday with the everyday, the public and semi- 
public with both the common and uncommon manifestations of individual and group 
concerns as these change under various influences.
The setting
Udaynala is a Muslim-majority village, although the majority is slim and 45% of the 
population is Hindu.2 Population and landowning statistics are given in table 1.1.
2Both Udaynala and Gopinathpur were technically divided into two distinct 
mouzas (revenue villages) and panchayat seats, which, for the sake of simplicity, I 
have merely called Udaynala North and Udaynala South, and Gopinathpur East and
19
The Muslim population is divided in two groups — jatis (castes) seems an appropriate 
term3 — the sekhs (who constitute a "dominant caste" in terms of its land-owning and 
political clout), and the malliks, who are much poorer. The Hindus are divided into 
several jatis: among the high and clean castes we find several families of bamuns (or 
Brahmins) and benes (Baniyas), and one family each of kayastha and kalu.4 These 
live in close proximity to one another, in the bene- and bamun-przras (neighbourhoods) 
in the north mouza. The rest of the Hindu population is Scheduled Caste (SC, 
formerly "untouchable"), the major groups being the namasudra, the bagdi and the 
muchi, who live in separate neighbourhoods, mainly in the south mouza. The bagdis 
live at a distance from the main village, and so do, a bit further north, the saotals 
(Santals), a Scheduled Tribe (ST), settled in the village since the 1950s. Although 
they acknowledge certain distinctly saotal customs, the saotals consider themselves 
Hindu. Not all Hindus accept this claim.
Gopinathpur West, respectively. Both appear physically as one village, and were 
formerly referred to as such. Of Udaynala South it was said that "previously only the 
Kajis [the dominant family there] knew how to read and write". Gopinathpur West 
was considered but a part of Gopinathpur East. Only in 1993 did it get its own 
panchayat seat.
3At least following the common understanding of jati, as an endogamous group, 
see Kolenda 1978. For "caste" among Muslims, see Ahmad 1977.
4I prefer the colloquial jati names since many of the "sanskritized" names are long 
(such as Barga-Kshatriya for bagdi) and little used. Lower case initial letters will be 
used for the colloquialisms, upper case for sanskritized names.
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Table 1.1
Population and landownership by jati, Udaynala 19935
Population Landownership
Jati N. % (in percent)
Bamun 41 2.0 1.2
Kayastha 4 0.2 0.3
Bene 43 2.2 4.4
Kalu 6 0.3 0.8
Sekh (Muslim) 935 46.6 62.0
Namasudra (SC) 299 14.9 8.3
Mallik (Muslim) 190 9.5 5.5
Bagdi (SC) 304 15.2 14.2
Muchi (SC) 91 4.5 2.8
Saotal (ST) 93 4 6 0 7
Total 2006 100.0 100.0
Source: field-data
Table 1.2
Population and landownership by jati, Gopinathpur 1993
Jati N
Population
%
Landownership 
(in percent)
Bamun 15 1.4 4.7
Kayastha 96 8.6 8.5
Aguri 214 19.2 29.1
Napit 165 14.8 23.1
Bagdi (SC) 371 33.4 28.9
Dule (SC) 85 7.7 2.8
Muchi (SC) 165 14.8
Total 1111 100.2 100.0
Source: field-data
Gopinathpur, bordering on Udaynala in the west, is all-Hindu, and quite evenly 
divided between the lower castes (Scheduled Caste) and the clean and high castes
5The different jatis have been place in an approximate socio-ritual ranking. 
Though Muslims and Hindus do not rank on the same ritual scale, Muslim jatis tend 
to be ranked socially as comparable Hindu jatis would.
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(table 1.2). The aguri jati forms the village’s dominant caste, numerically large and 
both economically an ^ politically dominant. Of other clean or high castes, we find 
a few bamun families, and a fairly large number of kayasthas. These two jatis have 
contributed a large number of important village leaders and landlords, and could well 
be counted among the "dominant castes" of Gopinathpur. Among the lower castes, 
we find bagdis and muchis plus the duter a jati closely related to the bagdis.6 The 
bagdis rival the aguris in terms of numbers. The "home" paras of these two 
communities border on each other and constitute the centre and the bulk of the 
physical village. The muchis contribute a larger proportion of the total village 
population than their Udaynala counterparts but here live in a small para to the south 
of the village. Also situated away from the main village are the napits (Barbers), who 
live along the road, towards Udaynala.
This road, a mud-road (although "mud" does not fully convey its condition during the 
rainy season), runs from P. in the east, passes through first Udaynala and next 
Gopinathpur, and ends in S-bazar in the west. Both P. and S-bazar are well connected 
with frequent buses. Buses have operated on these two roads since the 1950s and 
have become the main means of transportation for villagers. Two kilometres to the 
north of these villages, a little used narrow-gauge railway runs from Bankura in the 
west, only to end up in the middle of a field some kilometres north-east of Udaynala.7
6Satadal Dasgupta 1986.
7The line’s official name, Bankura Damodar River Railway, is abbreviated to BDR 
and hence the local name boro duhkho rel ("The railway of great sorrow") since it 
runs very infrequently and is of minimal commercial interest.
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Of even less use than this railway is the canal that runs between the railway and the 
villages. It was dug in the early 1960s as part of the Damodar Valley Corporation 
(DVC) development to provide irrigation for the adjoining areas, but it turned out that 
the plans were grander than the water supply, and so this canal has been dry for the 
last 20 years. Instead, fields are irrigated by rainwater for the main aman-crop (late 
summer, autumn), and increasingly by mini deep-tubewells and various other diesel 
or electricity-run pumps for the smaller but crucial boro-crop (winter). This crop was 
nearly non-existent until some 20 years back, when a few individuals first invested in 
pumping equipment. In the 1980s and 1990s, mainly with the help of subsidized 
government loans to village cooperative societies, the number of mini deep-tubewells 
has increased fantastically (and the water-level sunk comparatively), so that for the 
boro-season of 1994-5 (when I last visited these villages), Udaynala planned to pump- 
irrigate about one half of its total acreage, while Gopinathpur planned for about one 
third. For the period under study, this is the single most important economic change.
The main crop for both the aman and the boro-seasons is paddy, although we find 
neighbouring areas also thriving on crops such as potato and sunflowers (for cooking 
oil) for the commercialized and intensive boro-season. But paddy remains the main 
crop for the region, and the Dakshin Damodar has a very large number of both 
private, government and co-operative rice mills, all in all 15, mostly located around 
S-bazar and another village somewhat closer to Burdwan Town.
Burdwan Town, just across the wide Damodar river, is the commercial and political 
centre of the district, and the town to which people of Udaynala and Gopinathpur turn
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for what they cannot get locally, in particular medical expertise and university 
education. In the main, however, daily needs are satisfied in the immediate vicinity. 
Both villages have primary schools, a number of doctors, Gopinathpur has a "health 
centre" with a resident health worker, and both villages have several small shops 
selling a wide range of items for daily consumption (cooking oil, chilies, biris or 
country cigarettes, cheap plastic toys, soap, etc.) — occasionally even for barter. For 
the not-so-everyday items or services, villagers turn to P., which has a twice-weekly 
market, or S-bazar, which has a permanent market. There are higher secondary 
schools both in P. and S-bazar; in S-bazar even a small college. To the north of P., 
easily accessible on bicycle from Udaynala and Gopinathpur, is another larger college. 
Close to this college are the new buildings of a full-fledged "country hospital", a 
hospital that, however, has not opened due to lack of funds.
This description, which has sought to situate these two villages in their landscape, 
gives an impression of a placid, unremarkable, sleepy village society. And in many 
ways it is, but it is also an area of broad support for a communist (marxist) party. 
The Panchayat Samiti8 under which Udaynala and Gopinathpur fall has not seen 
elected one non-CPM panchayat member since 1978. But the story starts much 
further back...
8The "panchayat system" of elected bodies of local government has in West 
Bengal three "tiers": Gram Panchayat (or village council, covering some 10-15 
villages), Panchayat Samiti (covering some 8-12 Gram Panchayats), and the Jela (or 
district) Parishad.
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A short sketch of state political history
As I have argued elsewhere, the turning of the tide of communist support in rural 
Burdwan came during the United Front (UF) period (1967-1972)9 — as can be seen 
from table 1.3. The table gives election results from the overwhelmingly agricultural 
"Central and Eastern Burdwan" (subdivisions Sadar, Kalna and Katwa).10 Table 1.4 
reports figures of "mobilized vote", i.e. the percentage of all those with a right to vote 
("electors") actually mobilized into voting by the various parties ("voters").11 It was 
during the UF period that the vote for the CPM increased substantially. The increase 
followed an increase in voter turn-out, a near doubling of the "mobilized vote" from 
1967 to 1971.
9Ruud 1994a.
10Substantial industries are located in the western regions of the district.
“For the concept of "mobilized vote", see Vanderbok 1990.
Table 1.3
Percentage of votes polled by major political parties and "Independents" in 
Central and Eastern Burdwan, 1952-1982
Political
party 1952 1957 1962 1967 1969 W n  1972 1977 1982
Congress 43.0 48.7 48.2 46.5 30.3 26.6 68.6 22.7 39.3
Janata Dal 16.4
Bangla Congress 3.9 9.2
CPI 11.3 21.7 31.1 2.7 4.3 2.2 2.7
CPM (since 1964) 34.7 42.4 52.6 26.2 51.7 51.9
Forward Bloc 3.1 4.8 4.2 2.0 - - 8.2 3.4
Socialists* 11.3 8.0 4.5 6.3
Independents 20.1 14.2 9.4 7.9 4.4 - 2.5 - 4.7
For asterisk and sources, see table 1.4
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Table 1.4
"Mobilized vote" for major political parties and "Independents" in Central and 
Eastern Burdwan, 1952-1982
Political
party 1952 1957 1962 1967 1969 1971 1972 1977 1982
Congress 17.7 23.0 24.0 28.1 25.4 19.6 44.3 13.0 30.6
Janata Dal 9.4 -
Bangla Congress - 2.5 6.8
CPI 4.6 10.2 15.5 1.6 2.8 1.6 1.7 -
CPM (since 1964) 20.9 27.4 38.8 17.0 29.6 40.4
Forward Bloc 1.3 2.3 2.1 1.2 4.7 2.7
Socialists* 4.6 3.8 2.2 3.8 -
Independents 8.3 6.7 4.7 4.8 2.2 - 1.6 - 3.6
Voters 41.1 47.2 49.8 60.4 64.6 73.7 64.6 57.2 77.9
* Figures for "Socialists" combine the results for the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party 
(KMPP), the Praja Socialist Party (PSP), the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), and the 
Socialist Party.
Results of less than one per cent are indicated by a dash.
Compiled and calculated from Baxter 1969, Field and Franda 1974, and Singh and 
Bose 1987.
Table 1.5
Percentage of votes polled: Raina constituency, 1952-1982
Political
party 1952 1957 1962 1967 1969 1971. 1972 1977 1982
Congress 40.5 45.8 66.0 36.0 37.4 36.6 56.4 22.3 32.7
KMPP/PSP* 41.6 54.3 30.5 37.9 1.7
CPM 23.4 52.2 60.3 43.6 63.4 65.4
Other** 18.0 3.5 2.7 8.7 3.2 14.3 1.9
For asterisks and sources, see table 1.6
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Table 1.6
Percentage of mobilized vote; Raina constituency, 1952-1982
Political
oartv 1952 1957 1962 1967 1969 1971 1972 1977 1982
Congress 14.6 23.6 37.5 20.5 24.6 23.5 35.9 12.9 26.2
KMPP/PSP* 15.0 28.0 17.3 21.6 1.1
CPM 13.3 34.3 38.8 27.7 36.7 52.3
Other** 6.5 2.0 1.5 5.7 2.1 8.3 1.5
Voters 36.0 51.6 56.8 57.0 65.7 64.3 63.6 57.9 80.0
* The Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP) merged in 1952 with the Socialist Party 
to form the Praja Socialist Party (PSP).
** "Other" includes independent candidates plus the Jana Sangh and Bolshevik Party 
(both ran in 1952), the Indian National Democratic Front (1969), the Congress (O) 
(1971), and the Janata Dal (1977 and 1982).
Compiled and calculated from Singh and Bose 1987
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 give the comparable figures for Raina constituency (which 
comprises Udaynala and Gopinathpur). It may appear that in Raina the CPM did not 
achieve much in terms of mobilization during the UF years, and that its increase from 
1967 to 1969 merely reflected the demise of the Praja Socialist Party (PSP), the old 
party of the opposition. However, the increase in mobilized vote for the Congress 
probably came mainly from ex-PSP voters, following the lead of the main PSP figure 
at the time, Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) for Raina since 1952, 
Dasarathi Tah. A number of ex-PSP voters also voted for the INDF, a party of 
dissatisfied ex-PSP organizers. There is reason to believe that most of the increase 
in mobilized vote went in the direction of the CPM, as it did in most of Burdwan.
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The first impetus towards this radically changed political situation in West Bengal 
seems, at first glance anyway, to have taken place in Calcutta. After a split in the 
Congress in 1966, the Congress lost its majority in the state Legislative Assembly in 
the 1967 election, and the two opposition fronts merged to form the United Front 
(including the Congress splinter group and both communist parties) and the state’s 
first non-Congress Government. That Government was ousted later the same year, the 
Front ran for re-election, won, and again formed Government in 1969. It was again 
ousted in 1970, and broke down before the 1971 elections. The CPM emerged as the 
single largest party in the Assembly from the 1971 elections but was denied 
Government positions by a combination of former allies and foes. A little later the 
same year, repression started to be unleashed on communists, and police and para­
military troops were stationed in rural localities and reversed many land occupations. 
The 1972 elections were rigged in favour of the Congress in many constituencies, 
including some in Burdwan.12
Few have directly addressed the rural mobilization of this period; it has mostly been 
mentioned in passing or analyzed from a set of assumptions about peasant behaviour. 
During the period itself, according to one line of analysis, inner squabbles in the UF 
and struggles over positions made the various constituents to the Front use their 
Government posts and whatever other means at their disposal to strengthen and widen
12Field and Franda 1974:19.
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strongholds.13 Another line argues that the period opened politicians’ eyes to the 
possibilities available from rural mobilization.
The "call" for mobilization, and the middle-class leadership
Bhabani Sen Gupta, a prominent student of Indian communism, points to economic 
developments at work throughout the 20th century — "growing agrarian unrest" and 
a "disintegration of the peasantry"14 — in seeking to understand communist peasant 
mobilization in West Bengal. However, what specifically made peasant mobilization 
possible was "a new tactical thinking" on the part of communist parties, after having 
"discovered — to the surprise of their own leaders" that rural support bases tended to 
be more stable than urban ones.15
Much along the same lines, Marcus Franda asserts that by the time of the UF period, 
the CPM "showed a new flexibility" which allowed for different strategies in localities 
with different socio-economic structures.16 In some they focused on agricultural 
labourers, in others on a collaboration between landless and middle-class peasants 
against landlords. In an extremely detailed study, but not directly concerned with 
peasant mobilization, Nossiter points to the West Bengal CPI unit’s history of internal
13Franda 1971a: Chapter 7, S. Chakrabarty 1978:304-46. This line of argument 
formed the tenor of newspaper reports and analysis during the UF period, plus some 
books; see for instance Sajal Basu 1974, Anjali Ghosh 1981, or Sankar Ghosh 1971.
14B. Sen Gupta 1979:56 and 151.
15B. Sen Gupta 1979:53.
16Franda 1971a:184.
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"cohesion and purpose" from the 1950s onwards.17 Also important, according to 
Nossiter, was the decline of the same within the Congress, and an increased internal 
factionalism.
One crucial point seems to have been the pressure from the Naxalites, a break-away 
group of China-supported CPM activists mobilizing rural proletariat in north Bengal, 
which proved very attractive to younger CPM activists all over the state and caused 
self-doubts among important wings of the party.18 This point is raised by Atul Kohli, 
who also points to several important contributing factors internal to the party itself: 
the CPM’s ideological reorientation, partly under pressure from the leftist wings of its 
own organization inspired by the Naxalites; its well-knit cadre-based organization, 
with dedicated village youth turned students and teachers; and lastly economic unrest 
and divisions. With this ideological turn towards the rural masses and the 1969 call 
for occupation of illegally held land, forces were "let loose ... that the CPM itself 
could not control".19 Moreover, he finds that economic inequalities and "massive 
poverty" had caused a deep cleavage in rural society — a "hostility of the lower 
classes to their superiors".20 Absentee landlordism had caused a lack of landlord 
political control over the village population, and, subsequently, once the party turned 
its attention to the countryside and called for mobilization of the landless, reactionary 
forces did not have sufficient local clout to suppress the upsurge. However, Kohli
17Nossiter 1988:129.
18Franda 1971a, Ch. 3, and Ruud 1994a.
I9Kohli 1987:101.
20Kohli 1990:377.
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points out, the party depended to a large extent on middle-class peasants for the 
mobilization.
And this middle-class character of both cadre and local activists is another interesting 
feature of the CPM’s support in rural West Bengal. It is generally agreed that the 
background of political radicalism in West Bengal can be traced to the historical 
development of the so-called bhadralok ("gentlefolk”), the archetypical Bengali class 
(or status group) of educated urbanites, professionals or government employees.21 
It is to Marcus Franda that we owe the exploration of the cultural linkage between 
Bengali radicalism/communism and the bhadralok. However, his insistence on a 
politically "frustrated bhadralok" turning communist in the pre-Independence period 
has been rightfully criticized by Gordon: "In fact, most of the bhadralok were pillars 
of the establishment...".22
One reason why Harekrishna Konar, CPM leader and twice minister, labelled Burdwan 
a "model" district during the UF mobilization was, according to Sen Gupta, that the 
party had "succeeded in enlisting the support of the middle peasants against the 
jotedars (big landowners)".23 In an interview with me on the same topic, Benoy
21Franda 1971a, Kohli 1990, Nossiter 1988, B. Sen Gupta 1972. Partha Chatteijee 
(1993, Ch. 3) rightfully questions the meaningfulness of the term in a colonial 
situation.
22Gordon 1972.
23B. Sen Gupta 1979:55. Konar was the most prominent CPM leader on the rural 
front. Apart from his positions within the party, he was also Secretary of the All- 
India Kisan Sabha (AIKS, autonomous peasant organization, affiliated to the CPM) 
and minister for Land and Land Revenue in both United Front Governments (1967 and 
1969-70).
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Chowdhuri, LFG Land and Land Reform Minister, commented on the middle peasant 
leadership of the UF mobilization.
These middle peasants, they are educated, they are vocal, so they would 
sometimes lead, due to certain traditions. They enjoyed more clout with the 
local people who were mostly illiterate.24
The CPM-led LFG has been in power in West Bengal since 1977, which, at the time 
of writing, makes for 18 years of continuous rule. It is argued that the party was still 
manned and controlled mainlyljlie people of high ritual and social rank, and has in 
effect only transferred power from the very rich to the middle classes. "The CPM is 
dominated by the lower-middle income rural groups and is not really a party of the 
poor", although the poor support the party and benefit from Government policies.25
Although such observations are no doubt accurate, there is nonetheless a lack of 
appreciation of their implications and many questions are left unanswered. What does 
it tell us about how politics functions at the local level when the poor accept, or co­
opt, middle class leadership? And if middle-class leadership is a fact, were middle 
class rather than poor interests behind the UF period mobilization? So what groups 
did respond to the CPM’s "call" in the late 1960s? Were the poor only waiting for 
the CPM to call them in order to discover their real interest? And what happens to
^Interview, Calcutta, January 1989. During the UF period Benoy Chowdhuri was 
Secretary of the CPM in Burdwan and leader of the West Bengal branch of the AIKS, 
the Krishak Samiti.
25Kohli 1990:380, see also his 1983 article. More explicit critique is found in 
Mallick 1990 and 1992.
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the legitimacy of middle class political leadership when it becomes, at least to an 
extent, a mouthpiece for unarticulated interests of the poor? Do themes such as 
"middle-class leadership" and "co-option" explain the CPM’s entrenchment in rural 
West Bengal? The particularities of Bengal’s history gave rise to a radical elite, as 
pointed out, but this does not explain how that urban, educated and high-status elite 
connected to the rural masses. To assume that it comes naturally once the educated 
communist worker visits a village would be to overrate his ability of persuasion. I 
will not try here to deny the relevance of any of the points raised by the scholars 
mentioned, but instead fill out the picture by looking backwards, into the immediate 
and not so immediate past of village society. I shall point to how a heterogenous 
cultural environment specific to Bengal formed its history in interaction with political 
events and ideological currents, constantly changing and interpreted through the 
process of village politics.
Village politics in the literature
Though dated (from the 1950s and 1960s) village politics studies still contain much 
interesting material, often detailed and lucidly observed.26 The most prominent of 
concepts developed here, from the observation that Indian villages are often 
economically and politically dominated by members of one caste, is "dominant caste", 
which Srinivas described thus:
26Village politics studies have unfortunately been out of fashion since the early 
1980s. Fuller and Spencer 1990.
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A caste may be said to be ’dominant’ when it preponderates numerically over 
the other castes, and when it also wields preponderant economic and political 
power. A large and powerful caste group can more easily be dominant if its 
position in the local caste hierarchy is not too low.27
The concept has been widely used, also for understanding change. It is generally 
accepted that many castes transformed socio-economic clout and relatively high ritual 
position into political dominance over other castes, from where they could take 
advantage of new opportunities more easily.28 However, the concept has also been 
criticized for being ambiguous,29 and for ignoring the fact that several castes may be 
competing for dominance or sharing in dominance.30
A very fundamental problem with the concept is that it is not the caste which is 
dominant, but a limited number of individuals who hail from that caste. In Mayer’s 
words, "The whole caste group in a village participates in the dominant position, but 
all aspects of this position are made manifest in a few men only".31 More critically, 
the notion of a dominant caste cannot be retained, according to Dube, unless one
27Srinivas 1987:4. The point about numerical preponderance was later abandoned 
by Srinivas himself (1987, "Introduction"). See also Dumont 1980:161-2.
28Frankel ("Introduction" in Frankel and Rao 1993) argues that at least some 
"dominant castes" were able to translate their local dominance into control over the 
(local) state. Beteille (1965) holds that new institutions such as general suffrage, 
education, and political parties have broken the monopoly of power.
29Oommen (1970) points out that Srinivas has no less than seven elements of 
"dominance": numbers, economic status, political power, ritual status, non-traditional 
education, modern education, physical force. Some of these follow from others, but 
none have given relative significance.
30Mayer 1960 and Miller 1975.
31Mayer 1958:425.
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assumes the unity of that caste,32 and, pace Oommen, it is "a matter of common 
knowledge [that] there exists a high degree of factionalism in Indian villages...".33 
According to Mayer again, where one caste is dominant the principal political 
cleavages tend to be vertical, not between castes but within the dominant caste. From 
Rampur, Lewis reported that "...the community in the sense of a cohesive and united 
village community ... hardly exists".34 The "dominant caste" is the first victim of 
factionalism. Faction leaders most often belong to the same caste, and members of 
that caste pay allegiance to either one of them, as do also members of other castes.
Does this critique mean that we must discard the concept of dominant caste? 
Probably not. Such castes can be readily observed in most villages, sometimes more 
sometimes less dominant, but invariably with a sense of pride in their traditions and 
position, often, as Mayer in particular has observed, following a particular codex 
deemed appropriate to their historical position.35 This pride is shared by the whole 
caste, not only the powerful few individuals, and is an element in what perpetuates 
their dominance. Below I turn to cultural constructs supporting both dominant castes 
and village leaders. However, it may be better to start at a lower level, that of 
factions or patron-client relationships.
32Dube 1968.
33Oommen 1970:76-7.
34Lewis, quoted in Pocock 1957:297.
35Mayer 1960, Ch. 6.
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The "dominant caste" concept does not deny the relevance of faction and patron-client 
relationships in everyday village politics. Carter, from a region-wide study, found it 
"better to separate caste from dominance and to speak of dominant groups as 
comprising a political class".36 Politicians engage in shifting ("horizontal") alliances 
and alliance-building within their own (political) class while retaining fairly lasting 
("vertical") alliances with clients in villages.37 Such alliances, or patron-client 
relationships, form factions.
The term faction to describe Indian village life was first used by Lewis, who wrote 
that factions were not primarily political or built around patron-client relationships, but 
basically apolitical kin or neighbour groups.38 This understanding of faction is very 
different from the politicized cross-caste patron-client relationships found by later 
scholars, including Carter.39 To Carter the linkage between politicians and villagers 
(the "vertical alliances") were primarily based on "ties of economic dependence"40 
and "the distribution of patronage".41
36Carter 1974:50.
37Carter 1974:7.
38Lewis 1958:503.
39There are two sorts of groups in a faction, says Alavi (1971): the core and the 
rest, where the core consists of family and immediate retainers. This is a point to be 
taken up later.
40Carter 1974:8.
41Carter 1974:163.
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The distribution of patronage creates supporters, groups of whom (factions) are 
generally thought to maintain political dominance whether in a village or a region.42 
In Carter’s opinion, patronage created relatively stable relationships, a view not shared 
by most scholars. Pocock saw exchanges of support as creating only circumstantial 
and shifting alliances, occasionally appearing to be more permanent, but ultimately 
"determined by the precise circumstances of their occurrence".43 This interest- 
oriented ("transactional") understanding comes out even more strongly in Marvin 
Davis’s study of a Bengali village, where membership in a faction "depends on a 
return for support given [...] Simply, individuals can switch their loyalties and support 
at will".44
In this analysis factions are different from relationships such as family or caste, which 
are based on "natural or moral ties". In the case of the faction there is only the 
bargain.45 This view of the faction is supported by Hardiman, who argues that in 
villages a faction is a collection of patron-client relationships, where the clients are 
demanded to support the patron politically in order to receive patronage, or just 
employment. Factions are instances of circumstantial "class collaboration", based on 
economic ties "or perhaps because of ties of caste and kinship which require ’brothers’ 
to stick together".46
42For "factionalist" perspectives on state politics, see Brass 1965 and Franda 1970.
43Pocock 1957:295.
44Davis 1983:163.
45Davis 1983:163.
46Hardiman 1982:231.
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Feudal magnanimity and legitimacy
However, the picture may not be that simple. From Breman’s study of servitude and 
agrarian relations in Gujarat, although the relationship was ultimately one of "unfree 
labor", it had, nonetheless, at some point in time, been "complicated and mitigated by 
a relationship of patronage".47 As Harriss notes from Tamil Nadu, patronage 
continued to be forthcoming because it enhanced the status of the patrons in local 
society, even after such relationships had largely become economically unnecessary 48 
Paternalist structures were upheld, and this diffused class antagonism, prevented 
eviction of the poor from their lands, and reinforced the notion of the village 
community.
Moreover, an observation made by the late Abdul Rasul on the failure of a 
sharecroppers’ movement in certain areas belies the notion of agrarian relations as 
purely economistic.
...there was some sort of social relation and sentimental attachment between 
exploiter and exploited. Some feudal generosity or magnanimity could be 
found in the exploiting class. In Burdwan, for example, the landlord and 
tenant trusted one another and shares would be distributed and little else 
taken.49
47Breman 1974:21.
48Harriss 1982.
49Cited in Cooper 1984:200. Abdul Rasul was a prominent CPI/CPM leader and 
peasant organizer, and author of several books on the peasant movement and 
organizations in India (see Rasul 1974). He was a leading activist in the tebhaga- 
movement (1946-47) — to which he referred in the quotation — a sharecroppers’ 
revolt for an increase in their share of the crop.
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Mayer and Cohn pointed to cultural underpinnings by showing that locally "dominant 
castes", in their villages, filled a role akin to the king, and replicated a "kingly" life­
style. From Senapur village in Uttar Pradesh, Cohn comments that "The Rajputs, their 
way of life, values, and power were dominant in the little kingdom. Everyone else 
was subservient to them...".50 And according to Mayer, the Rajputs of Ramkheri 
regarded short temper, martial arts, and dominance as constitutive elements in the 
kingly model on which they moulded themselves.51 Dumont comments that there 
seems to be "a homology between the function of dominance at village level and the 
royal function at the level of the large territory: the dominant caste reproduces the 
royal function at the village level",52 a homology he sums up in neat points: 
1. relatively eminent right over land, and thus; 2. power to employ, build up clientele;
3. power of justice (also within other castes or among these) and to extract penalties;
4. monopoly of authority; and 5. occasionally the locally dominant caste is also a 
royal caste or allied to or similar to a royal caste.
In addition, dominance is legitimized by the special relationship to village priests — 
exemplified in "royal" patterns of ritual and gifting which many see as possibly more 
important than the caste system in regulating village inter-caste relations.53 Here, the 
ideological point of reference is the king whose duty (dharma, or rajadharma, the
50Cohn 1990:92 ("Some notes on law and change in North India") and Mayer 
1958.
51Mayer 1958.
52Dumont i980:162.
53Raheja 1988a and 1988b.
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king’s duty) is to protect the kingdom from evil. Other castes — the service castes 
— assist him in the project by supplying products and services and by removing 
pollutants.54 In Raheja’s words, "the dominant landholding caste stands at the centre 
of a complex ritual organization that permeates nearly every aspect of the everyday 
life of the village".55
The reproduction of the king by dominant castes has a North Indian avatar in the so- 
called jajmani system. This concept should not be taken as an economic "system" but 
represents cultural constructs on mutuality and reciprocity between unequal 
partners,56 exemplified in the notions surrounding the role of the king and in the 
hierarchical relation of village landowners and the landless. The construct can be seen 
to inform (and be informed by) all structurally similar relationships, such as 
provider/receiver, king/subject, and even father/child or god/devotee relationships. As 
a father is responsible for his family, so a cultivator is responsible for his dependents 
and the king for his subjects. From a small town in West Bengal, Ostor remarks that 
"We may parallel the relation between king and subject to merchant and supplier, 
deity and worshipper".57
54Gould 1958, Pocock 1962.
55Raheja 1988a:517.
56The jajmani system was thought of as a money-free system of exchange of 
services and kinds for the (basically ritual) upholding of the entire village society -  
to have existed in "traditional India" (see for example Kolenda 1978:46ff, Dumont
1980, Ch. 4). Referring to recent historical research, Fuller (1989:57) concludes that 
the notion of a money-free economic system "is predicated upon a combination of 
historical inaccuracy and the ahistorical premise of unchanging, ’traditional’ India".
57Ostor 1984:179.
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Furthermore, Ostor and Greenough suggest, both king and cultivator-employer are 
subordinate to "a dharmic and karmic restraint on superiority and power — against 
exploitation, for cooperation".58 This construct obliges them to provide for their 
subjects. "The essence of this code [writes Greenough] was that the king protect and 
nourish his tenant-subjects. [...] Like a master of a household, the king was also a 
’destined provider of subsistence’... He was expected to give rice to the needy and 
to make grants of paddy-land to his subjects".59 The king’s role model is thus also 
a fatherly role, and everyone in a position of superiority shares in a superior mediating 
power in their respective domains which obliges them to protect, feed and even 
indulge their subordinates. I shall return later to the element of the inferior’s clout in 
such a scheme. The point here has been to underscore that cultivators (or dominant 
castes) as kings were at a focal point of an ideology regulating intra-village relations. 
This construct of mutual if unequal hierarchical relationships between providers and 
receivers was an important ideology for regulating relationships between high-caste, 
dominant leaders and powerless, low-caste followers.
Contested ideology
This looks peculiarly like what Gramsci termed "hegemonic ideology" (although 
nowhere entirely clearly stated), a dominant conception, established as "historically
58Ostor 1984:180.
59Greenough 1982:19.
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true" and appearing as "universal".60 Its main feature is to maintain the existing 
social and power relations of a society. It is this view of hegemony’s all-pervasive 
nature, internalized in "normal times", that Scott challenges in a study of a Malaysian 
village society whose paternalist ideology was not too different from India’s. Scott 
instead sees culture as "an arena for contest". Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, he 
writes, "...ignores the extent to which most subordinate classes are able, on the basis 
of their daily material experience, to penetrate and demystify the prevailing 
ideology".61 He found that "everyday forms of peasant resistance" take the form of 
"foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance" plus social and symbolic 
"backbiting, gossip, character assassination, rude nicknames, gestures, and silences of 
contempt".62 Subordinates, says Scott, are "[not] mystified about their situation",63 
but realize their dependence. Although they find the existing social relations amoral 
they also realize their own limited power to correct these. Discussing how norms and 
ideologies can be manipulated by the weaker sections of a village community, Scott 
writes that
...the key symbols animating class relations [...] — generosity, stinginess, 
arrogance, humility, help, assistance, wealth and poverty — do not constitute 
a set of given rules or principles that actors simply follow. They are instead
“ Gramsci 1971:348. Komter comments on hegemonic ideology, "Thus [in 
Gramsci’s view] social interests of dominant groups are presented as those of general 
interest, which can be freely accepted by the dominated group." A. Komter De macht 
van de vanzelfsprekendheid 1985, quoted in Risseeuw 1988:165. For a recent 
discussion of Gramsci, see Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, Introduction.
6IScott 1985:317.
62Scott 1985: xvi-xvii.
63Scott 1985:304.
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the normative raw material that is created, maintained, changed, and above all 
manipulated by daily human activity.64
This normative raw material constitutes the means the poor use to secure at least some 
concessions. These means exist within the same context in which dependence is 
worked out: a given, normative environment. Every such normative environment 
postulates degrees of paternalism to legitimize inequalities — as Gramsci pointed out 
—  and so gives rise to divergent interpretations over the correct, the good, the morally 
justified. Thus Scott sees ideology as dominant, prevailing, rather than hegemonic: 
not the exclusive realm of one class but the ideology "euphemizing" and legitimizing 
social inequalities.65
The Subaltern Studies: from "autonomy" to "rajadharma"
Partly inspired by Scott, a new Indian historiographic school emerged in the Subaltern 
Studies group.66 This school sought a reinterpretation of Indian history through the 
study of peasant rebellions and the "subaltern", the non-elite.67 A major concern has
“ Scott 1985:309.
65Scott 1985:307.
66The "school" is represented in particular by the Subaltern Studies series but also 
by a good body of excellent monographs. Guha (ed) 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1987, 
1989 and Chatterjee and Pandey (eds) 1992. Primary among the monographs are 
Guha 1983, Chakrabarty 1989, Sarkar 1989b, Pandey 1985 and 1990, Hardiman 1981.
67A disputed concept, variously understood as "tribals", "peasants", "low castes", 
"women", "the colonized", and urban labourers. For subaltemist and opposing 
interpretations of who the "subaltern" is, see Guha 1982, Guha 1983:92-3, Sen 1987, 
Mukherjee 1988, Chakrabarty 1985, Social Scientist 1984, Spivak 1985.
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been with "subaltern autonomy" vis-a-vis the elites, the non-elite’s ability to perceive 
a separate world-view in relation or opposition to power, the elite and the hegemonic 
ideological constructs. Ranajit Guha, a major force behind the Subaltern Studies 
initiative, saw the subalterns as independent from elite leadership, secure in a separate, 
independent ideology. Although this ideology related to power, subaltern action (as 
a "political domain") nonetheless constituted "...an autonomous domain, for it neither 
originated from elite politics nor did its existence depend on the latter".68 This 
"’bravado’ attempt", writes Mridula Mukherjee, ignores the studies of several 
subalternists. These show the subaltern classes incapable of throwing up leadership 
from among themselves, relying instead on outsiders or elites.69 This points to what 
Rosalind O’Hanlon identifies as a main problem with the Subaltern Studies. The 
"autonomy" concern has by many contributors been taken too far and understood as 
a wholly separate field of knowledge, unrelated to power and to the hegemonic 
constructs the subaltern revolt against.70
One aspect that Mukherjee ignores is that though leaders of those rebellions were 
outsiders, their control over the rebellions was limited. Shahid Amin, for instance, 
shows that though images of "Gandhiji" were at the forefront of Gorakhpuri peasant 
perceptions of the ongoing (Non-cooperation) struggle, these images were not 
controlled by the Congress (though partly exploited).71 "Unauthorized" perceptions
68Guha 1982:4. Emphasis in original.
69Mukherjee 1988:2115, she refers to Henningham 1983.
70O’Hanlon 1988.
71 Amin 1984.
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of Gandhi and of the aim of the struggle led to the Chauri Chaura massacre, which 
prompted Gandhi to call off the whole campaign.
In a turn away from the autonomous peasant, other Subalternists have focused on the 
issue of elite dominance of the subaltern, on the hegemonic constructs of some 
duration. Dipesh Chakrabarty, for instance, is very explicit in understanding 
"subaltern autonomy" as an analytical category, as "only ’relative’".
It is only by giving this ’consciousness’ a central place in historical analysis 
that we see the subaltern as the maker of the history s/he lives out. However, 
this does not mean that we place this consciousness outside history...72
He understands "subaltemity" as "the composite culture of resistance to and 
acceptance of dominance and hierarchy",73 as visualized in his own study of the 
Calcutta jute-mill workers* relations with superiors and trade unionists. Even as an 
emerging industrial proletariat the jute-mill workers’ attitudes and expectations to 
superiors were moulded by the village culture whence they came: a culture of 
inequality, violence, ideologies of superiority and dominance, where only superiors 
could represent one’s cause.74 Pre-capitalist community notions remained powerful 
and explain the erratic and arbitrary degree of organization among those workers.75
72Chakrabarty 1985:374.
73Chakrabarty 1985:376.
74Chakrabarty 1989:141.
75Chakrabarty 1989:219.
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Following Chakrabarty, we may say that the subalterns are immersed in a culture 
which is shared by (indigenous) elite and subaltern alike. Subaltern action, 
perceptions, and consciousness are formed within a given (although not finite) culture. 
It is only within that culture that subaltern autonomy becomes an issue. Peasant 
autonomy is limited by, but also given form and expression by "hierarchy" and its 
notions of "fairness", protection and interdependence. The subordination of the 
subaltern to dominance is not necessarily complete or servile, but may contain 
elements of assertion, a cognition of social and cultural inequalities that entail 
(paternalist) demands on the superior. Sumit Sarkar has called this "assertion-within- 
deference".76 Gautam Bhadra elaborates much the same idea.
Submissiveness to authority in one context is as frequent as defiance in 
another. It is these two elements that together constitute the subaltern 
mentality. [...] First, the idioms of domination, subordination and revolt, I 
believe, are often inextricably linked together; we separate them here only to 
facilitate analysis. If this is true, it follows that subordination or domination 
is seldom complete, if ever.77
In Bhadra* s study, the concept of rajdharma — the duty of kings — constitutes a key 
(remark the completion of a circle from Greenough and Ostor who use the same 
concept). Within an ideal of dominance and subordination, notions of the just or the 
fair gave the subalterns room for consciousness and leverage for protest. "The worker 
reacts when he sees himself being deprived of something that he thinks is justly
76Sarkar 1989a:6.
77Bhadra 1989:54.
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his”.78 However, "The worker’s idea of fairness was related to his idea of what was 
customary (or riwaz)"19 But this was again a very fluid category, far from 
historically fixed. "’Custom’, ’tradition’, and ’legitimacy’ were [...] open to 
interpretation."80 This understanding left the subaltern a large space for protest and 
assertion within an acceptance of domination. The pattern of dominance was not 
challenged, but the relative weight of categories and interests could be.
The manipulation of elements of paternalism by the subordinates is very interesting. 
It is not the existing cultural categories — dominance, subordination — that are 
challenged, but perceived non-conformity to ideals. Since ideals by necessity are 
vague, they are open to manipulation. This may resemble Scott’s "everyday forms of 
resistance", but unlike Scott the subalternists (at least some contributors) do not regard 
culture itself as "an arena for contest". Rather, the contest takes place within culture. 
Expectations, demands, obligations, complaints, all are culturally constituted and 
formed. It is in this manner that subordination can be understood, as a real-life 
experience nonetheless mediated in culture, persuasive but manipulable. Cultural 
categories are contested, even challenged, but never escaped. Not all deference 
implies assertion, but all submission contributes towards creating authority, and so 
there is leverage if manipulated with care.
78Chakrabarty 1989:178.
79Chakrabarty 1989:179.
80Chakrabarty 1989:180.
Polyvalent sign systems: the multi-voiced
The society under study underwent over the last three to four decades extensive socio­
cultural changes, with a high level of awareness of normative changes. Efforts of 
distancing from the ways of the past were undertaken by some — a number of whom 
had much to lose — and resisted by others. This took place within a pattern of 
unequal but reciprocal interaction of village leaders and followers, the one group 
influencing the other. In particular, the middle-class-led communist movement can 
be seen to have moved away from much of its own middle-classness towards a more 
rustic, earthy style of action familiar to the lower castes. In this context, "assertion 
through submission" makes potentially much sense. The only question is, does it help 
us understand the dynamics of changes in normative systems? Appeals to 
"rajadharma" can only be effective if the norms are kept alive.81
One crucial element is, I believe, that the poor did not represent a unified class 
pressing in one direction. Instead they played different roles in village politics, had 
different relations with village leaders and the nascent communist movement, and can 
be seen pressing in different directions. This pattern represented very different 
normative systems (although not unrelated to one another) that gave rise to different 
courses of action and different perceptions of and options in both village politics and 
the communist movement. These differences related primarily to different castes, for
81As Gayatri Spivak (1985:331) writes, the Subalternists "perceive their task as 
making a theory of consciousness or culture rather than specifically a theory of 
change". Also O’Hanlon (1988:211) criticises the Subalternists for a tendency towards 
assuming timeless significants, "primordial loyalties", and "essences" in representations 
of peasant culture.
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whom life-style, material conditions, myths and history, and role in village politics, 
combined to create different self-images and social restrictions. These self-images and 
norms made the opportunities represented by communist ideology and policy appear 
in very different light to the different castes. To understand this situation we need a 
different set of concepts than the sole notion of a dominant "rajadharma". Recently, 
Jean and John Comaroff have argued that culture cannot be seen as a given whole.
...far from being reducible to a closed system of signs and relations, the 
meaningful world always presents itself as a fluid, often contested, and only 
partially integrated mosaic.82
Although not entirely, some of the world looks permanent and stable. The Comaroffs
discriminate different levels by differentiating analytically the "unconscious" culture
(simply covering the entire sign system) from "ideology", "an articulated system of
meanings, values and beliefs of a kind that can be abstracted as [the] ’worldview* of
any social grouping".83 In the Comaroffs’ view, the regnant ideology will be the one
of the dominant group but "other, subordinate populations, at least those with
communal identities, also have ideologies".84 I will use this understanding of
ideology as a system of more of less clearly articulated norms, systems that do not
lAeoVflgtes
exclude other comparative systems (idelegie&). In between conscious ideology and 
unconscious culture there is "hegemony", which is understood as the quasi-conscious
82Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:27.
83Following in part Raymond Williams’s definition of ideology in Marxism and 
literature 1977. Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:24.
^Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:24.
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realm which supports the existing social system in a broad sense, allowing for 
different ideologies within.
This somewhat standard view is made most original by pointing out that the 
conscious/unconscious opposition is not a dichotomy but two ends of a continuum, "a 
chain of consciousness".85 In between the two opposites lies the most fascinating 
realm, namely
...the realm of partial recognition, of inchoate awareness, of ambiguous 
perception, and, sometimes, of creative tension: that liminal space of human 
experience in which people discern acts and facts but cannot or do not order 
them into narrative descriptions or even articulate conceptions of the world [...] 
It is from this realm, we suggest, that silent signifiers and unmarked practices 
may rise to the level of explicit consciousness, of ideological assertion, and 
become the subject of overt political and social contestation.86
This is a dynamic field, where seeds of alternative interpretations may slowly be bom 
into awareness and where, equally, signs and symbols may recede into the unremarked 
taken-for-granted. Here, the Comaroffs refer the graduation of protest to its practice, 
and to the response of the dominant, which leads in the end to the production of 
consciousness. Consciousness is not a priori but grows out of practice and recognition 
— "with varying degrees of inchoateness and clarity".87 Thus hegemony is never 
entirely dominant. It is made and remade, will seek to dominate conflicting norms 
which it with smaller or larger degrees of success presses away. But there is always
85Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:29.
86Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:29,
87Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:31.
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a field where other (previous) ideologies go when overtaken, where values that do not 
fit the dominant ideology exist, a field of more or less powerful value-systems and 
possibly counter-ideologies.88 It is the field from which resistance may arise because 
no power can command all signs and symbols.
Using this understanding of the "cultural field" as a myriad of signs and norms, 
although not all immediately available for justification of action, we can handle the 
striking and tangible differences in the appropriation of new ideologies and political 
opportunities displayed by groups of villagers, including the differences in response 
to a changing political environment by groups of poor. Recognizing "rajadharma" as 
suggestive of the dominant but complex theme of rank and mutuality in Indian culture 
should not mean ignoring alternative norm systems or the possibility of alternative 
interpretations of any one situation, even if these interpretations do not appear to 
contradict the theme of hierarchy and dominance. Although I have relied much on 
both the village politics studies tradition and the Scott/subaltemist school for 
understanding socio-cultural changes in rural West Bengal, only the aid of an 
advanced conception of culture has made it possible to break through the monolithic 
views of hierarchical cultures to grasp the dynamics of change.
Chapters 2 and 3 will in the main investigate aspects of village politics. Firstly, a 
historical study of village leaders and their respective sources of "power" will be used 
to "deconstruct" the nature of village leadership. Following that, I will use 
contemporary material — the daily workings of village politics that I was able to
88Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:25-6.
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observe — to "reconstruct" village leadership from a consideration of the 
circumstantial and the idiosyncratic.
With this understanding of village politics in mind, the study turns, in Chapter 4, to 
the history of communism in rural West Bengal and to the radicalization of sections 
of the middle-class peasantry. The investigation builds mainly on events from before 
the mobilization of the late 1960s, and will concern itself with reading of practices 
such as road constructions and poetry recitals. Following that I turn to the 
mobilization of poorer sections of society, and in particular to the United Front period. 
The main aim of Chapter 5 is to investigate the meaning of the mobilization to those 
mobilized. I am particularly concerned with the observed differences in appropriation 
of opportunities that the CPM represented by the different castes. This leads to an 
investigation into the nature of caste and its significance for political participation and 
mobilization. That investigation is carried into the 1980s and 1990s in Chapter 6, 
which concerns itself with the different roles different low castes have in the local 
political structure under the LFG.
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TWO 
"POWER" — AS IN "INFLUENCE"
Introduction: "We were all in it together"
"We were all in it together", uttered in public, is a standard answer by village leaders 
to queries about who initiated or led one or the other project. Other villagers will, in 
private, be more explicit: "This road was built by Ehiasaheb", or "Bhasu-kes organized 
the building of this school". But Ehiasaheb and Bhaskar Kes themselves will 
understate their own role and instead emphasize the community or the collectivity, 
"We were all in it together".
In a society as preoccupied with rank and hierarchy as rural India, would a village 
leader not seek to underline his own role and contribution to enhance his status and 
prestige? And why should he even be bothered? Did wealth, political contacts and 
traditional status not yield sufficient clout?' It does not seem so. Village 
ethnographies present the same self-denial of importance. Lewis, for instance, wrote 
from a village in north India that:
A fundamental requisite for leadership in this village is humility, self- 
abnegation, and hospitality, especially within the in-group. [...] Leaders will 
never refer to themselves as such and will make a point of attributing 
leadership qualities to the others who are present.1
xLewis 1958:129.
Leaders publicly present themselves as just one among many, as perhaps not important 
at all. On the subject of decision-making, Dhillon writes that in the "traditional 
panchayat":
The Yajmans [here: leaders] must make decisions in consultation with all 
concerned, and the confidence in them must be constantly reaffirmed by the 
people.2
This looks like some sort of rudimentary democracy. The people "elect" their leaders 
through extending or withdrawing support. Dhillon may have overstated his case, but 
there seems nonetheless to be a substantial degree of "consultation" between leaders 
and the led, also in Bengali villages. But rather than commoners electing leaders by 
extending or withdrawing support, the leaders seem to take great care to accommodate 
themselves to public opinion. This is a typical pattern: the elders first "scan" the 
general mood and only then pronounce a verdict — one in line with the commonly 
held opinion.3 This phenomenon is evident in bichars (village courts).4 Discussions 
may last for hours, with a large number of those present participating, including some
2Dhillon quoted in Mandelbaum 1970a:292.
3Mayer (1960:257) noted that "The most influential men say nothing at first" in 
village meetings. They leave the floor to the less influential.
4A bichar is a particular kind of village meeting in which culprits are sentenced, 
or disputes discussed and solved. In bichars, villagers together deliberate upon or pass 
sentence in a dispute, or on someone who has committed an offence. Samsad 
Bengali-English dictionary gives bichar as "consideration, deliberation; argument; 
discussion; decision; inference; a (judicial) trial; judgment, finding". Bichars and other 
meetings are called on an ad hoc basis every now and then with an attendance varying 
from five to 50-60 or more. They are central arenas for community affairs.
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of the younger ones.5 Only women do not participate, although a number of women 
are almost invariably present in the outskirts of the bichar site and throw in remarks 
and arguments.6 Finally, the responsibility for the decision is laid on all those 
assembled. It is the decision of all assembled, and its implementation is their 
responsibility.7
Both these aspects can be seen from the instance of one bichar I witnessed. A son
<4
had accused his father and step-mother wanting to cheat him of his inheritance, and
A
the decision for an immediate sharing of the land was firmly in the son’s favour. His 
father, "the defendant", protested vehemently and raised the very valid point that, "A 
man’s land is not divided before his death!". This was the recognized tradition and 
was not argued with, but the desire to right the wrong and provide security for the son 
precipitated the demand to see the lands shared immediately. His argument was 
dismissed by senior-most judge Haksaheb: "Right or wrong, this is the samaf s 
[society, community] decision", and everybody agreed. Haksaheb’s phrasing pointed 
to how everyone, ideally, was involved in the verdict and was responsible for it. 
There was no final legitimation in law or tradition, only in the will of those present.
5Risseeuw 1988 contains repeated references to the "young men" who transgress 
the limits of respect and reverence.
^ h e  extent to which their opinion is considered constitutes of course an altogether 
different issue. No doubt women have subtle ways of influencing village affairs, 
although their public participation is severely restricted. Unfortunately, space does not 
permit an elaboration of this issue.
7The importance laid on consensus in Indian village councils is outlined in Bailey 
1968.
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Their decision was based on how they perceived the arguments in view of the 
circumstances.8
The phrasing also points to the reality of village affairs: the limits of the powers of 
village leaders in issues such as this. The decision was a collective one that would 
stand and fall with the unity, will and unanimity of those present. Alone, village 
leader and at the time panchayat member Haksaheb — owner of a mere 22 bighas — 
would not have been able to enforce the verdict. Even assisted by other village 
"elders", verdicts such as this would have been largely ineffectual had there not been 
social pressure to legitimate and enforce it. This will become even more evident in 
a case to be presented in Chapter Three, where Haksaheb and his supporters were 
unsuccessful in ostracizing a woman because most villagers disagreed or saw the 
effort as part of a factional struggle for influence and prestige.
The informal arena of village politics
What I have called "village leader" exists primarily as an analytical entity. Udaynala 
and Gopinathpur do not have institutionalized positions of village headman or leader,9 
nor is there any proper term for "village leader" in the vocabulary of the villagers 
there. The Bengali term morol (derived from mandcil, village headman) was in some
8Cohn (1990:465) points out that in the 18th century Indian perception law was 
circumstantial.
^ o th  villages had families entitled Mandal who according to tradition belonged 
to the lineage of village headmen (hence the title). But these positions no longer 
carried responsibilities nor were they heeded except for a few ritual roles.
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use previously, but is now only used sarcastically. The other common term for 
"leader", neta, refers more to leaders of larger organizations or at least within some 
institutional framework. At present, the statutory powers of the panchayat members 
make people show them respect in public although many are ridiculed in private to 
the extent of disallowing them any extra-official, informal powers or authority. As 
we shall see here panchayat members also spend their time "being around" guarding 
their name and reputation in the same fashion as other would-be village leaders. 
"Village leader" is a position created locally, through mechanisms that are informal.
Bichars such as the above took place within what we may term "the informal arena" 
of village politics (or, more accurate but less elegant, "the non-institutionalized arena" 
of village politics). The administrative apparatus of rural West Bengal is involved in 
such issues only when they cannot be handled satisfactorily by the villagers 
themselves. The local level governmental bodies, the Gram Panchayat or "village 
councils" (a direct translation), normally cover 10-15 villages, and have one or two 
representatives from each village. It goes without saying that these bodies are 
incapable of being involved in the everyday affairs of each and every village. Even 
political parties do not become involved in such issues of contention until they reach 
proportions of wider implications. Firstly, the political organizations do not have the 
capacity to become involved in all such issues in all villages. Secondly, they are 
probably not interested. Issues such as the one presented above has no bearing on
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political affiliations or political questions. On the contrary, involvement could easily 
cause embarrassment and strain.10
However, exactly such issues are of crucial importance for the positions of (would-be) 
village leaders. This is ihe arena in which their stature is gossiped about and where 
they create confidence (see Chapter Three). Apart from all the time spent in "being 
around", the village leaders’ stature is also measured and assessed in meetings such 
as bichars.11
But where does this leave the more hard-core social science economic structures, 
political clout, or social status? Particularly West Bengal’s much-discussed panchayat 
system surely lends clout — even in "the informal arena" — to the individual village 
leader cum panchayat member? Furthermore, village leaders are more often than not 
of clean caste (in Udaynala high status Muslims), owners of more than subsistence 
land, and with wide political contacts. Such factors, particularly when in the hands 
of one individual, should surely contribute towards a dominant position in the village? 
However, these factors rarely form sufficient clout to "rule" a village by personal will, 
without cooperation from other villagers. Moreover, other villagers, as we shall see, 
have "powers" of their own, "powers" that may rival the (would-be) village leader —
10There is also a strong sense of outside involvement being regarded as undesired 
interference. This has been found in a number of cases; most strikingly, Hitchcock 
(1959) found it to hold for two different kinds of leaders, with thirty years apart.
nSee for instance Epstein 1962:129-40 on village meetings and competition 
between groups. See also Chapter Three.
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"power” being understood in the conventional Weberian sense of the ability to exercise 
one’s preference against the will of others.
Rural West Bengal — including Udaynala and Gopinathpur — was an area 
characterized by economic, ritual, and political inequalities. The higher castes tended 
to have more land and more political clout. The various rankings coincided. But 
what is often ignored is that village leaders needed to be accepted as such, as 
legitimate leaders. Not only were personal "powers" (in particular, land) limited for 
the individual village leader (and thus the number of dependants was limited); he also 
found a large number of people equally wealthy or wealthier. Other structural 
categories, for instance ritual status, only further expanded the group of peers or 
potential rivals. Relatively well-off owner-cultivators (owners of 20 or more bighas) 
and the "dominant caste(-s)" formed respectively 16% and 44% of the population of 
Udaynala and 22% and 50% of Gopinathpur by 1960. The "dominant caste" may 
have been dominant, but the individual village leader was but one individual in a large 
pool of people who were not his subordinates. Instead they were his peers with a 
status and possibly also "powers" that matched his. Many were also his rivals for the 
position of village leader.12
What needs to be kept in mind when dealing with socio-cultural changes is that in 
addition to being part of a group or a class, individuals also act as individuals, i.e. in 
relation to other individuals within or outside their own group or class. This is
12For West Bengal see Nicholas 1963 and 1965, and Davis 1983. For a 
comparative study, see Cohn 1990 ("Anthropological notes on law and disputes in 
North India").
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particularly so in the case of village leaders who have to seek to stand out as 
"individuals extraordinaires" in order to rise above the group from which they emerged 
and reach out beyond their own group, to other groups in the village community, to 
find support against rivals.
As to the material having been collected from what is now a "communist" area, I will 
underline how this code of behaviour grows out of pre-communist notions or social 
principles. The status of high rank in the opposition between the labourer and the 
owner-cultivator, and the status of the swajati ("same caste"), both conflict with "the 
humiliation of dependence" to prevent the subordination to a village leader of 
comparable status. Having said that, it needs to be emphasized that the norm of 
equality under communist influence has been expanded to include other social groups. 
From having been part of the reproduction of hierarchy, the norm of equality 
established itself as the dominant norm (in the sense of a value, not statistically). The 
arrival of communist ideology has resulted in a vast expansion of the "equality" group, 
of the number and character of those to whom notions of egalitarian interaction are 
applicable.13 This, however, was a later development in these villages.
Factionalism and rivalry
Thirty years ago "groupism" — nowadays the English term is used — or daladali 
(factionalism) or the affairs of the dais (factions, groups), was rampant in both
13Beteille (1991, Ch. 8) has argued — and I quite agree — that the value of 
equality has spread in India through the government’s "affirmative action". However, 
he points out, it is still far from dominant, particularly in the countryside.
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Udaynala and Gopinathpur. Daladali was a well-known phenomenon with a long 
history, and village politics was perceived as having centred around dais led by 
powerful or influential individuals. These dais and the subsequent daladali were 
important enough to form the core of village history; "In the days of Hekimsaheb’s 
dal" or "When the bagdis were in the Kaji dal" are common shorthand for fixing 
historical periods. From several quarters I was given a listing of the main divisions 
in the recent history of Udaynala’s village leadership.
Primary village leaders Period of leadership
Hekimsaheb vs. Raju Munsi until early 1950s
Jikukaji vs. Baset Ali mid-1950s
Hanukaji vs. Rahim Ali late 1950s
Ehiasaheb vs. Haksaheb early 1960s to 1971
Ehiasaheb unrivalled 1971-75
Haksaheb unrivalled 1975-1992
Haksaheb vs. Rabiel 1992-
In addition to these main groupings there were other dais. Most paras had at least one 
each, some had two. The larger dais encompassed several minor ones and so covered 
several paras. At the time of the Hanukaji vs. Rahim division, there were two minor 
factions among the north-para sekhs (one led by Waselmaster, Rabiel’s father’s 
brother), and two among the west-para namasudras. The village twice-born normally 
acted as one dal although not everyone there would be considered "part" of the 
faction. Most prominent among them was Bhola Sarkar, a cultivator but well- 
connected, with cousins in business and service in Calcutta. The Udaynala bagdis 
were divided between two dais at that time, one led by Manik Bag, an up-and-coming 
money-lender allied to Rahim, and one anti-Manik consisting of the rest in the main
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allied to the Kaji family. In addition there were some minor dais among the middle- 
para sekhs.
With the division between Ehiasaheb and Haksaheb village politics came closer to 
resembling party politics, with Ehiasaheb in the Congress party and Haksaheb a long­
time communist, and both supported by and engaged in the activities of their 
respective parties. During the 1960s these two at least tried to work together. They 
were both part of the so-called tarun dal ("young group" or "faction" — its reformist 
activities will be taken up in Chapter Four) which included Waselmaster, Imam 
Hosen, Najir Hosen and others. The only ones excluded were Rahim and Manik. A 
"faire sembler" cooperation between Ehiasaheb and Haksaheb lasted through the 
troubled years of United Front Governments, land occupations and general rural unrest 
(1968-71), but broke when repression was unleashed on communists and Haksaheb 
fled. From then until 1975 Ehiasaheb was the unrivalled, if repressive, leader of 
Udaynala.
In neighbouring Gopinathpur daladali was somewhat less pronounced. A major factor 
in this was the long-standing position of strength held by Bhaskar Kes, and his ability 
to gather other groups around him. The list of major leaders of Gopinathpur looks 
like this:
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Primary village leaders 
Bhaskar Kes vs. Ranjan Kes 
Bhaskar Kes unrivalled 
Bhaskar Kes vs. Anadi Sarkar
Period of leadership 
late 1950s — early 1960s 
early 1960s — early 1970s
early 1970s to 1977 
1977 to mid-1980s 
mid-1980s onwards
Sailen Kes and others 
Shyamsundar and others
This picture however is too placid and conceals many intrigues. Though Bhaskar — 
aguri by jati — retained his position over many years, he did so by balancing various 
secondary leaders. He maintained a long-standing alliance with the two bagdi leaders, 
Gobardhan Porel and Sakti Dhara, although not without many instances of co-opting 
the support of Paritas Sarkar or Bijay Chakrabarti — high-caste leaders. In the 1970s, 
Bhaskar’s alliance came to an end when Gobardhan sided with Anadi Sarkar, 
Bhaskar’s rival. In the 1960s the aguris were further sub-divided into groups headed 
by Mohan Sen and Sakti Jos, with Ranjan Kes’s family excluded. The kayasthas were 
headed by Paritas Sarkar for many years, and later on by Anadi Sarkar (distantly 
related). The bamun Bijay Chakrabarti gained notorious importance due to his 
extensive money-lending in the west mouza. Later on Jagatnath Majumdar as leader 
of the village napits also entered the scene.
The term "faction leader" should be properly understood as the informal, vague 
leadership it refers to. Among those who took an active interest in village affairs, 
some were more prominent than others. There is no way of making final distinctions 
between para or jati leader and the all-village leaders. Some kept their activities 
limited to para or jati while others expanded their time and efforts (and ambitions) to 
include the entire village, though also all-village leaders often enjoyed a core of 
support in their own more limited group. Others were less committed and appeared
64
only now and then for meetings or bichars. From among the latter group, again, some 
individuals might emerge as prominent, with maturity, interest or opportunity.
There was, both in Udaynala and Gopinathpur of the early 1960s, a high degree of 
rivalry among a fairly large number of individuals. This high degree of factionalism 
was not unknown elsewhere, occasionally with one or two main leaders only, 
occasionally with more, but always with a number of secondary leaders. The level 
of competition varied, but for instance the relatively long period of limited 
factionalism in Gopinathpur under Bhaskar reflected effective alliance-building rather 
than any strong sense of cooperation. Occasionally degrees of "faire sembler" 
cooperation were enough to prevent overt factionalism. Below we shall investigate 
more closely the "powers" held by the individuals in question.
Sources of "power"
In his diaries, Waselmaster mentioned a range of individuals who were active in the 
village affairs of Udaynala in the 1960s. They regularly attended the many meetings 
called, gained positions in the increasing number of institutions or were in other ways 
influential in determining the course of village politics. They are listed in table 2.1, 
together with information on jati, landownership, and the activities they were involved 
in. Under "Other" I have listed their most obvious (if any) extra source of authority 
or influence. What I have not included is "knowledge" — except as in "educated". 
The land figures refer to land held by families, some of whom were large and joint,
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others small. The table thus does not give an accurate indication of wealth per 
member of family, but an indication of land controlled by each head of family.
Table 2.1
Details of main village leaders, Udaynala, early 1960s14
Head of Land-
family (bighas) Jati Activities* Other
Haksaheb 65 Sekli PA S c D P r e s t i g i o u s  f ami ly ;
communist
Hanukaji** 60 Sekh P S c D Prestigious family; bagdi
support
Rahim Ali** 40 Sekh P S Money-lender
Bhola Sarkar 30 Kayastha P c Money-lender
Najir Hosen 25 Sekh P S c D Communist
Waselmaster** 16 Sekh S c D Educated
Ehiasaheb 14 Sekh PA s c Congress contacts
Manik Bag** 12 Bagdi P s c Money-lender
Imam Hosen 8 Sekh s D Educated; prestigious
family
♦"Activities" refers to involvement in one of the following at one point or another 
during the early 1960s: member of the 1964 Gram Panchayat (P) or Anchal Panchayat 
(A); member of the village school board (S) or the village cooperative society board 
(C); founding member of the Udaynala Village Development Society (D).
**Joint family
Source: field-data
Both Haksaheb and Hanukaji headed old "prestigious" (baniadi) families with large 
lands — lands they were losing rather than gaining. Haksaheb was a primary village 
leader for many years and had been involved with the communists since the late 
1950s. Hanukaji never managed to fill the footsteps of his more illustrious father
14The figures on landholding relate to 1957 and were mainly given by Najir 
Hosen, who returned to his native village that year and started keeping records.
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Jikukaji, and the family’s historical bagdi support was eventually transferred to 
Haksaheb and Ehiasaheb. Rahim was more of an "up-start" who had gained land 
through extensive money-lending and hard work. Bhola Sarkar had inherited land and 
maintained it well; he was also deeply engaged in money-lending. His position was 
based on his influence among the caste Hindus. Imam Hosen headed a poor but 
prestigious family. He and a few others, Najir Hosen, Waselmaster, Haksaheb and 
Hanukaji, were among the few educated (i.e. with 6-8 years of schooling). Najir 
Hosen, Waselmaster, and Ehiasaheb all belong to the dominant sekh jati but headed 
non-prestigious families. Ehiasaheb originally held only 16 bighas, but became a 
primary village leader in the 1960s through incessant activity and broad "alliances" 
in the village. He also represented the Congress in the village, but this gave him little 
extra clout in the 1960s.
Table 2.2
Households by landownership, sekh vs other jatis, Udaynala 1957
Land held Sekh Sekh Others Others
Tin bigha) m (%) INI (%)
0-4.9 12 16.2 50 54.9
5-9.9 26 35.1 12 13.2
10-19.9 19 25.7 19 20.9
20+ 17 23.0 10 11.0
74 100.0 91 100.0
Source: field-data
Table 2.1 shows that the sekh community was more prominent in village affairs than 
other jatis. They were in general wealthier than the other communities. Table 2.2 
shows a larger percentage of sekhs in the 10-19 bighas and the 20+ bighas groups 
than of the other jatis combined. However, whereas two non-sekh heads of family
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were actively engaged, many well-off sekh heads of family were not active in village 
affairs. There were ten sekh households holding 20 or more bighas of land that did 
not have a member active in village affairs. On the other hand, both Bhola Sarkar and 
Manik Bag — the two non-sekhs — played important roles, were elected to positions, 
and received repeated mention in Waselmaster’s diaries for their initiatives.
Table 2.3
Details of main village leaders, Gopinathpur early 1960s
Head of Land
familv (bighas) Jati Activity* Other
Paritas Sarkar 47 Kayastha C P Ex-lawyer
Mohan Sen 32 Aguri C B
Bhaskar Kes** 32 Aguri S C B PA Strong alliance, large
and old family
Gobardhan Porel 27 Bagdi C P " S a n s k r i t i z e d " ,
rel igious  leader;
alliance
Bijay Chakrabarti 22 Bamun P Money-lender; village
priest
Paritas Malik** 20 Bagdi S Educated; service
Ranjan Kes 17 Aguri B Large and old family
Sakti Jos 16 Aguri B Devout
Anadi Sarkar 5 Kayastha PA Political contacts
Sakti Dhara 2 Bagdi S C P Alliance
Baul Porel 2 Bagdi S
♦"Activity" refers to involvement in one of the following: the 1957 building of the 
school (S); the 1963 relaunch or position on the board of the cooperative society (C); 
chairman of the baroari (public) committee between 1957-1965 (B); selected to the 
1964 Gram Panchayat (P) or Anchal Panchayat (A).
**Joint family
Source: field-data
Table 2.3 comprises all prominent villagers in Gopinathpur from 1957 to 1965. They 
include initiators behind the 1957 building of the school, the 1963 relaunch of the
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cooperative society, baroari committee chairmen in the early 1960s,15 and members 
of the 1964 Gram or Anchal Panchayats. The clean- and upper castes dominate the 
list. Paritas Sarkar was a well-off landowner who for many years had been absentee 
while practising law in Burdwan Town. Mohan Sen was also well-off, moderately 
involved in village affairs but never one who carried great weight. Most prominent 
of all was Bhaskar Kes, who qualified for the title village leader and was still during 
my stay presented by fellow villagers as "Gopinathpur’s morol" (leader). Interestingly 
he was not particularly wealthy, and the 32 bighas he held around 1960 were towards 
the end of the 1960s divided when his younger brother established a separate 
household. The next, very interesting, persona on the list was a culturally reforming 
bagdi whose family had gained land through hard work, a moderate life-style, and 
moderate money-lending. Gobardhan himself was local guru of a reformist Hindu sect 
(the Satsangha) to which Anadi Sarkar also belonged. Gobardhan and Sakti Dhara 
were the two major bagdi leaders of the village, and in the 1960s both were allied to 
Bhaskar — an alliance that made the three prominent for many years.
Bijay Chakrabarti was once a poor village priest who amassed land through 
unscrupulous money-lending (he took security in land). He seems to have been 
particularly unpopular, but demanded and obtained influence through the large number 
of people indebted to him. Paritas Malik lived only for a short while in the village: 
he was the most educated of the village bagdis and had a service position (in Bihar). 
Ranjan Kes and Sakti Jos were both relatively poor owner-cultivators of the dominant
15Gopinathpur’s baroari (public) committee was fairly prosperous, controlling 
about 20 bighas of land, and engaged in most communal activities in the village. It 
was a central forum in village politics.
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caste, both moderately involved in village affairs. Ranjan had a larger role cut out for 
himself but was forced out by his cousin Bhaskar. Lastly, there were the two bagdis 
Sakti Dhara and Baul Porel. Baul was involved only in the establishing of the village 
school — although towards the late 1960s he was the first CPM supporter in the 
village. Sakti Dhara was a very poor but energetic leader of the bagdis, and allied, 
with Gobardhan, to Bhaskar.
Table 2.4
Households (in numbers) by landownership, all jatis, Gopinathpur, ca 1960
Land held Kaya-
(bigha) Bamun stha Aguri Napit Bagdi Pule Muchi
0-4 3 3 1 - 7 5 4
5-9 1 2 4
10-19 5 4 - 1 -
20+ I  1  8 1  I  z -
Total 4 9 14 3 15 5 4
Source: field-data
Again, from table 2.4 it appears that several of the large landowning heads of family 
in Gopinathpur were not engaged in village affairs. Of the twelve owners of 20 
bighas or more, only six were actively involved in village affairs. The wealthiest 
landowner, Jagatnath of the napit jati, energetic and hard-working head of a huge 
family (his brother died early but left five sons), was a decade or so later on to engage 
himself in various committees, such as the baroari. But of the rest, only one (Ram 
Mandal, aguri) ever became at all involved.
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This section has shown that in the early 1960s those villagers most prominent in 
village affairs were not necessarily the wealthiest though they were usually well-off. 
Occasionally but significantly village leaders were not from among the village 
economic elite. Some, such as Sakti Dhara, were influential in spite of being both low 
caste and almost landless. Ignoring such special cases, we still find that influential 
leaders such as both Ehiasaheb and Anadi Sarkar, although of the right jati(-s), were 
outsiders in terms of landholding. Anadi was from a very poor family and remained 
so. They were both supported by the Congress and the police during the years of 
repression of CPM activists after 1971, but had crucially been influential village 
leaders long before that. Both became for instance Anchal Panchayat members in 
1964. Also among other village leaders, not decisively supported by any party in 
power, we find that village leaders were not necessarily from among the richest: 
Bhaskar Kes headed a joint family holding 32 bighas of land or a mere 16 bighas per 
brother, while four other heads of family held respectively 32, 42, 47 and 50 bighas 
alone, with no brothers to share with. These four were not involved in village affairs.
Village leaders were recruited from certain jatis rather than others. These jatis — in 
Udaynala the sekhs and in Gopinathpur the aguris and to an extent bamuns and 
kayasthas — can be characterized as "dominant castes" following their political and 
economic position within each village. But it is nonetheless striking that these jatis 
were not entirely dominant. Occasionally someone from a lower jati made an 
appearance and an impact. For instance, Gopinathpur’s Sakti Dhara and Gobardhan 
Porel were active for nearly two decades as leaders of their own community but also 
involved in village affairs at large. In Udaynala, Manik Bag was aligned to Rahim
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for some time and then with Ehiasaheb, but gradually gained his own political weight. 
Like the dominant caste village leaders, these low-caste village leaders were also 
active in factions, alignments, and the bickering of village politics.
Landlords and money-lenders
Lastly we should consider the "power" of money-lending, and, with it, the formation 
of "political interest groups". None of the villages were fully "owned" by single 
zamindar families. Zamindar rights16 to much of Udaynala were held by a Burdwan 
Town family that did not own demesne-land in the village and never interfered in its 
affairs (except rent collection). Zamindari rights to minor — often tiny — plots were 
held by others, including a number of local villagers. In Gopinathpur both zamindari 
rights and substantial private lands were held at the time of the zamindari abolition 
by one Dawn family. The family did not live in the village but leased out its 150 
bighas for sharecropping. Two-thirds of this land was sold in the decades after 
Independence, mostly bought by local families in minor plots. Another landlord was 
one bamun who moved in the late 1950s to Burdwan Town and had his 50 bighas 
sharecropped. Over the years he too sold all except 8 bighas to local villagers.
Udaynala’s one major absentee landlord was Hitu Munsi, son and heir of Raju who 
had amassed 200 bighas through money-lending and court cases (the "mamla 
business"). Raju and his three brothers did play a major role in village affairs, but the
16I use the term zamindari rights in a generic sense; in reality these were sub- 
tenureships such as dar-patnidari, dar-darpatnidari, etc.
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next generation much less so (one died heir-less, and two left altogether eight sons, 
none of whom could qualify as landlord). Hitu moved to Burdwan Town and left the 
management of his sharecropped lands to his local manager, Manuar. Manuar was a 
money-lender but with his own means, not those of Hitu Munsi. During the 1970s, 
Hitu sold almost all his lands. The buyers were all locals, many of them his (land- 
rich) sharecroppers.
It was not landlords but mostly substantial owner-cultivators who functioned as 
money-lenders: in Udaynala Raju Munsi, Mohammed Hosen, Baset and Rahim Ali, 
Sobhachacha, and others. All of these started off as relatively poor or only 
moderately well-off, only to work their way up through money-lending. One 
remarkable but not unusual case was Manik Bag, who worked his way up from near­
landlessness to rich peasant status through money-lending. In Gopinathpur, a number 
of landowners engaged in some form of money- or grain-lending, and village leader 
Bhaskar Kes admitted that it was a common practice. However, only one, Bijay 
Chakrabarty, made money-lending a major source of income. Most others extended 
credit or advances only to secure what was known as bandha lok ("tied people") — 
labourers thus contracted for the peak season. Such advances were most often not 
expected to be repaid. In addition to the advances, "tied people" were paid at the 
current rate for their work.
In spite of the good profit to be reaped from money-lending, a strangely limited 
number of people made it a source of income. Landowners — "peasants" — wanted 
labourers not only to work but to work as hard as possible. There was an interesting
73
social mechanism in this, where the most unpopular landowner got the least interested 
or hard-working labourer. Conversely, landowners could not afford to make 
themselves unpopular through money-lending lest they forfeit willing peak season 
labour. They needed the social acceptance that translates into labour input ("symbolic 
capital" in Bourdieu’s parlance; more of this in Chapter Three). Money-lending was 
heavily stigmatized, an activity respectable people would not get involved in at least 
partly because it was detrimental to the cultivation process.
In emergency cases such as illness — which often caused major expenses that did not 
promise to readily translate into labour input for the creditor — landowners were 
generally not willing to assist (would-be) dependants. The latter in such cases turned 
to the major money-lenders who demanded land as security, and at an interest of 3% 
per month the land was lost within three years.
Landowner-Iabourer relations
Almost every landowning household employed one or several landless individuals as 
kirsen — on year-long contracts. A kirsen was an all-purpose labourer expected to 
work for the employer from dawn to dusk and sometimes to late night if required, 
with only an hour’s rest at midday. Another form of attached labour was the mas- 
maine who was hired for one month at a time. The kirsen was paid in paddy, cash 
and cloth. The pay was less than the daily wages (majuri), but all-year employment
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was secured.17 Among women, only saotals were regularly employed in the fields. 
Out-working women of other poor jatis were most often domestic servants (or they 
worked in their own fields). Of these there were two kinds: the very few long-term 
domestic servants (at any one time possibly no more than six or seven in Udaynala), 
and the many who could be hired for special occasions. The former were poorly paid, 
with meals only, though some cloth and paddy once a year. The latter were rewarded 
relatively generously. The appropriate code of conduct demanded generous feeding, 
gifting of cloth and some cash.
Some individual kirsens were employed in one household for years in a row, some for 
15-20 years. Those, however, were exceptional cases, and most were rarely employed 
for more than one year, at the most two or three. For kirsens, assistance was 
occasionally extended in case of illness or mishap. In most cases, however, the 
labourer was left to himself. "Tied people" were mainly employed one season at a 
time. A few were employed by the same landowner several years in a row, but that 
was also rather exceptional.
The absence of multiple long-term relationships was particularly evident in the case 
of sharecropping. The land sharecropped on a long-term basis was almost exclusively 
owned by absentee landlords such as Gopinathpur’s Banerjee, Udaynala’s Hitu Munsi, 
or the Dawn family. In the 1950s and 1960s (if not before), the sharecroppers were 
mainly substantial landowners in their own right, particularly Sobhachacha and the
17Cf. Chandra 1983 on types of labour contracts in Burdwan. Davis 1983 
mentions a distinction between "mojur" and "munsi", long and short-term labourers.
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Dhaure family (sharecropping 55 and 40 bighas respectively). Absentee owners of 
huge lands seem to have preferred long-term leasing out of land in large chunks 
instead of dealing with a large number of sharecroppers.
Intra-village sharecropping consisted mainly of short-term arrangements for small plots 
of land rarely exceeding a few bighas. In general, sharecropping was not deemed 
profitable and was often undertaken reluctantly. Today, the land-poor complain how 
harsh such contracts were, and landowners how difficult it was to find willing and 
reliable sharecroppers. The sharecropper’s scope for cheating seems to have been 
more prominent than the landowner’s scope for demanding deductions, particularly 
where the sharecropped land was far from the main lands of the owner. The sharing 
was commonly 50:50 and the sharecropper normally contributed all expenses. 
Sharecropping arrangements rarely exceeded a few years.
Interested patron-client relationships
It seems that patron-client relationships of the archetypical kind were most pronounced 
in the case of major village leaders. Jikukaji —^rnajor village leader^in the 1950s — 
maintained a very close and multiple relationship with the bagdis of Udaynala. They 
were settled on land owned by his family, and Jikukaji used the bagdis to guard the 
family’s position and his own prestige in the village. The bagdis were in his dal and 
his dal only, they were his lathials who intimidated insubordinate "subjects" or 
opponents. The extent of credit relations between the Kajis and the bagdis is difficult 
to ascertain. However, in the 1950s the money-lending brothers Baset and Rahim Ali
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sought to challenge Jikukaji’s position and take over his bagdi support through an 
extension of credit in their direction. To counter the move, Jikukaji too extended 
credit to the bagdis (presumably more extensively than earlier), an exercise which over 
the years came to cost him about half of his land while the Ali brothers kept losing 
what they gained elsewhere. This is the very opposite of the cases of Bijay 
Chakrabarty and Manik Bag, who through money-lending extended their lands. In 
Jikukaji’s case, the credit was not expected to be repaid; it was not a financial 
investment but a symbolic one. In addition to the defaulted credit advances, bagdis 
in the Kaji dal more easily secured employment than non-aligned labourers. Jikukaji 
himself was not in a position to employ them all, but his supporters among the 
landholding group, in order to assist Jikukaji, employed "Jikukaji’s bagdis". Credit 
and employment together with favourable arbitration and support were basic elements 
in a relationship of wider implications, of general, mutual support between village 
leaders and groups of supporters. Credit tied the debtor to the creditor, which in the 
case of people such as Jikukaji was the point. When repaid, it ended the relationship, 
and only augmented the creditor’s material assets, which for many was only half a 
point. In short, the relationship between village leaders and crucial groups of 
supporters (on occasions lathials) was not built on economic dependency alone but on 
broader relationships where credit was one element, although not in the favour of the 
landlord-village leader. Credit could be detrimental to political positions as extortion 
could alienate potential supporters.
Few of the Udaynala or Gopinathpur village leaders that emerged in the early 1960s 
engaged in money-lending to any extent. There were only two exceptions to this rule,
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Manik Bag and Bijay Chakrabarti, both immon3ly- unpopular. Outside the realm of 
political bonds, economic exploitation was quite possible and did take place only 
mildly softened by ideological considerations. However, in the case of political bonds 
— "interested" relationships — the ideological considerations of symbolic capital took 
precedence, particularly when the relationship was challenged.
To sum up this section, the many village leaders of the early 1960s had, firstly, a 
fairly wide range of different "powers" behind them — ranging from debtors and 
employees to prestige and alliances. Secondly, few if any of the prominent village 
leaders had enough personal "power" — derived from whatever source — to out-do 
other would-be village leaders, or at least a combination of them. One village leader’s 
large number of debtors could outbalance someone else’s prestige; one’s land and 
refined manners could be outbalanced by another’s large number of supporters.
What has been lurking behind the scene in this section without being properly 
addressed is the growth of institutional bodies and organized politics over the 
following decades. We obviously need to investigate the extent to which those 
changes influenced and altered the picture drawn from the situation of the early 1960s.
Growth and limits of local level governmental bodies
It is interesting to note that of the three major village leaders of the early to mid- 
1960s — Haksaheb, Ehiasaheb and Bhaskar Kes — only Ehiasaheb was aligned to the 
political party in power, the Congress. A village leader is expected to be influential
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and assist his followers (to be taken up in more detail in Chapter Three). In seeking 
to do so he is naturally advantaged by contacts in the dominant political party. In one 
view of this, village level patron-client relationships are tied into a district level net 
of patron-client relationships (in the dominant political party), which again is tied to 
a similar net of relationships at state and perhaps even national levels.18 Nicholas 
writes for the 1950s and 1960s that, in general, village leaders (or "the village 
establishment") aligned themselves to the Congress in an alliance of convenience, 
whereas "the village opposition" became by default aligned to — for instance —  the 
Communist Party of India (CPI) or any other locally important party of the 
opposition.19 According to Nicholas, there was no difference between the two groups; 
the CPI-supporting village group also included rich peasants and the Congress group 
sported poor people.
This does not seem to be quite the case for these villages. I shall argue later on for 
the very specific and conscious choice of the CPI/CPM by leading villagers (Chapter 
Four). Moreover, we find that until at least 1967 and the instalment of the first non- 
Congress United Front Government, the alignment to the dominant political party 
made little difference to the general power situation in the villages, and had in 
particular only a limited impact on the selection of the major village leaders. True, 
Anadi Sarkar and Ehiasaheb both became major village leaders — and used their
18The most well-known exponent of this view is Brass 1965. Weiner 1967 
presents a thorough study of the "expediting" functioning of the Congress party in 
power. Franda 1971a has applied it to West Bengal. The theory is criticized by
Hardiman 1982. For a more recent example see Robinson 1988.
19Nicholas 1965.
79
political contacts to that effect. Anadi organized meetings with a proper agenda, 
attended rallies in central villages, enlisted members of the Congress party from 1961 
onwards. But he was not able to rival Bhaskar and become a major village leader 
until the 1970s, almost ten years later. Bhaskar himself was more informally aligned 
to the People s  Socialist Party (PSP) — and although the local Member of the 
Legislative Assembly (MLA) was a PSP man, the party belonged to the opposition. 
In 1966 Bhaskar switched to the Congress — where he and Anadi maintained an 
uneasy alliance — but he never organized or attended formal Congress meetings, and 
his local position rested on his local alliance. The same applied to the case of 
Haksaheb in Udaynala. He had been known as a communist since the late 1950s and 
was thus in opposition to the dominant political party, without this seemingly affecting 
his position in the village adversely.
By the 1980s, the infant party politics had grown into a solid network of large 
institutions with increased economic powers, particularly in the panchayat system of 
local level "government". Its growth and increased power merit a presentation. The 
colonial government’s Union Boards had been manned through the appointment of, 
and from among, influential individuals in the localities. These bodies were continued 
after Independence although suffrage was extended. However, at least in this area 
elections were never held and the selection of Union Board members continued to be 
monopolized by local influential figures. Union Boards were replaced by the 1957 
panchayat system which was organized on four levels: the lowest comprised single 
villages (composed of wards with one or two representatives each), and the highest
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at the district level (the Jela Parishad).20 In Burdwan, the only panchayat under this 
system was formed in 1964. Following on a Gandhian ideal, election to these bodies 
was depoliticized, i.e. candidates could not run on party tickets. In Gopinathpur the 
practice of appointment rather than election was continued, but in Udaynala elections 
were held due to rivalry. In general these bodies had limited powers and even more 
limited means at their disposal. They became largely defunct with the political unrest 
of the late 1960s.
In 1978, the Left Front Government implemented a new panchayat system with the 
lowest tier abolished. Candidates were allowed to run on party tickets, and the CPM 
with its tight organization was highly successful, continuously winning around 60% 
of all Gram Panchayat seats in the state ever since. In the anchal that includes 
Gopinathpur and Udaynala no non-CPM candidate has been elected in the four 
elections held since 1978 — in spite of Congress candidates being fielded at each 
election (and in 1993 BJP candidates).21 The CPM’s organizational efficiency 
(compared to the Congress) has contributed an additional source of influence and 
power in villages.
In addition the state Government has infused the panchayat system with powers of 
decisive economic and political importance — which combined have ensured a vastly
20The legislation in the West Bengal Panchayat Act was passed in 1957, however 
(s-)elections were in many cases held years later.
21Elections have been held regularly, in 1978, 1983, 1987, and 1993.
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increased role for the panchayats.22 The panchayats and the chairman are together 
with the Block Development Officers (BDOs) in charge of the local level 
implementation of the land redistribution programme, and influence the allocation of 
the large number of development programmes (the IRDP, NREP, RLEGP, Food for 
work, etc.23) to eligible individuals, families or projects. These programmes 
combined represent large sums of money. In 1988 much of the allocation process was 
transferred from the slate government lo the panchayats, bringing the total sum 
handled by the panchayats to Rs 7,000 million, or Rs 175 per capita of the rural 
population.24
The most important of these was the Central Government-funded IRDP (Integrated 
Rural Development Programme). In the reality of Burdwan in the 1980s, the signature 
of the local panchayat member (more often than not CPM-affiliated) was indispensable 
for an IRDP application to be successful. In effect, these resources were (at least in 
Burdwan district, given the party’s dominant position) controlled by the CPM. The 
panchayat members were answerable to the party; they were not members as 
individuals but as representatives of a political party. Larger decisions — for instance 
budgets or the allocation of programme resources — were discussed and decided upon
22For a full history of the panchayats in West Bengal as well as a detailed outline 
of its functions, see Webster 1992.
23IRDP = Integrated Rural Development Programme, NREP = National Rural 
Employment Programme, RLEGP = Rural Landless Employment Guarantee 
Programme.
24Lieten 1988. Rs 175 is slightly more that one full week’s minimum pay for an 
agricultural labourer. Considering that the sum refers to "per capita of the rural 
population", i.e. including women and children, it appears that the panchayats control 
quite substantial sums of money.
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in the party’s organs some time before the formal panchayat meetings. This practice 
— common enough in modern-day parliamentary democracies — was rigorously 
implemented, and the party made no bones about it. In this set-up, the more 
influential figure was not necessarily the panchayat member but the party worker. 
This division was also apparent in popular perceptions; villagers tended to first turn 
to their panchayat member for assistance with problems, and if that failed they turned 
to the party men.
But the potential of both party and panchayats was still limited. Under the 1978 
panchayat system each village had one representative (for larger villages more than 
one: in the case of Udaynala and Gopinathpur, one representative for each mouza), 
and the Gram Panchayat — the "village council" — covered normally some 10-15 
villages. In other words, the Gram Panchayat was not a village level governmental 
body. The area covered (anchat) was too large for everyday involvement in each 
village, and, from the other perspective, each village had only one person, one 
individual, invested with the authority of the Gram Panchayat. Although there was 
also the party’s presence to be accounted for as it had more than one activist in each 
village (occasionally the panchayat member was not a senior party worker), what can 
be termed village politics or village affairs were still conducted within each village by 
a number of people of whom only a few were affiliated to the party, and of whom 
only one was a panchayat member. Disputes over inheritance, land or irrigation water, 
quarrels or allegations, and cases of theft, were all effectively dealt with by villagers 
themselves without reference to the Gram Panchayat and without reference to the 
party.
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In other words, there was and continues to be a large social space outside the reach 
of formal institutions or organized politics. There are thus two arenas of local politics: 
the Gram Panchayat area, i.e. the anchal, and the village or below (i.e. para or jati).25 
Issues dealt with at the village level are most often of little direct interest to the party 
or the Gram Panchayat. Except for labour disputes or open political challenges, the 
party rarely intervenes, and the administrative apparatus is too limited to be able to 
cope with village level disputes. The obvious obstacles against involvement in village 
affairs include an absence of local knowledge and of a capacity to cope with the 
never-ending flow of small issues of conflict in each and every village.26 Instead, 
they prefer to stay out of the conflicts and let these be solved by the villagers 
themselves, although the party finds it useful to let potential panchayat members or 
party workers establish their credentials as leaders before being admitted to positions 
it sanctioned.27
25Davis (1983, Ch.s 4 and 5) found a division between "sorkari kaj" ("government 
affairs") and "gramer kaj" (or "village affairs"); to the first belong concerns with laws, 
political parties and modern-day political ideologies, and the second concerns with 
caste, ritual status, family affairs, and village leadership. He has made the point that 
the two arenas seem (to villagers) conceptually different in orientations, concerns, 
practices and mechanisms.
26It was the recognition of its inability to control affairs at the village level that 
made the CPM, in 1988, initiate the Gram Sabha (village committees, commonly 
known as Gram Committee): village level bodies informally invested with party 
authority. The Gram Committees were nominally open to anyone but in reality 
restricted to CPM supporters. They formed an integral part of the party’s efforts to 
bring its policies to the villages and they have been involved in various projects, the 
largest being the organizing and mobilization of instructors for the mass literacy 
programme (see Banerjee 1992); but their success varied considerably.
27This was a common practice within the party; to obtain a position within the 
mother party long-term work at the lowest level of the affiliated organizations — 
normally the Krishak Samiti (peasant organization), the Democratic Youth Federation 
of India (DYFI), the Student Federation of India (SFI), or the Mahila Samiti (women’s 
organization) — was required. Such involvement created exposure to popular
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Without doubt, institutional politics has increased radically in importance. It may, 
however, be safely assumed that at no point have political contacts been as important 
as during the Emergency period imposed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from 1975 
until 1977, and in the case of West Bengal from a few months before the 1972 
election onwards. During those years, communist party activities were repressed and 
workers and activists beaten, jailed and some even killed.28 Surprisingly enough, as 
we shall see from the case of Ehiasaheb, even during those years backing from the 
party in government was not sufficient to keep a village leader in position.
A village leader’s fall
Ehiasaheb was a prominent village leader of Udaynala for many years, and the most 
prominent for a few years. His "power" derived partly from his political contacts 
although he was also socially active and a protector of his supporters. However, 
without losing his political contacts he still lost control over the village, just as Indira 
Gandhi’s Emergency was implemented. Ehiasaheb’s authoritarian manners denied him 
acceptance by villagers. Popular support from among one’s peers derives from the 
ability to evoke their acceptance, which again is based on their perception of their own 
prestige relative to that of the village leader.
concerns, arguments, and a wider section of society.
28See for instance Sajal Basu 1974, B. Sen Gupta 1979, Anjali Ghosh 1981, 
Nossiter 1988.
All Udaynala’s village leaders in the 1960s, especially the "young group", placed 
themselves somewhere between the Communist party and the left wing of the 
Congress, with Ehiasaheb as the one most influential among the latter. He and 
Haksaheb had cooperated on occasions, and Ehiasaheb’s well-known antipathy towards 
landlords and money-lenders led him to join in land occupations in 1969 and to raise 
a red flag on the occupied plot.
In the autumn of 1971 the S. S. Ray regime started repression of the communists. 
During this autumn Hitu Munsi — owner of 200 bigha in Udaynala, some of which 
had been occupied by the "young group" including Ehiasaheb — brought a police 
party to secure his harvest. Ehiasaheb unexpectedly supported them. It was a harder 
political climate in both the state and the village, with a clear dichotomy between the 
Congress and the CPM and no middle ground. With Congress and police backing 
Ehiasaheb became the most powerful man in Udaynala, while other prominent leaders 
backed out: Najir Hosen fled to an uncle in Murshidabad for four years, and Haksaheb 
spent his nights in the fields for two years to avoid arrest.29 Waselmaster and Imam 
Hosen denounced their involvement in activities led by communists, and turned their 
attention to the Muslim layman-organization Tabligh Jamat.
On several occasions over the next few years Ehiasaheb brought in the police (with 
guns) to arrest people, and at least ten individuals were either arrested or fled the 
village for opposing Ehiasaheb. He also invariably won court cases — there were 
four or five in this period — and cheated on government resources extended to the
29The police prefer to raid at night.
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village school and cooperative society without facing prosecution. In the village he 
also came to enjoy support from a section of the village bagdis and a small group of 
young sekhs — the Ohabs, sons and nephews of his former arch-enemy, Rahim. This 
was very limited support, considering the size of the village and the hardened climate, 
and so the position was maintained by a degree of intimidation.
During these years every day a group of bagdis was found sitting in front of 
Ehiasaheb’s house during day-time. They were his retainers, his lathials, a presence 
which suggested a potential use of force. Some bagdis even accompanied him on his 
rounds. On occasions, his supporters ran through the village at night — the Ohabs 
with a gun or two, the bagdis with lathis — shouting loudly and intimidating people. 
The threat or actual use of violence was manifest. Individuals were beaten on several 
occasions. In general, however, intimidation, use of force, and violence were limited. 
The potential use of violence, the threat of doing so, was as important in maintaining 
his position as actual force.
Moreover, people from the other side of the political divide acknowledged that "He 
was not all bad". On many occasions he helped the poor (particularly his own — 
would-be — supporters), brought grain to the village in times of scarcity and assisted 
villagers in conflict with outside forces. During his reign he initiated a 
dharmagola,30 and organized the final construction of a road between Udaynala and 
P., a road that had been planned and replanned for nearly ten years.
30A dharmagola is a communal paddy store for times of crisis.
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But Ehiasaheb’s many initiatives were not enough, or not right. His authoritarian 
manners made him increasingly unpopular in the village. His house was once set on 
fire (straw roof), though without much damage. On another occasion, in 1973, his 
daughter’s marriage almost turned into a fiasco since none of his neighbours were 
willing to come forward to assist in the preparations or be present at the festivities. 
Only Haksaheb’s unexpected intervention saved the occasion.
Ehiasaheb’s problem was that though constantly in contact with a large number of 
people through his ayurvedic practice both in Udaynala and by the road in P., he was 
nonetheless known as someone who was not able to listen properly, prone to give 
short authoritarian orders and impatiently dismiss people. Rather than listening, 
gossiping, argueing? and spending time with others, he used his lathials, his Congress 
party contacts, and his guns to enforce his will and decisions.
The final turning point came in 1975. The school board elections were due, and 
Ehiasaheb, as had been his custom for some years by then, appointed himself and 
Manik Bag. However, resentment was already strong and this instance of high­
handedness in the case of the communally constructed and funded village school was 
the last straw for many. During the days before the formal election meeting, hectic 
albeit secret discussions took place in the village, and an unusually large crowd turned 
up at the meeting. Ehiasaheb gave a speech and proposed his candidates. Haksaheb 
immediately got up and counter-proposed Waselmaster and Imam Hosen — 
Congressites but not on friendly terms with Ehiasaheb. The latter two were elected 
with near unanimity by the assembly.
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With this Ehiasaheb’s authority was effectively broken. A large assembly of villagers 
had turned down his suggestions, and did so facing the bagdi-dal he had used to build 
his position. When the physical power he commanded was no longer sufficient to 
implement his plans, he became impotent as village leader. Even though this was 
only at the beginning of Indira Gandhi’s Emergency period, he could from then 
onwards not assert his authority in the village. Fearing for his life, Ehiasaheb moved 
to P. and did not spend nights in Udaynala for the next three years.
This case shows the limits of political contacts for village leaders and how 
dissatisfaction can translate into support for a rival leader who may eventually "(re­
conquer" the position. Haksaheb’s "power" resided in his "authority" and his position 
as a representative of the just, the rightful, and what most thought and wanted done. 
Ehiasaheb’s increasing unpopularity was due to instances of intimidation which denied 
others a right to participate in village affairs — however benevolent his ultimate aims 
may have been.
The limited significance of party and panchayat
It may be argued that by the 1990s, fifteen years on, the nascent political system had 
grown into a more solid and fully-fledged institutionalized political system, one which 
provided vastly increased means at the disposal of panchayat members. In addition 
there has been an increased political will on the part of the state Government and the 
dominant political party to infuse this system with real powers. This has combined 
to create a new situation and new, important sources of influence and power. It is,
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however, still striking how some have enjoyed positions of influence and status in 
their respective villages even without connection to the ruling party. In Udaynala, 
Haksaheb has been an important leader both in the village and in the area for at least 
thirty years. Except for altogether a little over two years in the late 1960s (the United 
Front period), he was aligned to an opposition party for what amounts to almost half 
his career, until 1977, and then again party-less after 1989. His rival Ehiasaheb lost 
his standing in the village in 1975 just as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed the 
Emergency and the party he represented became all-mighty. After Ehiasaheb’s fall 
his rival, Haksaheb, emerged again as village leader — though without political 
contacts during the Emergency period.
Haksaheb’s rival from 1989-90 onwards has been Rabiel, also a party worker, who 
emerged as a rival after Haksaheb relinquished his party membership and in 1993 lost 
his position as panchayat member. Haksaheb, however, has remained a major or 
perhaps the major village leader in Udaynala. His political contacts may have gone, 
but he has retained considerable support among a large number of fellow villagers and 
could still be counted as a major village leader four years after relinquishing his party 
membership.
The opposite was the case with Biswanath, panchayat member for Udaynala South for 
ten years (1983-93). At the time of the 1983 election he was under age — only 17 
whereas the minimum age for candidates was 18 — but Haksaheb "managed" that 
small problem. During his decade in power, Biswanath learned to use his influence. 
In the beginning his IRDP signature could be "bought" with a good meal, preferably
chicken. Later on he started demanding a share of the loan, approximating 10 per 
cent. He also demanded and got attention at both para and all-village meetings. 
However, a turning-point came in 1988, when he, as secretary of the village 
cooperative society, embezzled between Rs 18 and 24 thousand of the society’s funds. 
There were but muffled protests at the time, but these grew over the following years 
and eventually the party relieved him of most positions in 1990. From then onwards, 
although still a panchayat member, his informal, extra-institutional influence declined, 
and he was given only scant attention or respect at village meetings and was not 
consulted in disputes. The party did not relaunch him as a candidate in the 1993 
panchayat elections.
There was no automatic relation between political contacts (party or panchayats) and 
a position of influence in the villages. The role of the "informal arena" has shrunk 
under the increased importance of the growing institutions, but it has far from 
vanished. This is related to Mayer’s point, that historically statutory powers do not 
necessarily spill over into informal influence. He argues, however, for the decreasing 
importance of the informal and particularistic, and the comparatively increased role 
of specific and government-related institutions. He found that the headman’s "powers 
in unofficial contexts have diminished".31 However, his material suggests that, 
although the headman’s position has diminished in importance, the particularistic has 
not. Major villagers of Ramkheri felt dissatisfied with the statutory institutions and 
set up their own (unelected) "Comprehensive Committee" which soon came to be the
3‘Mayer 1960:113.
real centre of power.32 Similarly, Oommen remarks that "Power reservoirs may not 
be on the formal power bodies, such as the Gram Sabha executive committee [...] and 
yet they count in community affairs and may run the entire business from behind".33 
Beteille states that "functionally diffuse" bodies such as groups of elders "have to 
compete increasingly with functionally specific structures of power" — but they have 
not been replaced.34
I do not wish to argue for the irrelevance of modem-type institutions, but to suggest 
that the process is still far from complete and that the role of institutionalized politics 
may well be overrated. In the 1990s, in Burdwan, institutional politics reached into 
the daily affairs of villages still only in a limited manner. Disputes, quarrels or 
allegations, and issues such as sentencing thieves, continued to be settled without the 
intervention of party-workers or panchayat members. Naturally, these were often 
present, but not in their official capacity, and they did not lend the authority of their 
institutions to press for a solution. Issues were still settled by consensus among the 
villagers themselves, and the authority of the decision-making was entirely in the 
hands of those present.
32Mayer 1960:114-123.
33Oommen 1966:103.
34Beteille 1970:260-1.
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Conclusion
We have seen that many different sorts of "power" could be "matched" in several 
ways. Where one individual enjoyed "power" or influence (by his authority for 
instance, derived from superior knowledge), others might enjoy other forms of 
"power", for instance with a large number of dependent debtors. These "powers" have 
very unclear relations to one another. They seem to outweigh one another at times, 
at others they reinforce one another. This view is quite close to ideas developed by 
Marvin Davis, whose cultural anthropological study focuses on how people became 
equal in a society thoroughly concerned with rank and status.35 They are concerned 
with rank, he says, but the criteria for the actual ranking are not always clearly 
defined, or they overlap. There are in his findings a set of criteria for the ranking of 
groups, including ritual status and life-stage, and of individuals, including power, 
knowledge, wealth, and respect or honour.36 Each of these, in the villagers’ 
perception, represents separate hierarchical rankings. But in the case of individuals, 
who have values on each of the rankings, one ranking can invalidate another. 
According to Davis, it is the profound preoccupation with hierarchy but unclarity on 
how to rank within it that eventually sets off rivalry. It is when these different 
criteria, without relative ranking, are at work at the same time that controversies over 
rank arise.
35Davis 1983, particularly Chapter 3.
36Davis 1983:99, see also Inden and Nicholas 1977:26. Gough (1955:45) found 
non-dominant caste leaders to have "above-average intelligence".
93
But rather than confusion as to the correct ranking of individuals in interaction, I see 
a fluid and circumstantial evaluation of different forms of "power" and authority. As 
one would expect, the set of criteria forwarded by these scholars is quite close to the 
one suggested by villagers of Udaynala and Gopinathpur. Upon my queries on what 
qualities a villager needs to become a leader, they gave me the following list: "power" 
(khamata), wealth (dhan, or land), (caste) status and prestige (uchu jati, and ijjat or 
samman), "compassion" (sarad), and intelligence or cleverness (buddhi). These should 
not be read as fixed criteria but as indicators of what kind of qualities a village leader 
needs. The beauty of this set of criteria and the one developed by Inden and Nicholas 
plus Davis lies in its inclusion of "knowledge" and "prestige" — which must be 
regarded as creating "authority", in the Weberian sense — together with elements that 
create "power".37 By grouping these elements together, it is recognized that people 
may behave as "supporters", "followers" or willing "clients" for a variety of reasons. 
They may be compulsory supporters (debtors, labourers), or they may be attracted by 
ideas and values: the "justice of it all".
The "power" derived from land, political contacts or ritual status was limited, and also 
easily "matched" by a large number of people — potential rivals. These forms of 
"power" could vary widely. Some had land, some had followers, while others had 
"knowledge". Any one sort of "power" could potentially outdo any other. Low ritual 
status could be outdone by having followers, while "prestige" could weight heavily
37Heesterman (1985:152) has analysed the srciuta rite with respect to the division 
between the king/kshatriya ("power") and the priest/brahmin ("authority"): "All this, 
however, is remote from the strict separation of power and authority [...]. In fact, it 
is the very opposite. Coming together in the nexus of the sacrificial contest, power 
and authority as well as priesthood are inextricably interwoven".
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against the clout of money-lenders. Secondly, village leaders emerged from the 
relatively large pool of people for whom subordination was not an economic 
imperative. These were both valuable supporters ("allies") and potential rivals. It is 
to be noted that a large number of people interacted with one another as equals, using 
terms of address to that effect.38 The size of this group, its outer borders, were 
ambiguous, fluid, and open to contestation. Sakti Dhara, for instance, was addressed 
with the pronoun suggesting inferiority by some, and the one suggesting equality by 
others.
The bottom line, I believe, can be found in the Bengali term khamata (or ksamata), 
which only awkwardly translates as "power". "Influence" or "ability" seem better 
translations. "Khamata" concerns both "real" material or political power (in the 
Weberian sense of ability to enforce one’s will on others) and more specifically agility 
and social influence, the capacity to mobilize people based on whatever ground.39 It 
may have a material base, but it is not solely linked to Weberian power. It is closely 
linked to an ability to mobilize people (followers or potential rivals), to have things 
done, make projects or arrangements succeed, to have contacts and be able to mobilize 
these for whatever reason. Some may be mobilized from a sense of duty (e.g. family), 
others from a sense of obligation (dependent labourers, debtors), others again from a
38Bengali has three different terms for the second person pronoun: apni (polite, 
respectful), tumi (common), and tui (used to inferiors, children, dogs or among very 
close friends).
39Interestingly, Fuller points out that in pre-colonial India the politico-economic 
system centred upon control over both land and people. "Considered economically, 
what counted was control over the produce of the land. Considered politically, what 
counted was control over the people on the land." Fuller 1977:95-6, emphasis in 
original.
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sense of common cause (friends in a faith or ideology). The immediate cause of the 
bond that ties two individuals together thus and lets one "dictate" the actions of the 
other, is not immediately of importance to the net effect of influence. This is because 
bonds and leadership should be socially acceptable, and should be shrouded in a garb 
that does not hurt the feelings of the (analytically) subordinated. This is where 
phrases such as "We were all in it together" come in, as indicative of efforts of 
"alliance-building" both towards potential rivals and towards less powerful followers 
whose sentiments one does not wish to hurt.
In a very interesting article, Inden presents the role and image of the Hindu king as 
found in middle Bengali literature (15th to 18th centuries).40 He points to the 
importance in decision-making of people surrounding the king, people who were 
included in decision-making. These people were of different kinds: kin, both agnates 
and affines, subordinate chiefs, village headmen, respected leaders of caste groups, and 
finally dependent though powerful (court) officials. All were powerful in their own 
ways, enjoying individual forms of influence, and had to be respected. Inden 
comments that:
In order for a raja to Rile and maintain his power, he has to perform a 
balancing act between the different groups in his following as well as between 
members of each group 41
40Inden 1965.
41Inden 1965:29.
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The obvious reason for this was that the king alone could not enforce any decisions 
against the will of the rest. Many decisions concerned disputes over authority and 
prestige among or within caste groups or families, disputes in which a recognition 
among the powerful individuals present was a sine qua non. Without that recognition 
there could not be a decision. As one king was quoted as saying in a genealogy, "If 
I do not have the consent of everyone, what power have I?"42
The king was here conceived of as a primus inter pares, who "ruled" by consensus. 
He was not a law-maker and did not sway decisions alone. He was to a large extent 
a medium for the common will, albeit also part of the group and as such someone 
with an agenda of his own. The king was still king, and enjoyed a priviliged and 
unusual position and status, and he had forces behind him, in the army, the 
administration, and the treasury. However, in these institutions were more people with 
whom he had to relate. Furthermore, these forces were limited and brute force could 
not make a population accept decisions such as changes in ritual status (as was the 
case in Inden’s example).
The inclusion of family members, allies and other influentials into the realm and the 
"power" of the king was also found by Heesterman’s reading of Kautilya’s 
Arthasastra 43 Kautilya continuously stressed the dependence of the king on his 
associates. Even in the annual auditing process in Kautilya’s elaborate bureaucracy
42Inden 1965:31.
43Heesterman 1985. Kautilya is known as "the Indian Machiavelli". His 
Arthasastra is a treatise on politics.
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(where the officials perform their own auditing process), the top officials appear as 
"a body of cosharers with the king rather than regular bureaucrats".44 The king also 
accommodated the interests of others, such as kin and allies. This stems, in 
Heesterman’s reading, from the obvious fact of the king’s limited power, from the 
existence of others with rights in the realm, its territory and harvested crop. With a 
complex and overlapping system of rights and shares, it was not possible (or perhaps 
desirable) to reduce these to a numerical formula. Instead, the king was "the hub of 
the wheel" of delicate balancing acts, "reduced to operating the system of personal 
relationships from within, as a participant in it, by balancing the different factions that 
jealously watch each other".45
The Arthasastra also indicates "the open-endedness of the state": including allies and 
allies’s allies, reducing the "state" to essentially personal relations to the king. People 
representing or symbolizing officials, kin, and allies and allies’s allies, and even 
potential rivals — the paternal cousin — participated in the king’s consecration, and 
were considered important to the king’s legitimacy through being constituent parts of 
his "realm". Essentially, Kautilya’s state was one of continuous strife, of eternal 
renewal and maintenance of the king’s position.
This picture, read from ancient texts, fits surprisingly well with the situation in the 
villages of Udaynala and Gopinathpur. Many individuals had influence and could thus 
(claim to) participate in the running of the affairs of the village. Their sources of
44Heesterman 1985:133.
45Heesterman 1985:139.
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influence varied, from a large family to political contacts, from being part of the 
"dominant caste" to having debtors or economic clout. These various people, with 
their "knowledge" and their "wealth", were placated by the major village leader. They 
were allies, and at the same time potential rivals. The major village leader, or the 
king, was no more than a primus inter pares, both ideally and in real terms. His 
influence could be matched, and he was structurally more often than not equal to 
many others.
In the endeavour to understand village politics and socio-cultural changes, these 
observations are crucial. The main points to underline are that in a society of much 
inequality, a number of people could still be found to be near-equals in terms of 
influence and equals in terms of sentiments and norms. This situation entailed 
competition and rivalry, groups and alliance-building, balancing one against the other. 
The Bengali term khamata is most interesting here and yields a wide understanding 
of village politics. The term refers to agility and influence, the ability to have things 
done and to mobilize people for the project or cause one initiates. In this, "power" 
and "authority" can be differentiated only with difficulty because both may yield 
supporters — although in different manners. "Knowledge", or in the history of rural 
West Bengal, modernist or communist ideology (to be taken up in Chapter Four), 
becomes an entity comparable to wealth or political contacts in political rivalry, or 
perhaps even an entity of superior importance and quality because it constitutes what 
may ultimately decide competition among individuals of more or less comparable 
wealth.
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However, before going on to an investigation of the appropriateness of these ideas to 
the political history of rural West Bengal and the region’s socio-cultural changes, we 
need to find a new set of concepts to deal with the "making” of the individual village 
leader from among the larger pool of would-be’s. I am particularly concerned with 
understanding the importance of "knowledge" and how this is evaluated among people, 
with that other perspective on the village leader, from below. It is to this Chapter 
Three turns.
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THREE
GOSSIP AND CONFIDENCE:
THE MAKING OF VILLAGE LEADERS
Introduction
In a village people tend to spend much time gossiping. Gossip — adda — is rural 
Bengal’s favourite pastime. Women visit one another during the day to exchange 
views and news. Men meet in the fields or, preferably, in the evening, at one 
another’s home, where they discuss and smoke biris (country cigarettes) together. 
Younger people meet in the alleys, at street comers, or in purpose-built meeting- 
places, to tell stories, joke, play cards and sing the latest hit-songs. They all gossip 
—  about people they know, about people of the village in general, or about recent 
events. Rumours (gujab) arise and thrive, and people’s reputations for this or that are 
constantly under construction. Nicknames and suggestive couplets are invented by the 
more daring and creative, and old incriminating rumours or stories told and retold.
Gossip is an important social mechanism because everyone is "in the know". 
Everyone is informed and all contribute with their own information towards a 
communal body of knowledge and opinion. Gossip is particularly important for 
village leaders because leadership naturally means being in the forefront, exposed to 
village gossip. Their actions, motives and personalities are chatted over, argued over, 
subject to reflection and eventually evaluated against popular sentiments and shared
values. It is crucial to a village leader to have a good reputation because otherwise 
people will find it difficult to associate with him and heed him at village meetings. 
Taken together, gossip, rumours, nicknames, jokes, and suggestive couplets, constitute 
a semi-public realm for the making and unmaking of individuals’ "names" (nam) or 
reputations, with a bearing on individual leaders’ political capability. This realm is 
free from the constraints of public life — the show of respect, the rules of address, 
seniority — because it takes place in private, between intimates.
It is not gossip in itself that is interesting, but what it reveals of the relationship 
between commoners and village leaders, and the restraints it poses on the actions of 
the latter. At issue here is the relationship between a small number of villagers and 
the rest. Are the few — in spite of perhaps superior "powers" at their disposal — 
capable of swaying the population in the desired direction if this is against a majority 
sentiment? I will suggest below that they are not. If we consider only the structural 
criteria — land, ritual status, or political contacts — we lose the dynamics of village 
politics, of the intimate and circumstantial of small-scale societies, and, subsequently, 
of the environment in which social change can take place.
Gossip, Gluckman suggested, holds communities together and maintains their values. 
He makes the very interesting observation that gossip ultimately refers to and sustains 
group values. It is to these shared values that people, in gossip, refer when standard 
codes of behaviour are broken. Errant members of (small-scale) communities are
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brought in line by being whispered about. Even where gossip is "malicious", i.e. not 
based on errant behaviour, it will refer to shared values for the resonance effect.1
This view is in contrast to the one suggested by James Scott, who sees gossip as one 
of the "weapons of the weak" —  although not particularly effective. The weak gain 
leverage but above all express themselves through this semi-public and danger-free 
realm, where the rich are talked about in disrespectful and satirical ways that could 
not be used in public, "...gossip is a kind of democratic ’voice’ in conditions where 
power and possible repression make open acts of disrespect dangerous".2 Even the 
rich do not want to have a bad reputation and everybody is afraid of bad rumours 
being spread about them. They therefore accommodate, to an extent, public sentiment. 
Scott also suggests that people may be reluctant to work for someone of whom they 
have heard bad things.
Together with other "weapons", gossip represents a partly unarticulated poor man’s 
discourse, according to Scott. Gluckman’s "shared values" are here divided between 
the rich and their ideological hegemony and the poor and their alternative values. In 
gossip, argues Scott, is found a perspective on labour or social relations often different 
from the "official" public one presented by the rich. "Gossip", he writes, "is never 
’disinterested’; it is a partisan effort (by class, faction, family) to advance its claims 
and interests against those of others".3 Gossip, like other forms of everyday
^luckm an 1963.
2Scott 1985:282.
3Scott 1985:282.
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resistance, refers back to a shared value-system but contests the interpretations of the 
rich. Theft, for instance, may be interpreted by some poor as "a kind of self-help 
zakat [Islamic tithe] gift".4
Udaynala and Gopinathpur seem to have been very different from the society studied 
by Scott. As seen in Chapter Two, there was a large degree of rivalry among village 
leaders. Furthermore, although village society was very far from egalitarian, there was 
nonetheless a severe limit on the "powers" enjoyed by the village leaders. Rather, 
broad support was a sine qua non of village leadership. Village leaders, when 
engaged as judges or deliberators in issues ranging from family disputes to allegations 
of theft, could hope for a decision to be effective only if it was based on popular 
sentiment, on a near-general consensus.
In respect of the emphasis laid on consensus in decision-making and the importance 
of gossip on individual leaders’ capabilities, Udaynala and Gopinathpur seem more 
akin to the egalitarian village society studied by Brison. She makes two points of 
interest here. Firstly, she shows that community leaders are particularly exposed to 
the dangers of gossip and rumour. In relatively egalitarian societies, where leaders 
stand out, she says, command and respect are based on and ruined by hints, 
unsubstantiated interpretations, and suggestions. Gossip and rumour "are essential 
both to constituting, and, ultimately, destroying the position of leaders."5 But leaders 
also use these themselves, to destroy their rivals or prop up their own position.
4Scott 1985:291.
5Brison 1992:3.
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Although Udaynala and Gopinathpur were not egalitarian societies, we will still find 
that mechanism at work; gossip and more or less substantiated rumours severely 
affecting the effectiveness of individual village leaders. Brison* s second point is that 
this realm of gossip and rumour is not dominated by either (would-be) leaders — who 
may be attacked in gossip, but who likewise manipulate names and reputations —  or 
by "commoners" — who may use the realm in much the same way as rivalling 
leaders. Rather than being dominated by one or the other, says Brison, sustained 
rumours reflect social values or perceptions, and contribute towards making sense of 
events.6 In her study, gossip appears as a realm where everybody can participate, and 
eventually, she says, gossip and rumours "comprise a sort of oral history and come to 
constitute the ’map’ of events, relationships, and personalities".7
From Udaynala it will be observed that not only is gossip important to village politics, 
but it is also crucial to a village leader’s effectiveness that he obtains a positive 
evaluation in the semi-public realm of gossip. He can do so by compliance to the 
expectations villagers have of the appropriate behaviour and activities of leaders, 
particularly their ability to assist, intervene, advise, and be "an elder brother". Thus 
it will be seen how village leaders spend much of their time "being around" talking 
to people or seeing people at home. Leaders with statutory powers, such as panchayat 
members, are not excused from such time-consuming activities. They are all 
requested to assist fellow villagers in different ways and manners, and in practice do 
so to the extent they find required or possible.
6Brison 1992:23.
7Brison 1992:4.
People enter into relationships with one another which result in mutual assistance and 
consideration. If A is helped by B, he will not talk badly about B lest he ruin his own 
reputation. A village leader who has a reputation for being able and helpful will be 
talked about respectfully and will more easily command sympathetic ears when 
making a point in a large discussion or when making an appeal, suggestion, etc. 
Engagement on behalf of villagers constitutes a crucial element in what people expect 
of leaders. More importantly, such engagement creates relationships of mutual trust 
and confidence, and an obligation to reciprocate — ties of obligation that the village 
leader depends on. Village leaders are not elected, and although they are normally 
wealthy and high-status, their '’office" is not official and their position qua leader 
depends entirely on the popular acceptance and the confidence they are able to muster. 
The role of supplications in reputation-building is a double-barrelled affair, where only 
people’s requests make it possible for someone to show his concern for fellow 
villagers, only a successful intervention makes it possible for him to create a 
reputation as a potential village leader. In order to settle disputes or solve problems 
successfully, he would need to find solutions acceptable to a large number of people. 
The ambitious village leader is thus very preoccupied by what is going on in the 
village, what is happening, what this or that person is up to, and particularly by what 
"is being said", both to help create his own reputation and to know the general drift 
of public opinion.
However, village leaders do not appear as ambitious wheeler-dealers. What is 
particularly emphasized for leadership in Udaynala — both by villagers and in my 
analysis — are personal qualities and the respect, reputation and confidence bestowed
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on individual village leaders qua individuals by other villagers. This is quite 
irrespective of positions with statutory powers, a proviso with manifest implications, 
so that even officially appointed or elected village leaders (or Gram Panchayat 
members) need to engage in the same semi-public realm of confidence-building to 
maintain their efficiency. Mayer noted from Ramkheri — a village of once four 
headmen with statutory powers — that personal qualities and interest mattered 
particularly in maintaining their influence in unofficial matters and in selecting from 
among the four the one or two major village leaders. At the time of Mayer’s field 
study, elected offices had been institutionalized but had proved impotent. Instead, an 
unofficial committee (the "Comprehensive Committee") was initiated by villagers and 
became the influential organ of local government.8
In Udaynala and Gopinathpur, a number of village leaders existed quite in spite of a 
lack of any office even after 15 years of panchayati raj ("panchayat rule"). Even the 
office of panchayat membership was not sufficient in itself either to be heeded in 
informal, unofficial matters or to explain the mechanisms for the selection of village 
leaders (as shown in Chapter Two). In these villages, the absence of institutionalized 
village leadership (or headmanship) made the competition all the more open. Village 
leadership was a fickle position, easily lost, and continuously in need of maintenance.
The role of gossip and the informal, semi-public realm in constituting both the 
reputations of village leaders and the village political agenda is explored below 
through a history of groups, alliances and conflicts in Udaynala. It will show the
8Mayer 1960:92-114; this in the "traditional" system.
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workings of village politics: how prestige and reputations, gossip and rumours are part 
of subtle political struggles — struggles that do not appear publicly, that go on 
without being expressed, hidden somewhere in silences and in arguments on different 
issues. This story suggests the implications of rumours and gossip on the village 
agenda, and on village leaders and their reputations. More profoundly, it will suggest 
how limited the village leader’s own capacity is to form the agenda or follow his own 
preferred strategy. Village leaders are often overtaken by events, and find their 
position constantly challenged. It will emerge how the village leader is not so much 
a force in himself as an extension of the society of which he is part.
Gossip and rumour become particularly important for the agenda of village politics in 
societies without formal village leader positions or with a large number of people who 
for different reasons (such as ritual ranking) can and will not consider themselves 
inferior. Here crucial elements in the maintenance of leadership are the subtleties of 
alliances with other individuals of importance. These alliances are informal, even 
implicit, personal and multi-faceted ad hoc understandings based on mutual 
confidence. But "confidence" is crucial in a more general sense. It is the building- 
block for the relationship the individual leader has to create with all villagers — 
relationships for which the term "alliance" can be used but only in a vague sense. We 
prefer instead Bourdieu’s term "symbolic capital" — the exchange of unpaid labour 
or goods, and support — and apply this to village leaders’ relations with other 
villagers. The leader needs an ability to make people comfortable with his leadership, 
or to hide the subordination. The exercise of power must translate subordination into
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a socially recognized relationship in a situation where broad acquiescence or even 
support are needed — both for legitimation and effectiveness.
In this situation, gossip is not only a "weapon of the weak" — a largely ineffectual 
counter-hegemonic discourse — but the village discourse. Gossip is integral to village 
politics and forms its agenda and the reputation and thus effectiveness of individual 
leaders. Because it refers to commonly held beliefs and to individual characters, 
gossip ultimately concerns the relationship between villagers, the confidence that ties 
them together, or the suspicion that divides them. It affects the ability of village 
leaders to be heeded, sway the opinion at village meetings, and remain leaders.
Most of the material here refers to Udaynala, with only an occasional reference to 
Gopinathpur. Furthermore, most of the material draws on the activities of one 
community only, that of the sekh jati (caste, or sub-caste). Other jatis are involved 
only in a more limited manner. However, there is no reason to believe that the social 
mechanisms presented here vary markedly from one jati to another. Specific inter-jati 
relations will be taken up later on, in Chapter Six.
The making and unmaking of individual reputations
Semi-public displays of respect or disrespect are made in one’s absence, among a 
group of friends. Rumours, allegations, suggestive couplets and nicknames thrive in 
the most widespread of all pastimes in rural Bengal: gossiping (adda dewa). Gossip 
is a semi-public realm outside the confines of formality such as in public meetings
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where rules of address, respect, seniority, etc. apply. It is largely danger-free because 
it is rarely possible to punish for slander. The ultimate evasive source for sensitive 
information in Bengali is "It is being said among people" (loke bale). This refers to 
gossip, where one is talked about and evaluated.9 In gossip motives and intentions 
are interpreted and potentially given unintended meaning, one’s influence is 
questioned, one’s behaviour commented upon and evaluated with reference to 
commonly accepted norms. Furthermore, liaisons between different individuals can 
and are suggested and may cause a questioning of one’s honesty and integrity. It is 
a semi-public realm, but it is public enough — because everyone "is in the know" — 
to be important to individual reputations. Gossip and rumours affect all villagers in 
general and village leaders in particular.
Consider nicknames such as "Dairy-Anuar", whose dairy project flopped 15 years ago 
due to a cow disease; or "Mad-Kaji" who is considered a bit eccentric; "Goat-Santi" 
(or, more pointedly, "Stud-Santi") whose young wife ran away with a lover; or the 
small, dark and energetic but generally disliked Manik Chaudhuri who was known as 
"Manki-Chaudhuri" (i.e. Monkey). There were other more subtle ways, as in referring 
to Habib Rahman — although known to all — not by his name but as "khet majur 
neta" (leader of labourers), a satirical twist implying that he was not quite what he 
wanted to be. Of a more serious sort, often with implications for their political 
ambitions, were rumours of love affairs. A former panchayat member for Udaynala 
South, Biswanath, was "known" to be involved with an attractive married woman, and
9I was myself once informed that according to what "loke bale" my "respect" was 
going downwards. It was made known to me by a friend so that I could act upon it 
and correct my ways.
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this contributed to his poor reputation, his inability to be considered a potential all­
village leader or obtain attention at meetings (even while panchayat member). There 
was also a tendency to associate certain individuals with incriminating or ridiculing 
incidents. Such stories were plentiful and well-known, and a reference in a word or 
two is often enough to arouse anger or laughter. "Dairy-Anuar" was a case in point. 
Although pious, moderately well-off, and unblemished in the failure of his dairy 
project, his nickname and that association made it difficult for "Dairy-Anuar” to be 
taken seriously.
Reputations could be "made" through public displays of respect, by accommodating 
individuals and attributing to them their "due" prestige. Dignitaries of all sorts were 
expected to be given proper seating and an opportunity to address an assembly. 
Meetings with microphones were notoriously long-drawn (even lesser leaders like the 
respect suggested in the opportunity to address an assembly), and I have witnessed 
several meetings in which the number of speakers was as large as or larger than the 
number of spectators. Important people were also expected to be served tea, the most 
senior in the best cups, the lesser ones in glasses.
The public and the semi-public thrive on each other: The public realm is very often 
a reflection of the semi-public but not necessarily. The public realm may also 
contradict the semi-public perception. The semi-public, on the other hand, gains 
sustance, material, from the public. Credentials, statements and names — as displayed 
in the public realm — translate into village influence only if corroborated by general 
consensus in the semi-public realm. One’s "name" consists of the respect others are
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prepared to show. It is based on social consensus and can be made or unmade 
through social processes.
These are only minor cases — although serious enough for people involved. Below 
I will follow a case where gossip came to have a decisive impact on the course of 
village politics and on the actions of village leaders. It points to the close 
interrelationship between village leaders and commoners, particularly to village 
leaders’ preoccupation with their "names" and the impact of gossip on the creation of 
these — a gossip dominated by non-leaders.
Towards Bhadubhai’s bichar
In the following we shall see how a string of bichar ("village courts") and meetings 
held in Udaynala in 1992-3 — although on widely different issues — became 
connected to one another and to other incidents and developments in people’s 
perception (as expressed in the gossip), and how these (for the main actors) 
unintended interpretations gained a momentum of their own with severe implications 
for the main characters and their political effectiveness. What became of particular 
concern was a struggle over influence, name, reputation and prestige in the village. 
Vital to this development were the interpretations of ambitions that people made, 
interpretations the main actors had perhaps intended, perhaps not. Motives were read 
into actions, conspiracies suggested, and actors and actions interpreted through popular 
perceptions of prestige and of what "should be done".
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Let me start by introducing the background for the two main characters, Haksaheb and 
Rabiel. Haksaheb was a dominant figure in both the village and the area for several 
decades. He was the panchayat member for Udaynala North from the first election 
in 1964 until 1993, and he was member of the CPM from the mid-1970s.10 After the 
"fall" of Ehiasaheb in 1975 (see Chapter Two), Haksaheb became the unrivalled 
leader, a position only strengthened by the instalment of the CPM in 1977. The 
panchayat members for Udaynala South until 1993, both of the low-caste bagdi jati, 
were chosen by him. In the village, Haksaheb was in particular supported by the 
middle-para families, of which his own family was one, a group which was well 
united and backed Haksaheb in meetings and with volunteers. Particularly the youth 
of these families, led by Ajam Chaudhuri, were active supporters of Haksaheb. His 
personal position was such that he was rarely, and never seriously, challenged between 
1977 and 1992. He was also a very prominent figure in the area, with contacts far 
and wide.
However, the year after his re-election as panchayat member in 1988 he relinquished 
his party membership card due to "differences" with the party. He also stopped 
attending panchayat meetings. He was not reappointed to run as the party’s panchayat 
candidate in 1993, the seat being reserved for women.11 In spite of this loss of
10The 1964 panchayat system had four tiers, the 1978 one has three. Haksaheb 
was in the second from lowest level in the old system, in the lowest in the new; i.e. 
he was always in the level that covered the anchal (10-15 villages). Under the 1978 
system Udaynala had two panchayat seats (here known as Udaynala North and 
Udaynala South).
11 About one third of all panchayat seats in West Bengal were reserved for women 
with effect from the 1993 election.
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institutionalized influence, he retained his informal position in Udaynala where he 
continued to hold various positions, was always made chairman in village meetings 
and was consulted on, or involved in, practically everything going on. He continued 
to be the major village leader, about whom it was said that "Without Haksaheb there 
will be no bichar".
In about early 1992 Haksaheb’s position started to decline. The decline was not 
immediately obvious, but came in small incidents. These incidents may be regarded 
individually, in which case they do not add up to much. But they were interpreted — 
in the semi-public realm — in light of a growing opposition to him by younger 
would-be leaders. There was a number of them from among the first cohort of 
college-educated in the village, all active during the 1980s, and mainly from non- 
middle-para families: Rabiel, Fajlul, Santi, Ohab, Biswanath and others. Rabiel was 
the more important. A low-key, cerebral organizer, he rose in the party over the years 
and always sought collaboration not disruption. He remained second to Haksaheb, but 
that seemed only natural given differences in age and experience. However, in 1993 
his wife, Sandha, who was politically inexperienced, was chosen as the party’s 
candidate for panchayat member in Udaynala North. Due to her lack of political 
experience, Rabiel became the de facto panchayat member.12 After this election the 
long-standing and continued dominance in village affairs by the middle-para group and 
Haksaheb started to be an irritant to Rabiel. The increased dissonance between him 
and Haksaheb became progressively evident and "known", although Rabiel did not
12It was "known" in Udaynala that Sandha was appointed by the party so that 
Rabiel could become the de facto panchayat member for a seat nominally reserved for 
women.
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express any dissatisfaction and continued to work with Haksaheb. Rabiel also kept 
his distance from the more open "opposition", including his cousin Fajlul.
The fact that it was Haksaheb’s panchayat seat, Udaynala North, that was reserved for
women, and that the party selected Sandha, politically inexperienced but wife of
Rabiel, added to the gossip about why Haksaheb had left the party in the first place
jcsuLrth
— whether he had been rejected or himself had declined a forth period. Four months 
after the election, Haksaheb’s once party-supported elevation into the position of 
secretary of the cooperative society (he had been chosen to clean up the mess left by 
the former secretary, the heavily corrupt then panchayat member for Udaynala South, 
Biswanath) came under open attack as undemocratic at the annual general assembly. 
There had been no protests at the previous general assembly, and the party’s role in 
Haksaheb’s elevation had surprised no-one. What was surprising was that Haksaheb 
was now publicly attacked, and that the attack was lead by Ohab and his brother Raja, 
both of whom had "secretly" met Biswanath a few days earlier. Biswanath was 
"known" to be quite close to Santi, new panchayat member of Udaynala South and a 
favourite of the party. These "connections" gave gossipers a field-day.
Some months later Haksaheb’s 17-year-old son was beaten up by some youngsters 
from a neighbouring village. The immediate cause of the beating was a quarrel over 
a kabaddi-game a few weeks earlier, but — again — the fact that someone dared beat 
Haksaheb’s son was to him and others a sign of his declining prestige and reputation. 
He sought to have the culprits subjected to a bichar in Udaynala, a bichar that would
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have vindicated and reasserted his authority and influence. But the party was not 
behind him.
The major threat to his prestige and influence, however, came in connection with 
Bhadubhai, a poor labourer often employed by Haksaheb and considered his protege. 
Bhadubhai’s family had a several years-old dispute over some land and a small 
amount of money with their immediate neighbours, particularly with Milon, a young 
woman "known" to be terrifically quarrel-some. The dispute resulted in a dramatic 
night-time police raid in the village in 1992, in which a police party came to arrest 
Bhadubhai and his brother for the attempted murder of Milon. It was Milon who had 
filed the complaint, but it was unlikely to be true (though she may have been beaten 
by them). In spite of the fickle ground for the allegation and the fact that the police 
rarely act on such unsubstantiated reports, the police had nonetheless come to arrest 
Bhadubhai. And without even consulting Haksaheb, panchayat member and 
Bhadubhai’s patron. Haksaheb was caught off-guard, and although on the following 
day he did manage to secure permission from the police for Bhadubhai to remain in 
the village for the time being, he could not prevent the case from proceeding to court.
The police, it was argued in village gossip, were unlikely to have raided or persisted 
without some political pressure. They would not have been reacting to Milon’s 
allegations without consulting someone influential and knowledgeable in the village. 
In a grand conspiracy theory involving power balances and struggles within the party
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and the local Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA),13 it was alleged that 
Rabiel had machinated the whole thing.
A few weeks later Haksaheb called a bichar to settle the score between the 
Bhadubhais and the Milons. At the bichar the middle-para group was in the majority, 
and Haksaheb presided together with Abdul Kabir and Panchu Mandal. Panchu 
Mandal was a generally respected but politically disinterested cultivator. He headed 
the family traditionally considered descendants of the village headman’s lineage, but 
the post had no significance any longer except for a few ritual occasions, although it 
lent him some prestige. Abdul Kabir was head of the "nine-brothers" family —  some 
of whom are well-off landowners, others of whom have become rich from doing 
business in Calcutta. The father of the nine was poor, and their financial success gave 
them self-confidence and ultimately problems in the village. They have generally 
been shunned by the middle-para youth because of their role in the downfall of the 
ABC club ten years earlier (see below). However, Haksaheb always sought to calm 
them down, assisted them when needed, and has included Kabir in his circle. This 
was eventually to the benefit of Kabir who — middle-aged — sought to present 
himself as a reliable and responsible member of society.
The bichar was a disaster. It was dominated by the middle-para people but Milon 
refused to accept their authority. She refused to comply with the compromise reached, 
and kept calling for "her panchayat member" to be present, i.e. Rabiel. By that time
13The CPM’s internal divisions, particularly between the "pragmatists" and the 
"ideologues", were well-known to much of the population, although often interpreted 
in terms of individual ambitions and animosities.
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Sandha had been elected but not inaugurated, and Haksaheb was still officially the 
village panchayat member. Milon’s calls for Rabiel were ignored by those present; 
he was not informed or sent for. Her refusal to accept Haksaheb and the assembly’s 
authority was a slap in the face for the veteran panchayat member and for the middle- 
para families. She was accused of disrespect {any ay a). Eventually Milon’s mama 
("uncle", her "guardian" since her husband worked in Delhi) declined to be further 
involved and went home. But as judge (or deliberator: bicharak) Panchu Mandal 
insisted on a solution. He went to fetch the mama, but they started to quarrel. To the 
utmost humiliation of Panchu Mandal they ended up fighting in the mud, where they 
were soon joined by others.
Afterwards the large group of middle-para youth vigorously campaigned for the 
ultimate social weapon, ostracism {ekghare rakha) — an aim implicitly accepted by 
the elders. The next day the youth went around the village collecting signatures for 
Milon’s ostracization. The endeavour largely flopped, however, and one reason seems 
to have been that people saw this conflict not only in light of Milon’s or Bhadubhai’s 
right or wrong, but increasingly in light of how the two sides appeared to be involved 
in a dispute over influence in the village. And people were unwilling to take sides. 
Normally such an endeavour would have been entirely successful with the middle-para 
group’s support, but now their influence was diminishing because of interpretations 
made in village gossip.
To Haksaheb’s opponents, the Milon-bichar was a painful example of how the middle- 
para group sought to dominate and had dominated village affairs for too long. The
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group had ignored Milon’s calls for Rabiel’s mediation and proceeded to have her 
ostracized. A few days later a party meeting was held at the local party office in S- 
bazar. Here Rabiel vented his frustration for the first time. "Rule [sason] in 
Udaynala", he said, "is all done by Ajam [Chaudhuri, of the middle-para] and his 
friends, they are all Haksaheb’s boys. What right [adhikar] do these households have 
to run things?" His grudge was supported by others from Udaynala at the meeting, 
particularly by Biswanath, former panchayat member for Udaynala South and 
opponent of Haksaheb. Biswanath made sure the party’s reluctance to support 
Haksaheb was made known in the village.
It was at this time that Fajlul decided to arrange a "cultural function" (a common thing 
to do, as we shall see more of in Chapter Four). His cousin Rabiel was also involved 
in the preparations, although the two had so far not been on speaking terms. Rabiel 
was prominently seated during the function itself together with a number of other 
outside invitees, and participated in a small play staged during the function. 
Haksaheb, however, was not invited, and when he appeared nonetheless, he was not 
requested to sit among the prominent invitees. Fajlul made sure he had already left 
before he "invited" him to address the assembly. These not-so-subtle insults and the 
implications of Rabiel’s role were lost on no one.
It was also at this time "heard" in Udaynala that the village imam had been seen with
a woman in a shed very late at night. It was Bhadubhai who had seen them, the 
ujotvyay*
■women-in question being a sister-in-law of Milon, Bhadubhai’s long-standing enemy. 
He gave a precise date of the sighting, and this lent additional credence to an already
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existing rumour that the imam-saheb was indeed having an affair with her. That 
rumour had been around for some time, sustained with particular glee by the middle- 
para families. They had but scant respect for the imam who was active in the Muslim 
proselytizing layman organization Tabligh Jamat. A number of villagers had long 
wanted to stop the rumours, but these were veiy unspecific and it had not been 
possible to confront directly the powerful middle-para families on such flimsy 
grounds. When Bhadubhai started spreading his rumour, however, the allegations 
became very specific and at the same time the middle-para group’s influence was seen 
to be diminishing. The imam’s associates demanded a bichar and partly because of 
the weakened position of the middle-para families, the bichar demand was not 
opposed.
It was in this situation of a prolonged "nibbling away" of Haksaheb’s and the middle- 
para families’ prestige and their historical claim on respect, and a week or so before 
the bichar against Bhadubhai, that they decided to relaunch their once famous ABC 
club. The ABC club had been active in Udaynala from 1976 to 1984. It was headed 
by a number of prominent villagers (Haksaheb, Waselmaster, Imam Hosen — see 
Chapter Two — the last two later died), but the drive behind it was in the hands of 
the fairly large number of youth. They were the first large cohort in the village to 
have been college educated. Among them dominated the sons of the four or five 
traditionally dominating middle-p^ra14 families: Ajam Chaudhuri (Imam Hosen’s 
eldest son), three of Haksaheb’s sons, and four 01* five from the Sekh and Munsi
Hpara = neighbourhood, defined ad hoc following loose social or geographical 
criteria. Most of the historically dominant families lived in the "middle-para".
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families. In addition to these, there were some of the younger ones of the "nine- 
brothers"-family (also middle-para) — the elder brothers doing well in the steel polish 
business in Calcutta. Lastly there were the cousins Rabiel and Fajlul (Waselmaster’s 
son and school teacher) from the north-para, and panchayat members-to-be Biswanath 
and Santi.
The club was particularly active and efficient after the instalment of the CPM and the 
Left Front Government in 1977 when the first years of communist rule created a 
euphoric atmosphere of cooperation and social work. The ABC activists were all 
associated with the CPM. The club was a major and efficient organizer of various 
communal activities: the rakh (guarding the ripe paddy), football matches and other 
games, economic assistance to poor households, it brought electricity to the village, 
and had pipes dug in under the road (to prevent flooding). It also organized a library 
and various cultural functions, especially poetry readings and theatre performances. 
It enjoyed enormous prestige.
The club ceased to function in about 1984 for a number of reasons. With their elder 
brothers’ increased business success in Calcutta, the younger "nine-brothers" sought 
a more prominent position within the village and refused to bow to the will of the 
youngsters from the historically dominant families. There were two indecisive fights 
over this. When Fajlul — after the death of his father — opposed the middle-para 
youth’s dominance by starting his own theatre club, then he was supported by the 
"nine-brothers". The final blow was then delivered by Imam Hosen, secretary of the 
club, who had registered in his own name four bighas of land intended for the ABC
to sharecrop. After this, Fajlul, the "nine-brothers" and Imam Hosen (whose younger 
sister was married to Haksaheb) were all prevented from any major role in village 
affairs by the group of middle-para families which saw them as enemies and 
disruptive elements. The club’s demise created a cleavage in the village —  cutting 
local CPM support in two — that was to last for a long time. The "middle-para" 
families, the group around Haksaheb, came to enjoy a preeminent position in the 
village.
The ABC remained a glorious memory until the position of Haksaheb and his 
supporters went into rapid decline, in 1993. It was Ajam who formally called for a 
meeting as son of previous secretary Imam Hosen — who had misappropriated four 
bighas from the club. Fajlul — who had been prominent in the old ABC but had 
contributed to its downfall — was not invited. Rabiel — who had been prominent but 
not disruptive — was also left out, whereas the "nine-brothers" — with a terrific 
reputation for disruption — were invited. Also invited was Panchu Mandal, who had 
not been part of the old ABC. He was invited by Haksaheb and Ajam in a special 
and unusual deputation to his home.
The relaunch was a success. Forty to fifty people were present, and a full-fledged 
organization was established with a board of twenty-two from which a secretariat was 
elected. Ajam was made secretary, Panchu Mandal President, and Haksaheb chairman 
of an "Advisory Committee". The only dissonance was the issue of the four bighas 
misappropriated by Ajam’s faltering father. But after a short discussion it was 
dismissed by Haksaheb with a "What’s done is done", and "Let us start afresh." He
then proceeded to donate Rs 100 towards a new fund and Ajam donated Rs 50 (the 
cheapest four bighas in the history of the village, it was later mumbled). In the 
following week the new ABC initiated guarding the ripe paddy, football and kabaddi 
matches, and various other activities. The organizational force behind these initiatives 
was Ajam.
In light of these circumstances and developments Bhadubhai’s bichar —  the following 
week — was held and seen. At the bichar itself there was relatively little argument. 
Milon’s family continuously pressed on Bhadubhai, who was questioned by Haksaheb 
as chairman of the meeting and senior-most judge. Haksaheb’s opponents, such as 
Rabiel or Fajlul, Biswanath or Santi, were all absent. The middle-para group (Abdul 
Kabir, Ajam, and others) was present but quiet. The case, they told me later on, was 
lost in advance. There was no defence for Bhadubhai, only his word against that of 
the imam. They did not seek to dominate this bichar like they had with Milon’s. 
They were weakened, but they were present, showing that they had strength enough 
to take the blow.
Gossip and the village agenda
Bhadubhai had gone too far by alleging a sighting of the imam and the woman. 
However, the bichar would not have been called without the negative developments 
in Haksaheb’s position and the implicit support of his opponents. With the Milon- 
bichar fresh in mind, which the middle-para group had sought but failed to dominate, 
the Bhadubhai-bichar could have become an indictment of the entire group. It is in
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this light that the relaunch of the ABC gains its proper perspective. The choice of the 
ABC instead of a new name was seen as an un-camouflaged slight at Fajlul and by 
extension Rabiel. In the relaunch of the ABC, the middle-para group headed by 
Haksaheb showed its size, cohesion and influence by pulling off a major meeting and 
organizing a club that took care of important activities. Their sphere of influence had 
been expanded by including the respected Panchu Mandal — politically inexperienced 
and no doubt manipulatable in the hands of the experienced Haksaheb — who had 
been deeply humiliated by being dragged into a fight in the mud by Milon’s 
"guardian". By conferring honours, extending invitations, through praise and 
protection, he had instead been incorporated into the sphere of influence which 
Haksaheb was in the process of consolidating and extending to counter the rivalry 
from Rabiel.
Gossip contributes towards the creation of the village agenda. Through gossiping 
events and actions are associated and interpreted in context, with patterns of previous 
events, rumours, and known facts. Together this leads to a setting in which positions, 
goals, links, and relative strengths are perceived. More importantly, these popularly 
held interpretations or perceptions lead to expectations of courses of action — 
expectations that must be acted upon because failure to do so leads to the corrosion 
of reputations. This was what we saw in the immediate pre-history of the Bhadubhai- 
bichar. The bichar itself concerned the imam, Bhadubhai, the woman, and village 
social standards. However the circumstances of it — the linking of those involved to 
the previous Milon-bichar, the Milon family’s association to Rabiel, the increased 
tension between Rabiel and Haksaheb in the aftermath of the Milon-bichar, and
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Haksaheb’s increasingly difficult relation to the party — created an environment in 
which Haksaheb’s authority was severely threatened. To retain it demanded actions 
that would impress the villagers with his (continued) powers. As it became clear that 
Bhadubhai had to face a bichar he could not win, it became necessary, almost 
imperative, for the middle-para group to regain a momentum, to retain its reputation. 
The relaunching of the ABC club secured tliis by confirming the size, cohesion and 
ability of the group and of Haksaheb. The careful inclusion of Panchu Mandal was 
a further consolidation and mark of influence.
The whole history from the fall of the ABC to Bhadubhai’s bichar concerned disputes 
and quarrels that ended up in what was perceived of (increasingly also by those 
involved) as part of a power struggle between the two major village leaders and their 
groups over influence in the village. The pace was set by village gossip. 
Protagonists, important incidents and relevant factors were identified and interpreted 
through what was "being said". Notably, neither the final struggle nor the many 
disputes or quarrels that went before it were concerned with anything near issues of 
"real power". There was no land involved, no wealth (except the four ABC bighas, 
but only as a part of the conflict)* and no positions of statutory powers (the panchayat 
election was held and over before Milon’s bichar). Instead, some of the burning 
issues centred around the prestige of a village club, a rumour about the imam-saheb, 
ostracization of a perceived quarrelsome woman, and the beating up of a young boy. 
These incidents were considered insults, challenges, and feuds, and reflected on 
individuals’ reputations, their reputation for being influential. Ultimately gossip 
affected the ability of individuals to influence village affairs.
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Gossip — this seemingly never-ending waste of time — sets the village agenda, and 
also the expectations and limitations for village leaders, the very frame within which 
they have to operate. The "name" or image the leader needs in order to be eligible 
and to proceed in his endeavours is created within this informal realm of gossip. 
Though village leaders no doubt have their own agendas, gossip and their ultimate 
dependence on general goodwill nonetheless require that they stay within the confines 
of popularly held sentiments.
Fingerspitzgefiihl and "symbolic capital"
The informal realm, however, is not (only) about confines, restrictions or limited 
options. It is a quite open, dynamic, and changing field. It can be manipulated, and 
represents opportunities rather than restrictions for the discerning. As the above story 
showed, "timing" (Bourdieu’s tempo), manipulation, the ever-changing village 
rumours, are elements in what is less a restricted field than a field of possibilities for 
the willing and able player. Rather than a game of fixed rules, it is a game of 
constantly new moves and rules, of changing constellations, and, above all, of context- 
based acceptance or denial. What would be unacceptable for one would be acceptable 
for another; what would be unacceptable at one point would be acceptable at another. 
Take for instance Haksaheb’s little manipulation at the end of Bhadubhai’s bichar.
Towards the end of Bhadubhai’s bichar, after it was agreed that he was guilty of 
spreading malicious rumours about the imam, the lively discussions continued on the 
question of appropriate punishment. Many suggestions and arguments were launched:
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he should pay a fine; the fine should go to the mosque; no, the fine should go to a 
village fund; the imam is not from our village, he is our guest, so the punishment 
must be severe; Bhadubhai should work for the mosque; he should walk from house 
to house and apologize.
"Listen, listen!" Haksaheb cut the discussion short at the last suggestion and called 
people to be quiet. Other comments and argument were muffled. As senior-most 
villager present he — as is common — talked through the arguments against 
Bhadubhai and ended by saying that the bichar had reached the conclusion that 
Bhadubhai should walk from house to house to apologize. "Am I right? Is this a fair 
verdict, and is that the verdict of this bichar?" "Yes, yes! That is our decision" agreed 
those around him. Among those were the man who had suggested that punishment, 
and his friends. Other voices drowned in the immediate relapse into general debate. 
The verdict they suddenly had agreed upon was perhaps the least severe or 
disadvantageous for Bhadubhai. Eventually someone disagreed, "He should walk 
barefooted!". This was dismissed by Haksaheb with reference to an undisputed 
principle: "The verdict has been pronounced and we must stand by it." Amendments 
to a common sentence were out of the question.
By means of a little manipulation Haksaheb had reduced a potentially more severe 
punishment. His manipulation was relatively obvious, but he was supported by other 
"elders" present, such as Kabir and Panchu Mandal — a support he had secured and 
made manifest only the week before. This small piece of manipulation was very 
interesting. It pointed to the degree of manoeuvrability village leaders have. No
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single village leader would have been able to assert his own preference against the 
will of the majority without losing respect and influence in the long term or dividing 
the village. But Haksaheb was "allowed" some recompense after Bhadubhai’s 
opponents had been vindicated. The manipulation did not severely affect the general 
consensus and did not offend popular sentiments. If anything it contributed towards 
Haksaheb’s standing as both an able judge and protector of Bhadubhai at the same 
time. Above all, it showed his "feel" of the situation, his understanding or rather 
sensitivity for how far he could go and what would be acceptable, given his own 
position, the circumstances of the bichar and popular views of Bhadubhai, Panchu 
Mandal and others.
He overruled protest, gambling with his reputation as built over the preceding week, 
and won. Without the relaunch of the ABC, he might have lost, and would have had 
a severe blemish on his reputation. Much of Haksaheb’s influence lay in his "feel" 
of the situation, his knowledge of how to exploit it, how to stay on top. He was an 
able player in the game of village politics, manoeuvring between gossip and facts of 
life, gaining support, showing respect, acquiring knowledge of others* reputations and 
how these were affected, of what people to be surrounded by and how to attract them, 
how comments, arguments, circumstances were or would be interpreted. His coup 
with the relaunch of the ABC showed this. Haksaheb owned only 22 bighas of land 
and was not a major employer, and, in the thick of the developments described above, 
he had no position with statutory powers. He countered a challenge — successfully, 
in the general village perception — by "playing the game", a game he could play 
because of his intimate knowledge of the village, its people and their personal enmities
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and friendships, episodes from recent and not-So-recent village history, groups and 
alliances, the local concerns, the here-and-now gossip, the permissible, the rules and 
norms. This "feel" was also crucial to understanding how "alliances" can be formed, 
such as that recently formed between himself and Panchu Mandal: Panchu’s personal 
concerns, what it would take to coax him into village politics, the effect his presence 
would have.
Bourdieu has called this "the art of being in society" — which he applies to all 
members of a community.15 For the case of village leaders we may call it (from 
German) Fingerspitzgefiihl; "the feel in the tip of one’s fingers", the almost instinctive 
understanding of what is acceptable and what is not, and, in particular, what needs to 
be done next — an understanding that the individuals in question are perhaps not able 
to put into words, to define; they just "know". Fingerspitzgefuhl is based on intimate 
knowledge; what is permissible, how names and reputations are made and unmade, 
how actions are interpreted against the background of commonly held values, 
individual concerns and desires. In this, Fingerspitzgefuhl is far from manipulation 
pure and simple. On the contrary, it is important for its effect that it refers very 
closely to social norms and has to be confined within the borders of the acceptable. 
It has to be employed in such a way as to create confidence in the leader.
15Or "the art of necessary improvisation", that is, the "virtuoso’s" juggling with 
options of response, recognition, improvisation, and delay, his "play on all the 
resources inherent in the ambiguities and uncertainties of behaviour and situation in 
order to produce the actions appropriate to each case, to do that of which people will 
say ’There was nothing else to be done’, and do it the right way" (Bourdieu 1977:8). 
Although his point was another, to free us from "the objectivist model of the 
mechanical interlocking of preregulated actions", Bourdieu may have overstated his 
case, as people do make mistakes.
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We find from the above history of village politics that the alliances or ties that were 
created and maintained between, for instance, Haksaheb and Ajam, Panchu Mandal 
or Kabir, did not immediately concern exchanges of things material but a mutual 
implicit showing of respect and support for the creation or preservation of names. But 
the position of Haksaheb and others did not merely rely on a few "alliances". At issue 
were relations to a much larger number of people. Ultimately it is the "image" people 
have of a leader, or his reputation, and the confidence created continuously, day-by- 
day, that make the village leader’s position legitimate and acceptable. It is necessary 
for the village leader to be able to inspire confidence, to ensure that people trust him 
and his judgements. Such a confidence constitutes what Bourdieu has termed 
"symbolic capital", and which refers to social obligations and reciprocality, in other 
words the number of people, families or clans one may call upon for assistance (for 
harvests, or feuds). It is, says Bourdieu, "credit, in the widest sense of the word, i.e. 
a sort of advance which the group alone can grant those who give it the best material 
and symbolic guarantees" and ensures networks of allies.16 Bourdieu’s outline of 
how symbolic capital is typically created, seems especially appropriate for Bengali 
village leaders, and deserves to be quoted in extenso.
Wastage of money, energy, time, and ingenuity is the very essence of the 
social alchemy through which an interested relationship is transmuted into a 
disinterested, gratuitous relationship, overt domination into misrecognized, 
’socially recognized’ domination, in other words, legitimate authority. The 
active principle is the labour, time, care, attention and savoir-faire which must 
be squandered to produce a personal gift irreducible to its equivalent in money, 
a present in which what counts is not so much what you give as the way you 
give it, the seemingly "gratuitous" surrender not only of goods or women but 
of things that are even more personal and therefore more precious, because, as
16Bourdieu 1977:181, emphasis in original.
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the Kabyles say, they can "neither be borrowed nor lent", such as time — the 
time that has been taken to do the things that "won’t be forgotten", because 
they are done the right way at the right time — marks of appreciation, 
"gestures", "kindnesses", and "considerations".17
This form of authority is based on fides, an inherently personal quality, the ability to 
inspire confidence or trust, or a sense of protective authority. Such authority, says 
Bourdieu, "is neither officially declared nor institutionally guaranteed"18 and has to be 
continuously maintained.
The expectation of intervention on behalf of dependants or would-be dependants is the 
concrete tangible aspect of the relationship, exemplifying its content and strength. Not 
that everybody at all times needs the intervention of somebody influential, but such 
intervention is an important way in which relationships are formed because they entail 
reciprocation — for instance in the form of informal (political) support. Such acts of 
intervention are important in creating one’s name and reputation.
The ancient Bengali practice of len-den (approximately translatable as "taking and 
giving") constitutes a close parallel to symbolic capital. It involved the gratuitous 
giving of fish to neighbours after a catch in one’s pond, lending a good shirt or a 
particularly fine shawl to someone off on an important errand, or immediately and 
voluntarily sending over eggs, fish, vegetables or other items, to the neighbour who 
had just received important guests. "Len-den" created trust, confidence, and mutuality.
17Bourdieu 1977:192-3, emphasis in original.
,8Bourdieu 1977:193.
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It ensured reciprocation — when you needed a shirt or some fish yourself — and 
support when disputes arouse, or when extra money or labour was needed. To lend 
or give away created "credit"; to receive was "debt" that at one point would have to 
be reciprocated. Reciprocation both paid off debt and created new symbolic capital. 
A proper act of reciprocation was a statement of acceptance of the relationship and 
of a willingness to extend and maintain it. A proper reciprocation should not come 
too soon, nor be the same "gift" though it should be somehow equivalent. It should 
indicate the quality of the relationship rather than constitute a repayment of debt. For 
instance, if your neighbour gave you fish when you had none, you could support him 
in a dispute. Such relationships were not mechanical nor solely material. They were 
based on confidence and extended to all spheres of life.
Although the practice of len-den has almost vanished over the decades, there was a 
parallel practice in relations between village leaders and commoners. Village leaders 
were expected to assist fellow villagers when required. This assistance was 
"exchanged" — or reciprocated — with political support and a willingness to be 
associated with the particular leader. In such a case one would not, for instance, 
spread malicious rumours about him. Fingerspitzgefuhl refers in part to the individual 
leader’s capacity to "play the game", to coax, manipulate and manoeuvre in a 
community of his intimate knowledge. As is well known to all villagers, any leader 
has some ambitions. Fingerspitzgefuhl refers to his ability to pursue these without 
appearing to, while still creating symbolic capital.
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The other side of this concerns the background of values against which his actions 
were interpreted by individuals approached and by the community at large, as 
translated in the communal "discussion" of gossip. But gossip can influence one’s 
"power" only if power is understood as influence derived from the command of people 
over whom one has no "power", i.e. people whose participation is "voluntary", 
"socially (mis-)recognized" and thus influenced by social processes. Basic for the 
individual village leader with limited "power" in a community of small scale is the 
trust or confidence he is able to create between himself and potential followers, the 
creation and maintenance in all social relations of a sense of mutuality and personal 
interest and of confidence. Confidence is bestowed on those who can be seen engaged 
for others, taking others seriously, treating them as someone worthy of spending time 
and energy on. "Alliances" are rarely explicit, they are merely "there", inspired by a 
previous record, by an expectation that family or other relations matter, that to 
disregard such relations would be detrimental to one’s symbolic capital, to one’s 
"name" or reputation. Village leaders and would-be village leaders will spend time 
and energy on their co-villagers because by doing so they portray themselves as 
proper and good village leaders.
Supplications
The nature and importance of the expectation villagers have in relation to community 
leaders becomes clearer when we look at the requests made to village leaders. 
Villagers commonly turn to actual or would-be leaders for assistance in using a new 
seed, spraying the fields, or finding a remedy for an ailing cow. In this we find an
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expectation of "knowledge" in a somewhat limited sense. But we also find the 
expectation of "knowledge" in a much broader sense. People turn to certain 
individuals for advice on the right step to take in a dispute, for advice on the dowry 
negotiations for the marriage of their daughter, or with problems with the authorities. 
Some of these supplications concern issues related to outside people or powers (police, 
administration, political authorities). A larger number of supplications concern intra­
village disputes or misunderstandings: the distribution of irrigation water, a quarrel 
between heirs, allegations of malicious rumour-mongering, illicit love affairs, the 
sharing of a harvest — the list would never end. Issues such as these are constantly 
brought to the attention of the leaders. It is expected of the village leader to take an 
interest and find a solution. It is crucial to note that people do not turn to their 
leaders with such requests because they are "leaders". It is the ability and willingness 
to comply with such requests that create the leader, plus his interest in people’s lives, 
his (apparent) dedication to their problems. Some former village leaders called this 
"compassion" (sarad) — which seems slightly overstated but indicative of the 
importance put on the appearances of such a relationship. We may call it (an 
expectation of) interest or concern. Again, there is nothing mechanical in such a 
relationship. To be on friendly terms with an influential village leader does not 
necessarily mean that he will support you through thick and thin. Nor does his 
support oblige you for ever and anything. Symbolic capital is not cement; it is a 
moral obligation open to dispute and contestation.
Any dispute, such as those presented here, involves a number of people in close 
contact with one another, people who will mobilize their symbolic capital in order to
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achieve an advantageous solution, plus people whose reciprocal relationship with 
either contestant will contribute towards deciding their attitude to the dispute at hand. 
However, and this is the point where we have to remember the popularity of gossip, 
the number of people involved with the judging of a dispute is (most often) much 
larger than the number of people actually involved, even larger than the number of 
people actually present. Villagers all participate in judgements, either directly as 
spectators, or indirectly by accepting or rejecting any judgement reached in the 
following days and weeks. Moreover, the number of people who contribute towards 
the settling or worsening of a dispute, by throwing in comments, arguments and 
suggestions, is much larger than the group actually tied to one another by symbolic 
capital, or, at any rate, only loosely tied by symbolic capital to any of the major 
contestants. And one should also keep in mind that not everybody is an able or 
willing player in the game of village politics; even though perhaps tied to one or the 
other contestant by symbolic capital, it may well be that one accidentally or for some 
other reason contributes towards his misery.
The point is that what counts towards the making of the village leader is not merely 
the people tied to him by personal bonds, but the evaluation made by the village 
population in general. Apart from "tying in" people in a web of symbolic capital, 
which also severely affects his time and liis ability to manoeuvre, the village leader 
is also evaluated in the larger forum of village gossip. Although the main burden of 
acceptance or rejection of the verdict reached lies on the contestants of the dispute, 
any verdict will also have to be accepted by the audience present, and by the larger 
village community. It must be in line with their understanding of the case at hand and
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of right and wrong. Otherwise they may simply choose not to act in accordance with 
the verdk- This is the same audience that ultimately accepts or rejects the individual 
village leader’s claim to leadership.
For this larger audience, the same "principles" that we encountered with reference to 
individuals are at work, although perhaps in a watered-down version. Also for this 
audience village leadership will have to be "(mis-)recognized, socially acceptable". 
The difference is that most villagers are not necessarily personally involved with the 
village leader, only as members of a community he claims to represent. Symbolic 
capital, as Bourdieu points out, costs money. The majority of the village population 
will not have such close relations to any one village leader. Their "bond" to him does 
not depend on his material resources. In this context, it is involvement for society at 
large which becomes crucial, the village leader’s capability to "take care of' 
community affairs, to preserve its prestige vis-a-vis the outside, to represent it in an 
acceptable manner to outsiders, and to insiders (at times of important functions or 
festivities), to initiate projects, to settle disruptive conflicts. In a word, the symbolic 
capital he has in relation to the village population at large is what above was called 
his "name", or his reputation.
A survey of time spent
One particular week in the autumn of 1992 I conducted a small survey to discover 
how seven village leaders of Udaynala and Gopinathpur spent their time. The 
individuals selected were the most prominent and active villagers: Haksaheb (former
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panchayat member for Udaynala North); Rabiel (de facto panchayat member for 
Udaynala North); Biswanath (ex-panchayat member for Udaynala South); Santi 
(panchayat member for Udaynala South); Shyamsundar (former panchayat member for 
Gopinathpur, since 1993 Jela Parishad Member); Angsuman (secretary of the 
cooperative society, and brother of Shyamsundar); and finally Kesto Sarkar (prominent 
but ailing party activist in Gopinathpur). It is worth noting that at the time of the 
survey, only four of them had formal positions. People like the Gopinathpur Congress 
leader, Sukumar Mandal, and the CPM member of Udaynala, Najir Hosen —  both 
respected and occasionally sought out for advice, but not active in day-to-day affairs 
— were left out. Gopinathpur*s very active BJP leader, Uday Majumdar, declined to 
participate. The remaining seven were interviewed every day about what they had 
been doing since the last interview.
The survey took place at a time when the paddy was ripening and the villagers 
subsequently had little cultivation-related work except to wait and prepare for the 
harvesting, and so there was much time to engage in village affairs. There was some 
anxiety in Udaynala when insects appeared on the paddy straws, but pesticides were 
applied and only minor portions of the harvest were lost. Several meetings were held 
on this issue. There was also a problem of potential labour shortage that had to be 
sorted out. Another topic of much interest in Udaynala at the time was the upcoming 
general meeting of the cooperative society for which it was known that one group (the 
Ohabs) were planning a take-over bid. In Gopinathpur conversations revolved around 
an upcoming Gram Committee meeting, and above all the annual large baroari
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(public) puja to be held towards the end of the harvesting season with jatra (plays), 
visiting relatives and general festivities.19
The details of the survey are given in the Appendix. The number of meetings these 
seven attended appears very high, although, according to their own assessments, it was 
not. In Udaynala three major meetings were held, plus a number of minor meetings. 
In Gopinathpur two major meetings were held. The "meetings'1 were of different 
types. Some were institutionalized and more or less fixed like those of the Gram 
Committee. Others were less institutionalized though nonetheless took place within 
a fixed framework (such as the baroari committee meetings in Gopinathpur or the 
cooperative society committee’s meetings in Udaynala). Again there was a kind of 
meeting which takes place on an ad hoc basis, though with a chairman and ordered 
speeches. These would include bichars. Lastly, there were entirely informal meetings, 
where a few interested individuals had agreed to come together to discuss or plan an 
upcoming event or a problem, such as those in Udaynala on the division of hired-in 
labourers.
Though much time was spent planning, discussing and executing various public or 
party-related activities, the actual meetings were relatively short, and the informants 
were often at a loss to explain their activities since our last interview. Gram 
Committee meetings, the half-informal cooperative society meetings, discussion- 
meetings on issues such as the insects or the division of labourers, and bichars, were
19The timing of the Gopinathpur baroari puja was awkward and unusual; most 
baroari pujas were held well after the harvesting between late January and early April.
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in practice over within an hour or two. Occasionally they dragged out, but the rule 
was that much of the time was spent in small group discussions over a wide range of 
issues before and after the actual meeting.
Six of the interviewees — the seventh being Biswanath — were visited at home by 
individual or groups of villagers every morning, for consultations or assistance. Later 
during the day, but particularly in the evenings, both major and minor village leaders 
— irrespective of formal positions — spent their time visiting people, gossiping, 
attending meetings, or, in Udaynala, engaging in card-games. They spent most of 
their time being around, being available, and getting involved even where no one 
wanted them to. The institutional "power" enjoyed by Shyamsundar and his brother, 
by Santi and indirectly by Rabiel, did not ease this lot. The role of village leader and 
the expectations bestowed upon formal panchayat members were in no way different 
from those bestowed on informal village leaders; the role of a community leader, 
expected to take a personal interest in issues far removed from the confines of formal 
offices.
Previously, twenty, thirty years back, many would come asking for material assistance. 
Most people were poorer than nowadays, and many sought loans (in grain or cash), 
charity, or donations to cover expenses for a daughter’s wedding feast. These material 
pleas for assistance could easily have made the relationship between village leaders 
and commoners appear as purely materialistic, in which the wealthy exploited the 
poor, even in face of evidence of occasional requests for non-material assistance. But 
the fact that the pleas for assistance continued into the 1990s, and that only a portion
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of these requests now concerned grain or money, indicate that the relationship has 
always been more than an exchange of political support for material benefits.
The survey relates to two closely related issues: the village leader’s need for 
information about "what is going on", an information he gathers by "being around", 
gossiping; and, secondly, the requirement that he engage himself on another’s behalf. 
A village leader’s authority is constantly evaluated in village gossip. A positive 
evaluation in village gossip is part of what creates his influence, a negative evaluation 
may ruin it. Crucial for a (would-be) leader is an understanding of what may 
contribute towards building one’s reputation; where to put pressure, what initiatives 
to take, which individuals to be associated with and which not, and what is 
permissible. In short, village leaders need a "feel" for a situation constantly in flux, 
as Bhadubhai’s bichar illustrated.
In order to create his symbolic capital the village leader is required to move around 
in the village, talk to villagers, listen to their problems, get involved in community 
affairs. In doing so he also obtains the information necessary to "play the game". 
Here the term "knowledge" obviously becomes important, but rather more than in the 
restricted sense of "the game". "Knowledge" should here be taken in the broader 
sense of "(mis-)recognized" social acceptance. To villagers the individual village 
leader has to appear as knowledgeable; or rather, they have to accept him as 
knowledgeable, as someone they know to be a proper, intelligent person, morally just 
—  someone they can accept as a village leader, to represent them, someone they will 
listen to.
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Conclusion
Slander, rumour-mongering, and gossip are weapons of the weak but not only the 
weak; they are the "weapons" of the whole of the community, imperfect but far from 
ineffectual safeguards against faltering village leaders. There are times when the 
position of a village leader is so strong as to prevent opposition, even prevent public 
rebuke when something has obviously been done wrong. (Bhadubhai might not have 
been tried under other conditions.) But even during such times the village leader 
needs to build relationships with a large number of villagers — to sustain their 
confidence in him as someone capable of safeguarding their interests — and he is 
exposed to malicious gossip if he does not do so or does not conform to expectations. 
Dissatisfaction immediately translates into comments, arguments and opinions, in the 
loose, informal, and danger-free talk that is gossip. Such dissatisfaction may be 
difficult to translate into rejection of the leader, but it undermines his authority and 
his ability to put into practice decisions (see the rejection of the middle-para group’s 
efforts to have Milon ostracized). Gossip and rumours continuously nibble away at 
personal reputations, and responses have to be found counteracting and operating 
within the same realm as gossip. Gossip also gives potential leverage to would-be 
leaders who would easily gain support once they oppose the old leader.
I have sought to complement Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital with a discussion 
of gossip. Symbolic capital refers to the individual’s, or the family’s, ability to call 
on someone else’s "voluntary" assistance — closely resembling what Bengalis term 
"len-den" ("taking and giving"). The multi-faceted nature of len-den or symbolic
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capital indicates how personal relations can be translated into political support (and 
vice versa). In the case of village leaders, I have suggested, this symbolic capital may 
not be as "material" as in the case of most relationships. In Chapter Two we found 
that what in particular makes one village leader stand out from a larger group of 
would-be’s, potential rivals and others of equal wealth or social status, are his personal 
qualities, in particular his "knowledge" and ability to persuade people. The village 
leader relies more than most on a positive evaluation and interpretation in the realm 
of gossip. His symbolic capital is based on his ability to make people respect him, 
accept him as a leader, acknowledge him as "knowledgeable" — an acceptance and 
evaluation which is inherently social. His reputation, or "name", is created or ruined 
in the semi-public and informal realm of gossip, which without potential repercussions 
questions motives, interprets any action, and weighs "evidence" — all to "disclose" 
what is "really" going on. Gossip is based on implicit moral judgements, and refers 
to generally held values. The village leader thus appears as an exponent of common 
values, although one with Fingerspitzgefuhl, the one who most ably plays in the open, 
dynamic and constantly changing field of village gossip and interpretations, the one 
who brings in new arguments from a wide range of norms and ideologies to defend 
his position.
The next chapter will turn to an example of how new values could be conducive to 
establish village leadership. The example is historical, one of wide-ranging 
repercussions for social values and political developments, and takes us into the main 
historical context for this study, the making of rural communism in West Bengal.
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FOUR
MARXISM AND POETRY:
BENGAL’S "MODERN TRADITION" ENTERS THE 
VILLAGES
Introduction
In the olden days one had an institutionalized venue for broad social interaction, 
particularly for the village leader and his group, the "faction". This venue was the 
baithakkhana, discussion house, ornately decorated small buildings in which the head 
of wealthy families received his male neighbours, friends, supporters, and relatives in 
the evenings. He had tea and snacks served. Betel-nuts and the hookah were sent 
around, while the lesser guests were offered biri (country cigarettes). Here people 
played cards, gossiped and discussed, and quite frequently someone present sang or 
told stories. Thirty or more years back there were a large number of such discussion 
houses in Udaynala and Gopinathpur: possibly as many as fifteen in Udaynala, and 
six or seven in Gopinathpur. The evening social life centred around the discussion 
houses and it was expected of commoners to attend. The baithakkhana represented 
the village-scale ostentatious display of wealth and entourage required of village 
leaders.
Except for one in Udaynala, none of the discussion houses functioned in 1992-3 in the 
sense of being used for evening-gatherings. Most discussion houses had by the 1970s 
fallen into disuse, and eventually fell into decay. Ostentatious displays of wealth and
entourage were no longer acceptable. Nowadays, people gathered outside, at one or 
several locations in each para, preferably at some central place where they could see 
who was passing. Here they sat down and idled away the evenings long into the 
night. They gossiped, discussed and occasionally someone sung songs or told stories 
(though some of the entertainment had been taken over by television). Card-game 
tournaments were regularly arranged. In the case of Udaynala, this change was 
brought about within a relatively short time, and consciously. The village leader could 
no longer expect people to come to contribute to his prestige. Instead, it has become 
necessary for him to run around looking for people.
There is a reason for this change, one that indicates the nature and origin of the 
ideological changes rural West Bengal has experienced. In Udaynala the changes in 
the use and meaning of the baithakkhana were consciously brought about with a 
generational change of village leaders around 1960. In Gopinathpur it took more time, 
stretching into the 1970s, but there too those instrumental in bringing the changes 
about belonged to the same generation as their counterparts in Udaynala. In the first 
post-Independence decade and a half, increasingly large numbers of youth from high- 
status middle and rich peasant families were introduced, through education and 
through family ties, to an ideology that was fast gaining acceptance among the urban 
class of professionals and government employees. It was the ideology of modernizing 
India, personified above all by Prime Minister Nehru, although in West Bengal it 
contained a strong element of radical thought. It had indeed become the ideology — 
or, as more encompassing, the culture — of that segment of society which was
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regarded as high-status and dominant: the bhadralok ("gentlefolk").1 Education 
brought village youth into close contact with ideas critical to existing village society. 
Back in their villages, the youth — in Udaynala they quickly became village leaders 
due to death of their fathers — sought to put their new ideas into practice. They 
arranged cooperative societies, schools, poetry readings and theatre performances. 
They were the most active, but there is no reason to believe that they were the only 
ones acquainted with at least the general content of the new ideology of modernity. 
How successful they were in terms of actually changing village society is open to 
question. Their achievement lay elsewhere. Firstly, they recreated themselves in the 
image of the modernizing and socially concerned village leader. Secondly, they 
employed arguments and engaged in actions that familiarized other villagers with the 
new ideology and possibly gave them new arguments for old grievances. Above all, 
the 1960s reads as a Kulturkampf which eventually came to lay the foundations of the 
political mobilization of the United Front period (to be taken up in the following 
chapter).
I will seek to address the multifaceted character of the changes. These were value 
changes, not merely political regroupings. The history of these two villages shows 
that ideological reorientations among at least one crucial section of the population 
preceded political changes. The seeds of these social changes were sowed before they 
found political expressions. The profound socio-cultural and political changes in West
!I take note of Partha Chatterjee’s (1993, Ch. Three) critical assessment of the 
term, and that he prefers the term "the (Calcutta) middle class" to denote its 
"middleness". In the present context, however, I prefer the term bhadralok since, seen 
from a village, particularly after Independence, this "middle class" is not "middle" to 
anything but superior to most.
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Bengal derived, I shall argue, from an involvement by a village "elite" (the middle and 
rich peasants) of increasingly literary and progressivist inclination in social initiatives 
and eventually political mobilization. Through expansions in education they became 
culturally linked to the broad discourse that had hitherto been the domain of the 
urbanite — and they became its village representatives. The linkage to the world of 
the bhadralok — with a strong radical strand — altered their outlook and opened the 
terrain for new political alignments and courses of social action. It will be seen that 
the ideological reorientation allowed for actions that would have been detrimental to 
the all-crucial consideration under the previous "tradition" of prestige and distance.
The decade or so of enacting this ideology in institution building, jatra (theatre 
performances) and rhetoric was a prerequisite for the orientation of the political unrest 
to follow. The enactment created the arguments, a legitimation in a larger ideology, 
and thus the expanded the field of discussion by identifying problems and solutions. 
This enactment was more important than economic divisions to the direction and the 
specific features of the unrest and socio-cultural changes. Having said this, I do not 
intend to argue or regard economic divisions and forces as irrelevant, but as 
interpreted, and therefore acted upon, within parameters of a particular cultural 
outlook, of an ideology. In these areas, significant economic inequalities had already 
over many years — decades or more — given rise to many "everyday" and not-so- 
everyday forms of resistance: theft, foot-dragging or gossip (as seen in Chapter Three), 
and the occasional incident of looting and dacoity (more of which in Chapter Five). 
What village CPM activists did was to direct these forms into a coherent and 
ideologized movement, to imbue such actions with public political symbolic value.
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If we attribute a political "awareness" and communist mobilization to the entire unrest 
in the late 1960s because of an affiliation to or a nominal overlordship by the CPM 
— without regard for previous forms of actions and historical linkages —  we create 
false breaks in history.
From the discussion house to the alley, and other changes
The discussion houses were architectural expressions of family prestige and wealth, 
an integral aspect of the leadership "style" it was reacted against in the early 1960s.
The discussion houses were always placed outside the compound, which symbolized 
that one could entertain guests without bringing them inside the compound, that the 
"honour" of the women of the household would be preserved.2 Lesser discussion 
houses were normally plain mud buildings with a simple straw roof, while those of 
well-off households were ornately decorated, with intricate patterns in fine clay (for 
which there were specialist artisans), beautifully carved wooden doors and elaborate, 
carved wooden structures for the porch roof. There were three of these in Udaynala 
(the Hak, Kaji and Sekh families) but none in Gopinathpur.
The distinction between decorated or plain discussion houses was not accidental but 
of symbolic importance. In investigating the styles of village leadership until the 
1950s we find two "models", corresponding to similar findings elsewhere. Both 
"models" were concerned with "prestige" and "distance" (to the poor and low caste).
(«cA.s)
2For studies of the role of purdah in family prestige, see Papanek and Minault 
1982. *
But there was a difference in their self-perceptions. Land-wealthy villagers such as 
Hekimsaheb, Raju and Hitu Munsi, Jikukaji, and in Gopinathpur Paritas Sarkar were 
never seen walking from the village to the road. They were driven in a cart, walked 
only short distances, and were beautifully dressed. To be seen walking over paddy 
fields —  let alone work there — was unthinkable for someone of their prestige. There 
was also a certain trait of "largesse" in their behaviour. They gave lavish feasts, kept 
retainers and engaged in conspicuous consumption.3 This we may call a "kingly" (or 
"nawabi" for the Muslims) style of village leadership.
On the other hand, people such as Bhaskar Kes, Shyanaal Mandal, Muhammad Hosen 
— of moderate wealth but of great political importance —  were rarely seen driven in 
a cart to the road. They walked on foot. They never wore beautiful clothes except 
on special occasions, and instead soiled their hands working the land. Even in 1993 
the then octogenarian Bhaskar hesitated to be driven anywhere in a cart. To a peasant 
householder (chashi grihastha) it was intolerable to be seen driven in a cart. This we 
may call a "peasant" (chasi) style of political leadership: the image of the frugal and 
thrifty devout Hindu or Muslim peasant householder.4
3For "largesse", see Price 1989. Largesse among Rajputs was found by Mayer 
(1958:411). For the replication of the "royal" model in villages, see Dumont and 
Pocock 1957.
4Mayer (1958) noted the existence of two different "styles" in Ramkheri: one 
"kingly" and one "peasant". The two styles correspond to the kshatriya and the 
vaishya "models" in Mandelbaum 1970b:452ff. Contrary to Lai Behari Day, author 
of Peasant life in Bengal (cited in Mandelbaum 1970b:453) — who found the Ugra- 
Kshatriyas (or aguris) to be warrior-like ("a strong and somewhat fierce race") —  the 
aguris of Gopinathpur were frugal and peaceful.
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These two styles also seem to correspond to two of the three found by Raj at Ray in 
Tarashankar’s novels, though with the difference that the bhadralok culture of the 
refined urban-educated protagonists of Tarashankar’s novels was not quite the same 
as the somewhat flashy style of the rustic landlords of Udaynala.5
Ritual purity was a crucial consideration for both "styles". The ritually clean (in the 
case of Muslims, the high-status sekhs) preserved a clear distance to the lower castes 
in general and to the ritually very polluting muchis in particular. The kingly, or 
nawabi, model may have emphasized commensality more than did the more frugal 
"chashi" model followed by the Gopinathpur aguris. But as in the case of Mayer’s 
rajputs, commensality was fairly well restricted even among the would-be kingly 
landlords of Udaynala — who even were Muslims.6 They too considered the muchi 
too polluting to touch. It was common practice for landowners (Muslim or Hindu) 
wanting a majur (labourer) or having other business with the low-castes, to stand 
outside their para ("neighbourhood") and call in. It was also common to avoid 
situations where one had to touch the labourer if low-caste, in particular if muchi. 
The paddy and oil parts of majuri (a majur’s daily pay) were left on the ground for 
them to pick up, and the daily biri and occasional cash payments were dropped into 
their hands. On two occasions, in the early 1950s, muchis were beaten up for wearing
5Ray 1983 and 1987. The third "style" being the culture of the low-caste landless 
majur (labourer), to which I will return in Chapters Five and Six.
^ h e  rajputs of Ramkheri emphasized commensality as one of their characteristics 
as the dominant caste. However, even they restricted their commensality to a limited 
number of "allied castes". Mayer 1960, Chapters IV and VI.
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shoes. One of them was the young son of the moderately well-off Rishikesh Das, who 
owned 8 bighas.
A change in attitude is discernable from the following story. During one deputation 
by some Udaynala villagers (about the construction of a road towards their village) 
to some local administrator, one of the sekh (high-status) Muslims accidentally ate 
some muri (parched rice) from the plate belonging to one muchi, and that he too was 
eating from. "Oh, I ate your muri!", the Muslim exclaimed — and they all laughed.7 
There were no protests on the ground of ritual pollution. The laughter suggests 
perhaps a certain uneasiness; it was quite something of a novelty. Few if any had 
ever accepted food from a muchi’s plate. But by the early 1960s, these relatively 
young middle peasant villagers felt that to ignore it would be the right (if unusual) 
thing to do. That they were Muslims probably made the transition easier, but, as we 
shall see more of in Chapter Six, also among the high- and clean-caste Hindus of 
Gopinathpur commensality (although not extending to food) increased between the 
castes in this period.
Another change in inter-caste relations is perhaps more indicative of altered views on 
the legitimacy of strict caste divisions. Previously, low-caste labourers were served 
on banana leaves in the middle of the employer’s courtyard while ritually clean 
labourers sat on the porch eating from plates. For labourers employed over some
1"oh, tor muri khee fellum". It may be noted that the muchi was addressed using 
the lowliest pronoun, a pronoun he would probably not use in response. The incident 
probably took place in the early 1960s. The fact that the story was still remembered 
and told to a foreigner in the 1990s suggests that the incident was unique, and that 
they regard it with a certain measure of pride.
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time, a separate plate was kept under the paddy storage. From there the labourer 
would take it out himself, hold it out for food to be dropped onto it, and, having 
cleaned it himself, put it back afterwards. "Untouchable" labourers were also expected 
to cleanse the ground they had been sitting on with cow dung. These practices 
changed in the 1960s, but in an interesting narrative of the process of change that the 
practice of untouchability went through, Nimai Das (muchi) remembered how, in his 
youth (late 1960s or early 1970s), while working as a labourer for a ritually clean 
household, he would be seated on the porch with the others, though at a distance from 
them, and receive food on a plate as they did. No one demanded him to rinse the 
plate or cleanse the place where he had been eating with cow dung, but he did it 
nonetheless since, as he said, it was customary (ritimata). By this time these practices 
had been discontinued in the case of most former "untouchables". Although Nimai 
Das still felt people’s unexpressed abhorrence at his "untouchability", sanctions against 
pollution had been abandoned and caste divisions were not publicly expressed any 
more.
In the course of this and the following chapters we shall mark the decline in publicly 
expressed caste divisions and the general (if unequal) improvement of economic and 
political positions of lower castes and classes. There have also been marked changes 
in commensality, appearances, education, and lower caste public participation. 
Previously the lower castes could be marked out by their dress and comportment, 
while it now has become very difficult to tell the difference. From the 1970s 
onwards, the low castes increasingly visit the market, stroll around in the village and 
even sit to gossip by the village temple. Changes were particularly evident in the
comportment of adolescent boys. Nowadays they all go to school, sport fancy shirts 
and fashionable trousers and top it off with sunglasses. Not that social divisions have 
vanished; they do persist. But the visible division has become a class division, 
between well-off and poor, irrespective of jati.8
One important aspect of the olden "style" of leadership, or so it was argued by those 
to follow, was that the preoccupation with prestige led to continuous factional strife. 
It was suggested in Chapter Two that village politics until the 1960s had been 
characterized by factionalism. Such factionalism could be found irrespective of the 
chosen "model" of leadership. To note but one example: sometime in the early 1950s, 
a follower of Raju Munsi complained that the owner of a plot of paddy-land adjacent 
to his own had encroached on his land by moving the bank between the plots. Raju 
Munsi announced that such a wrongdoing would have to be corrected, and he would 
himself see to it. The owner of that adjacent plot was Hekimsaheb, Raju Munsi*s 
arch-enemy. For Hekimsaheb such allegations were intolerable (albeit not unlikely to 
be true). The dispute eventually led to a huge fight on the site, both sides present 
with 30-40 men armed with lathis (sticks) and some guns. The case represented only 
one element in what formed a drawn-out rivalry between the two, a rivalry which 
formed the centre stage for village politics for many years to come.
This rivalry formed a cornerstone in the following generation’s social and political 
critique of their predecessors. They came to regard factionalism, the "factionalist
8The same changes were observed by Gough (1989:5 lOff). In her villages, and 
in south India in general, caste divisions were probably much more pronounced than 
in Bengal.
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mentality", with abhorrence. This we will in particular find in Waselmaster’s 
notebook.
Waselmaster’s notebook
While attending a teacher-training seminar during the years 1961 and 1962, the late 
Waselmaster of Udaynala was requested to write about his village (presumably as part 
of the course). He produced a small hand-written and hand-coloured notebook which 
expresses his views on the good and the bad sides of Udaynala, ca. 1960. Over the 
following six years he filled in "major events" at the back.
Waselmaster did not hesitate to include what he saw as negative aspects of village life, 
and there are several pages on the "inconveniences" (or problems) of the village 
(gramer asubidha), more than on the positive aspects. Negative aspects included the 
poor standing of women, in particular their education, oppression of the poor and low- 
caste, and all sorts of other social, economic and material problems. A reading of his 
lamentations suggests that he saw four main problems in the village: laziness, money- 
lending, the lack of a road, and factionalism.
In his section on the economic situation of the village, he started by stating that, "The 
economic situation of the villagers is difficult" because "most villagers are reluctant 
to work" — they were "lazy". "They are satisfied if they can in one way or the other 
fill their stomachs." Then he went on to lament the propensity of loan-taking 
(mahajani): "They [the poor] have immense loans. Land and even household sites
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have been pawned to the money-lenders". He identified money lenders and money- 
lending as among the major causes of village misery.
Again and again he mentioned another major problem: the lack of a road. From May- 
June till December-January cow-carts could not reach the outside world. To travel out 
even by foot was strenuous. There was also no proper bridge across the canal to the 
north of the village, and so one would have to take a long detour to reach the railway 
station. In consequence, according to him, it was very difficult for the cultivators to 
sell their paddy when they wanted, and economic life suffered.
The last major problem was daladali or "the factionalist mentality". Due to daladali 
it was difficult to do "good work", because somebody would always feel that "they 
would lose and so start opposing you". People were full of "envy" and it was not 
possible to get them to work together. It was an unfortunate village because it did not 
have "competent leaders". In a later chapter on "Possible redress" of the problems 
facing the village, his favourite catch-words were unnayan (development) and 
paribartan (change, progress), goals that were hampered by factionalism, money- 
lending and the lack of an all-weather road. Towards the end of his notebook, he 
summed up an almost utopic outline of redress, strongly influenced by socialist 
thinking.
If everybody in the village worked together all would profit from it. One 
would have to stop daladali (factionalism) and the mamla-business [litigation: 
the common practice of taking disputes — particularly over land — to court; 
for money-lenders a secure way of obtaining land mortgaged to them]. A 
group of young volunteers would have to be formed. A communal paddy 
storage will have to be arranged and money-lending will have to be curbed.
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The cooperative society will have to be improved [or "developed"] and land 
should be tilled cooperatively. One would have to work in close collaboration 
with the government. If the honourable government helps the villages then 
village development will be possible.
Waselmaster’s notebook suggests that foremost in the minds of himself and his peers 
was a strong emphasis on cooperation and on institution-building for the improvement 
of the village, together with a vision of state-assisted development. The problems of 
society — factionalism, money-lending and the "mamla-business" — were identified 
with the old society and with the older generation. He portrayed contemporary village 
society as underdeveloped, sunk in ignorance, superstitious, divided, lacking in 
economic life and cooperation, problems only "A group of young volunteers" could 
possibly solve.
There are lacunae in Waselmaster’s "socialist" thinking, for instance the material 
problems of the poor (whom he saw as "lazy") or with women’s freedom of 
movement (apart from education, there is no mention of any problem) — which 
suggests a strong paternalistic attitude. However, his notebook echoed what Partha 
Chatterjee found for the literature emerging in the 19th century: "If there is one theme 
that dominates [...] it is the theme of change. Everything was changing; nothing was 
likely to remain the same."9 Waselmaster saw a village society on the brink of 
moving closer to the "modem" world. Juxtaposed to the money-lenders, the 
factionalists, and those engaging in the "mamla-business" were the "young volunteers" 
who through cooperation and good work would usher in a new era of development
9Chatterjee 1993:135.
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and progress. The age of (young) men with a vision was dawning. Waselmaster 
counted himself among a group of young would-be village leaders, called the "young 
group" (tarun dal).
The circumstances for the production of this notebook are worth noting. As a young 
man from a middle-class peasant family in a poor and road-less village, Wasel Hak 
(he was not yet "master") attended a teaching seminar at which he met progressive- 
minded teachers, some possibly leftists, representatives of the bhadralok, who taught 
him new ideas, opened up for him the literary world of Bengali writers, and showed 
him the ideology and aims of modem India. The notebook was written with the latter 
as audience but does not seem to have expressed views contradictory to those of 
Waselmaster himself. At least his actions after returning to the village or his later 
notes in the same notebook do not suggest any qualms with the first views expressed.
What Waselmaster met at this teacher-training seminar was a distinctly Bengali 
"tradition" that young boys and later on girls of middle-class peasant families were 
hinged onto, through education in particular. The "tradition" was already a century 
or more old, well-entrenched in urban, middle-class Bengali society. By the 1950s the 
"tradition" also contained a strong radical strand — though it remained within the 
domain of the bhadralok.
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The bhadralok and Bengali exceptionalism
In sociological terms, the bhadralok were distinguished from the rest of the population 
by dress, mannerisms and language. As Broomfield writes on the tum-of-the-century 
bhadralok:
They were distinguished by many aspects of their behaviour — their 
deportment, their speech, their dress, their style of housing, their eating habits, 
their occupations, and their associations — and quite as fundamentally by their 
cultural values and their sense of social propriety.10
It was through education that the bhadralok obtained his positions and was 
distinguished from the general population. "Education [...] became the hallmark of 
bhadralok status"11 — both defining and excluding. The culture of the bhadralok — 
both because he was defined by his education, and because of the parallel 
development of fiction and debates, and of the modem Bengali language (see below) 
— was a very literature-conscious culture, centring on novels, short stories, plays, 
poetry, and on conducting debates through the medium of literature. The "heroes" of 
the bhadralok were not so much the important politicians nor the aristocrats, as the 
social reformers, the novelists, the short story writers, and the philosophers. The 
major ones include such figures as the debater, polemicist, and novelist 
Bankimchandra Chatteqee (1838-1894), religious reformer Swami Vivekananda (1863- 
1902) and Nobel laureate in literature, Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941).
10Broomfield 1968:5-6.
“ Broomfield 1968:8.
In the words of Sumit Sarkar, the Bengali nationalist discourse was subject to "a 
variety of influences".12 From the mid-19th century the agenda of the national 
discourse took shape from, and turned around, the central issue of adaption to Western 
ideas, or rejection of the same to find an independent path or to resurrect the lost 
glories of the past. A conservative strand caused "sophisticated and intellectualized 
revivalism" in the writings of Bankimchandra. Within this, a persistent, albeit minor, 
set of traditionalist-reactionary ideas argued for a wholesale rejection of Western 
values and institutions and "found" that Western inventions had actually been made 
by Hindus centuries ago.13 Stronger, however, was a willingness to seek some 
accommodation to, or adoption of, selected ideas from the West. The core of "a 
growing awareness of contemporary developments in the West"14 gave raise to many 
different lines of thought, ideologies, and courses of action over the decades. Within 
this, an important strand was represented by the social reformers, inspired by 
Vivekananda’s ideals of social service, self-help and manly strength.
Politically the strands translated during the first decades of the present century into the 
famous division — among the bhadralok in general but specifically within the 
Congress — between the "moderates" (seeking concessions from the British through 
the available channels of influence within the framework of the colonial state) and the 
"extremists" (seeking concessions — and eventually independence — through 
mobilization and actions of "terrorism"). These reflected the two dominant but
12Sarkar 1989b: 113.
13Sarkar 1973:27-8.
14Sarkar 1989b:67.
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conflicting interpretations of the political circumstances but also different values 
arising from the grand debate: adoption and acceptance of the validity of British 
institutions and values in India vs. the call for action, "self-reliance", and national 
pride. However, Sarkar finds many different trends also within the Swadeshi 
movement,15 heir to the "self-reliance" ideology: the influence from the sakti-devotion 
of most higher castes in Bengal, the inspiration from Ireland and Italy (Mazzini), 
Bankimchandra’s and Vivekananda’s calls for physical strength and combat, and 
Tagore’s call for strength built through social engagement and education.
The radical strand
The differences were never "solved" but continued to influence people toward different 
strategies. From the 1930s onwards, an additional strand of socialist and communist 
ideas grew out of the existing discourse and social environment. This radical strand 
was a further development of ideas already developed within the existing debate. 
Admiration for the exploits of the Soviet Union, for instance — both as an anti­
imperialist and communist model — was evident from the time of the Russian 
revolution. The radical strand grew in importance particularly after Independence, and 
found political although divided expression in the large and increasing number of 
leftist and marxist political parties: the Forward Bloc, the Revolutionary Socialist 
Party, the Socialist Unity Centre, etc.16 In addition there was the CPI, which became
15The Swadeshi movement, the bhadralok’s hour of pride, was conducted in protest 
against Governor. General-Curzon’s partition of Bengal, 1905-12.
16Franda (197la: 117) calls the non-communist leftist parties "The most 
distinctively Bengali political parties".
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the major opposition party in the West Bengal Legislative Assembly after 
Independence. These parties were the "bhadralok-parties", dominated by and 
representing the bhadralok (if far from all bhadralok); they represented politically 
Bengal’s "exceptionalism", a radical middle class.
The reasons for this radicalization are difficult to pinpoint. An important development 
since the turn of the century was increasing unemployment among educated bhadralok, 
plus British "racial discrimination and arrogance".17 Franda attributes the leftist turn 
among the bhadralok to their becoming "permanently disenchanted with electoral 
politics" after having been politically marginalized.18 In a more sensitive analysis, 
Kohli emphasizes "the political diversity of this group [of bhadralok]", and sees 
"political alienation" as having affected only a section of the bhadralok.19 Instead 
Kohli traces bhadralok radicalism in their literature. He finds Tagore to have been 
sympathetic to the Soviet Union and so seeks to explain Bengali radicalism as having 
developed from some older sets of ideas.20
However, both these explanations deprive the "tradition" of an ability to change, to 
renew and to respond to history as it goes on. The radical strand was more than a 
development of previous ideas. It was the result of a continuous "conversation" 
between Bengali bhadralok and the world around them: famine and war in Bengal,
17Sarkar 1973:24.
I8Franda 1971a:ll.
19Kohli 1990:394; see also Gordon’s critique of Franda. Gordon 1972.
20Kohli 1990.
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Gandhi’s "obscurantism", communal clashes, nationalism and anti-imperialism 
throughout the world, the cold war, etc. I believe the more plausible reason for the 
association between radicals and poets lies in the history of bhadralok discourse, the 
sentiments and orientations being closely formed in a political and cultural society. 
In a way, the discourse was no more than a local (Bengali, only in some ways Indian) 
variety of a world-wide discourse — although in some respects it may have been more 
advanced than what was common. We may therefore give it a name: the "modem 
tradition", with its belief in progress, development, institutions, and equality.21 
Although spiced to a distinctly Bengali flavour the "meat" was a product of several 
countries.
Family ties and education
It was with this cultural world the village youth of Waselmaster’s kind became 
familiarized. There is no doubt that education constituted a main artery for the entry 
of the bhadralok culture into the villages, particularly in view of the place of education 
in the bhadralok model. Prior to this, well-off villagers were not unfamiliar with the 
bhadralok world. Though more clmsi ("peasant", "owner-cultivator") than bhadralok, 
a number of families in Udaynala (fewer in Gopinathpur) were descendants of lesser 
zamindar-families for whom literary pursuits were not unknown. The Kaji, Hak, and 
Chaudhuri families were all descendants or relatives of zamindar-families, and the 
Sekhs and Munsis somewhat more distantly so. Some families had family links to 
people in government service or business. Tahur Chaudhuri, for instance, married the
21The term "tradition of modernity" is from Heesterman 1985:9.
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daughter of a family of school-inspectors and teachers from Asansol. A maternal 
uncle of the bamun Umakanta was a general practitioner educated in England, and 
Udaynala* s lone kayastha-family, the Sarkars, were related to a large family of 
businessmen in Calcutta. In Gopinathpur one kayastha-family were themselves well- 
educated government employees, the head-of-family, Paritas, being a retired lawyer 
pursuing a quasi-urban bhadralok life-style. Other villagers could also boast zamindari 
ancestry without sharing the same ideology.
Nevertheless, education does seem to have constituted a more crucial source of 
cultural influence, in particular because it was so closely tied to the bhadralok-ideal. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 report the 1993 level of education (or schooling) by age-groups for 
males of the "dominant castes", i.e. for males of the jati(-s) with more well-off 
families to afford education for their sons and from which village leaders would 
emerge.
Among the interesting findings is the marked increase in years of schooling for the 
age-group 46-55 (in 1993) compared to the older group. In Udaynala, with only 14.5 
per cent of the 56+ group having any formal schooling, 34 per cent of the next group 
had some. Of these as many as 18 per cent had more than 5 years in school, that is 
they went to schools outside the village for some time. These were educated during 
the decade 1944-1953. Of the next batch, educated during the 1950s and early 1960s, 
more than half had some formal training, one in three had more than 5 years of 
schooling, and eight per cent went to higher secondary or more.
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Table 4.1
Education and age-groups, men above 16 years of age, of sekh jati, Udaynala 
1993
Years of Age-groups
schooling 16-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-90
None 7.2 16.0 25.9 28.6 46.1
Some* 8.7 16.0 19.6 37.5 39.3
1-5 20.5 24.4 16.1 16.1 2.2
6-10 38.5 29.8 29.5 17.9 11.2
11+ 4.1 13.7 8.0 - 1.1
Under
education 21.0
Sum 100.0 99.9 99.1 100.1 99.9
N 194 131 111 56 89
For asterisk and source, see Table 4.2
Table 4.2
Education and age-groups, men above 16 years of age, of bamun, kayastha and 
aguri jatis, Gopinathpur 1993
Years of 
schooling 16-25
Age-groups 
26-35 36-45 46-55 56-90
None _ • 12.5 11.1
Some* - - 3.7 - 5.6
1-5 14.7 36.4 40.7 37.5 77.7
6-10 44.1 36.4 33.3 25.0 5.6
11+ 11.7 27.3 22.2 25.0 -
Under
education
Sum
29.4
99.9 100.1 99.9 100.0 100.0
N 34 44 27 8 17
* "Some” = literate; in case of elder generations often acquired at a pathshala, while 
most of the younger generations were taught at the literacy campaign classes.
Source: field-data
Contrasted with Udaynala’s leading jati, the three clean castes of Gopinathpur sported 
a much higher level of literacy four to five decades back. Of the 56+ batch three out
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of four had a few years of formal schooling (there were primary schools in the near­
by villages of S-bazar, B., and K.). Though the numbers of individuals concerned are 
small for most age-groups, the trend seen for Udaynala is evident also here: 
increasingly, from the 46-55 batch onwards, the males of these jatis were given formal 
education. In Gopinathpur, one in two of those who started schooling in the 1944- 
1953 decade went on to 6th or more. One in four went beyond 10th. And of the 36- 
45 batch, again 50% received more than 5 years of schooling, with six individuals 
(22.2%) going for higher secondary or more.
Reading material in the villages
The young villagers who went to school after Independence became avid readers of 
novels and poetry from the tradition that developed with Bengali/Indian nationalism 
and that eventually developed a radical strand. However, there had been a number of 
literate villagers among the older generations — including people such as Hekimsaheb, 
Jikukaji, Mohammed Hosen, and others of Udaynala, and Bhaskar Kes, Shyamal 
Mandal, Paritas Sarkar and others of Gopinathpur. A striking difference between the 
two generations is in reading material. Although information on these issues is limited 
mainly to recollections by their siblings (except in the case of Bhaskar Kes himself, 
now more than 80), a general impression of their reading habits seems clear. The 
main source of reading material was religious literature. For Muslims, tracts on the 
Koran, on the history of Muslims in India, on the Muslim way of life, were available 
and read. Hindus naturally read the epics, particularly the Mahabharata and Ramayan. 
Of the vast body of "modem" Bengali literature they read little if anything. Bhaskar
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admits to not "liking” the writings of Tagore — the pre-eminent writer of "modem" 
Bengal.
It should be kept in mind that that generation grew up and were formed during India’s 
Independence movement and — more significantly — her partition. Although anti­
colonial movements were limited in this area (Bhaskar could remember only two 
meetings/demonstrations), there is not much doubt of a general pro-Independence 
attitude. More controversial was the issue of Hindu-Muslim agitation. Mohammed 
Hosen collected a large number of pre-Independence Muslim League pamphlets 
(mostly undated), which suggests the degree of penetration of the politics of the 
Hindu-Muslim divide and of the Muslim League into the countryside. The pamphlets, 
held in an Urdu-inspired Bengali, do not speak of partition or mention Pakistan, but 
call on all Muslims to be "good Muslims", to pray for the preservation of the faith. 
A number of Muslim League meetings were held in central villages (more, it seems, 
than pro-Independence meetings).22
Contrasted to this is the reading material of the following generation, who turned their 
avid attention to modern Bengali literature. I conducted closer interviews on reading 
habits with 15 individuals. Apart from two 45-year-olds, all those interviewed were 
aged 50 or more. Six were school teachers, all have attended 8th grade or higher. 
The emphasis in the interviews was on literature read while young, i.e. no later than 
the late 1960s (and thus excluding more recent literature). However, to put a year,
22The material was shown me by his son, Najir Hosen.
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even an approximation, on the reading of a famous (much talked-about) novel is very 
difficult. Thus, the following "top-10" chart is more suggestive than accurate.
Author Novel "Score"
Saratchandra Chattopadhyay 
Manik Bandyopadhyay
Palli samaj
Putulnacher itikatha
Srikanta
Pother panchali
Panchagram
Padma nadir majhi
Ganadebata
Aranak
Sesh prasna
Baikunther uil
15
14
13
13
13
11
10
9
8
8
Saratchandra Chattopadhyay 
Bibhutibhusan Bandyopadhyay
Tarashankar Bandyopadhyay 
Manik Bandyopadhyay
Tarashankar Bandyopadhyay 
Bibhutibhusan Bandyopadhyay
Saratchandra Chattopadhyay 
Saratchandra Chattopadhyay
This small and limited survey indicates the propensity towards literature among well- 
off Bengali villagers. When asked whether they have read Saratchandra’s Palli samaj, 
the standard answer was a slightly insulted "Yes, of course". Immensely popular were 
also Rabindranath’s and Kazi Nazrul Islam’s poetry and in particular their songs. 
Sung, read and memorized, rabindra-sangit and najrul-sangit were staple food for 
thought in Bengal villages, praised and sung at every "cultural function" and even 
heard hummed in the fields.
Conspicuous by their absence from the chart are novels by the great masters — 
Rabindranath, Bankimchandra, Vivekananda, Vidyasagar, etc. Those works were 
mostly not read because of difficulties of language, argumentation, or the advanced 
use of allegories. Though a household name all over Bengal, novels by Nobel laureate
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Rabindranath were not among the most widely read in villages. His novels were 
considered "too complicated", dealing more with "typical middle class" problems, as 
one informant put it, to be of interest. Nonetheless, as we shall see, the novels listed 
in the chart are works developed within the same tradition, but held to be in a 
language and style more accessible to common people.
Bengali exceptionalism in the literature
In general and at least in its beginnings, the "national" debate had not been much 
concerned with the peasantry as such. The relationship between the nationalist 
leadership with its debaters on the one hand, and the peasantry on the other was less 
than close.
In Bengal, the intelligentsia’s indifference to peasant problems [was also due 
to] the long bhadralok tradition of contempt or at best condescension for the 
men who worked with their hands, [and] the sense of alienation flowing from 
education through a foreign medium...23
That communist or marxist ideology eventually came to be prominent among 
bhadralok intelligentsia and literati is evident from the large number of "Marxists" in 
Zbavitel’s listing of "After Independence" Bengali writers.24 But it had already been 
turned towards the countryside, and village life for some decades by then, largely 
thanks to Saratchandra Chatterjee. From the second quarter of the 20th century
23Sarkar 1973:515.
24Zbavitel 1976, Chapter "After Independence".
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onwards the literature started to abound in village settings and "humanist" concerns 
with child-marriages, the position of women, casteism, and development. From the 
mid-century onwards, socialist ideas and affinities were becoming evident in Bengali 
literature. In the following I shall take up themes prominent in the novels and 
writings of six authors, known affectionately as Rabindranath and Nazrul (both more 
widely read as poets), and the writers Saratchandra, Bibhutibhusan, Tarashankar and 
Manik. These six have been selected from among the large number of Bengali writers 
partly from their popularity in the villages (as suggested by the chart above), and 
partly from a general assessment of them as the most influential and trend-setting 
writers in this century. The impact of these six can hardly be underestimated in the 
formation of a "conversation" (however one-way in the beginning) between the 
countryside and the world of the bhadralok in which these writers lived.
Rabindranath’s poetry and short stories were much appreciated in villages, filled as 
they are with concern for and observations of everyday life. The "unifying idea" in 
Rabindranath’s short stories and much of his writing, says Zbavitel, is "humanism".25 
His "rejection of religious reaction", criticism of "the empty shell of Hindu 
traditionalism and conservatism", and his attention to "social problems and the sad lot 
of Indian women",25 marked him out as a fearless social critic. At the outbreak of the 
Swadeshi movement Rabindranath called for his countrymen to give up "paper- 
patriotism" and take to active involvement in the building of a national society. His
25Zbavitel 1976:251-2.
26The citations are Zbavitel’s; 1976:249-50.
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brand of nationalism, centring around the concept of atmasakti,27 called for social 
work in villages, to build strength "through constructive and educational work", for 
bringing education to the population — and the "need to bridge the gulf between the 
educated and the masses."28
Rabindranath’s literary production is enormous and his span of themes and his 
intellectual creativity make it impossible to do him justice here. We need to note, 
however, that this writer of unprecedented influence on his society was a man with 
radical social and political ideas — ideas that were reflected in his short stories, his 
poetry, in how he is presented in school books and is generally perceived. However, 
Rabindranath cannot be said to have been a revolutionary. He always shunned 
violence. The poet Kazi Nazrul Islam (1899^0, however, was a revolutionary. Some 
of his poetry openly praises revolutions, even Bolsheviks,29 and he was a close friend 
of M. N. Roy, the founder of the CPI. Nazrul is still immensely popular in Bengal. 
The poetry and songs of this "poor village boy and [...] orphan" reflect "the 
revolutionary moods" of the period30 but are still quite on a par with Rabindranath’s 
poetry and songs in terms of popularity. His poems are either nationalistic or 
revolutionary and, in spite of a certain "emotionality" or even "sentimentalism" that 
offends the refined Zbavitel, have a "distinct social undertone often protesting against
27Sarkar (1973:47ff) translates "atmasakti" as "self-reliance", a term which does 
not cover the "building-of-the-self' element which he shows to be an important 
ingredient.
28Sarkar 1973:52.
29Chattopadhyay 1970:19-20.
30Zbavitel 1976:278-9.
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economic discrimination and exploitation of the poor".31 Nazrul’s poetry linked a 
revolutionary anger to the chores of common people and to the nature-mystique 
nationalist sentiments much developed by Rabindranath.
Writers such as Saratchandra (Chattopadhyay or Chatterjee), Tarashankar, 
Bibhutibhusan and Manik (all Bandyopadhyay or Banerjee) developed in their own 
distinctive fictional forms many of the same sentiments and ideas developed in more 
high-brow style by their predecessors Vivekananda, Rabindranath and others. These 
four authors are probably the most popular and influential of all Bengali litterateurs. 
Their impact can hardly be exaggerated. With profound insight they set many of their 
novels in contemporary village society, which made these themes readily recognizable 
and accessible to village readers.
The novelist and short story writer Saratchandra (1876-1938) had a more profound 
impact on village readers than Rabindranath. Saratchandra is probably "the only 
Indian writer who needed no official patronage to get translated from Bengal into 
other Indian languages",32 and he was the first to live from his writings. His books 
are widely read; his famous Palli samaj figures at the top of my small survey chart. 
His stories are also popular as films: "No plot on the Bengali screen can insure box- 
office successes as easily as a story by Sarat Chandra. The appeal is absolute and 
universal".33 But it would be wrong to see Saratchandra as a writer of easy-to-read,
31Zbavitel 1976:279.
32Mukherjee 1985:102.
33Roy 1975:54.
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light novels. He was a serious writer, dealing in serious issues. He made accessible 
to a larger audience the themes that the masters of the Bengali renaissance had raised. 
"Where Rabindranath stopped Saratchandra Chatterjee began".34
Zbavitel quotes another work holding Saratchandra as "an exalted opponent of 
conservatism".35 Zbavitel opposes this view but nonetheless acknowledges that in his 
writings Saratchandra was "to a remarkable degree, free from social conventions and 
prejudice" and showed a "deep-felt and sincere" hatred of discrimination against 
women.36 A prominent theme in his novels concerns "victims of social and economic 
oppression" — women, low-castes, and the poor. His novels take up caste oppression, 
religious bigotry, and stiffening reaction. However, though critical of existing social 
customs, Saratchandra was not revolutionary. His novels were popular precisely 
because "he did not rise above his themes and poor heroes but wrote as if being one 
of them".37 He points out the problems and lets his heroes speak without pressing the 
"answers".
Bengali literature’s perhaps most famous novel, Pather panchali ("Song of the road", 
with the sequel Aparajita) by Bibhutibhusan (1899-1950), is also widely read in 
villages. The story — the life of the family of a poor village Brahmin hardly able to 
scrape through and who eventually has to move away, all seen through the eyes of the
34Surendranath Sen in an 1924 article, quoted in Zbavitel 1976:280.
35Zbavitel 1976:281.
36Zbavitel 1976:280.
37Zbavitel 1976:281.
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son Apu — is, in Mukherjee’s reading, heavily interwoven with themes of nature- 
mystique, the smells of the village and its surrounding forests, the sounds of festivals, 
the rhythm of the seasons, and the songs.38 It is not about poverty as such, but about 
a mystical nostalgia for an innocence lost (particularly embodied in the deceased 
daughter, Durga). The novel is sensitive to the personal experience of growing up in 
a village, and constitutes a careful poetic but realistic rendering of a poor family in 
a readily recognizable (Bengali) village society.
In Zbavitel’s opinion, though strongly emotional and "very often bordering on 
sentimentality", Saratchandra’s impact "paved the way" for the next generation of 
Bengali writers — a generation "on a higher level" but some of whom were often 
more explicitly critical and political. Into the 1940s and the post-Independence period, 
"The leftist group of writers and poets in Bengal grew in number and quality", 
particularly so with the formation of the Progressive Writers Association in 1938.39 
One of the more prominent and "outstanding" among them was the marxist Manik 
Bandyopadhyay (1910-1956), whose novel Putulnacher itikatha ("The puppets’ tale") 
had been read by 14 out of 15 of the Udaynala and Gopinathpur interviewees. 
According to Zbavitel, "the hard fight with ever new clashes and defeats" of "man 
against nature and all those blind forces dominating his life and the old society" is in 
this novel depicted "as never before".40 Manik’s other main work, Padma nadir 
majhi ("Boatman of the Padma"), also appears among the top ten.
38Mukheijee 1985:127-144.
39Zbavitel 1976:285.
Z bav ite l 1976:287.
The last author on the chart is Tarashankar (1898-1971) who drew most of his 
material from his native Birbhum, where he was active as a social worker for many 
years before turning to writing. Tarashankar’s knowledge and depiction of life and 
problems of rural society was more than usually penetrating. His novels —  in the 
chart the two most widely read, Panchagram and Ganadebata — reflect his "deep 
insight into [village life’s] problems".41 According to Rajat Ray, Rabindranath 
himself ordered his lieutenants to read Tarashankar’s novels to village elders — who 
readily "understood and appreciated" these because they were so "firmly rooted in his 
indigenous rural experience"42 Tarashankar was also "always active in politics" (on 
the Congress side), an activity which is reflected in his writings: casteism, money- 
lending, inertia, problems of poverty, of pride, frustration, all figure in his novels as 
in most of the novels mentioned here.
Before we return to the village, a small recapitulation may be in order. I have tried
to point out a number of connections. In Bengal a social group of educated, urban
high-caste professionals — the so-called bhadralok — dominated the region’s cultural
as well as political life. Due to the circumstances of its infancy, the Bengali
bhadralok’s variety of the "modem tradition" was closely coupled with literature.
Ideas and themes from the "modern tradition", as interpreted in literature, were to gain
immense popularity, at least in part through the popularity of many novels. Many of
tVsan
the issues raised in literature were more often then- not short of the revolutionary but 
nonetheless radical for the village society in which the novels were set. Over the
41Zbavitel 1976:287.
42Ray 1983:274-5.
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decades of this century, a radical strand became increasingly important, both in the 
general debate and in literature. Through expanded educational facilities after 
Independence, the (male) youth of middle and rich peasant families came into contact 
with a ’’tradition" that was both strongly literary and high-status, and that was 
presented to them by its radical representatives. Now we turn to the effects this 
acquaintance was to have in village societies such as Udaynala and Gopinathpur.
Of poetry and roads: the "modern tradition" in villages
Literature may have presented the educated villagers with a radical strand, but only 
as a radical version of a larger discourse. The "modem tradition" gained prominence 
—  even dominance — in India after Independence. Foremost were the various 
economic programmes and the government’s policy of economic development. Prime 
Minister Nehru’s socialist progressivism found expression in five-year plans, numerous 
rural development programmes,43 the abolition of zamindars, and land-ceilings and 
reforms (however half-heartedly implemented in West Bengal and elsewhere). We 
also find almost all political parties using the rhetoric of progress, development, and 
equality (the exception being some minor soon-to-vanish Hindu revivalist parties). 
Politicians were regularly brought into villages for election campaigns, at least from 
1957 onwards and possibly before that. There were also a number of government 
officials of leftist leanings who sought to implement their ideas in spite of the 
constraints. We may note that in 1956 the local Block Development Officer (BDO)
43Burdwan district was selected for the Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme. 
For a study see Frankel 1972.
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insisted the Union Board sponsored well be dug in the bagdi-para of Gopinathpur (and 
not in the aguri-para, as the clean-castes insisted). During the land occupations of the 
late 1960s, many local officials (BDOs, Junior Land Reform Officers) assisted in 
identifying vested land.44 Waselmaster and his peers in the village were situated 
between the village world they knew well and the world of the educated bhadralok 
and schoolteacher and bureaucrat they met or were related to. To Waselmaster, his 
school and its culture seemed at the centre of the world, and his home village at the 
periphery. We find from his notebook a sense of the village having to catch up with 
the rest of the world.
In Udaynala, the young generation of village leaders-to-be had already formed a loose 
group and started their "good work" by the late 1950s and continued through the 
1960s. A striking although limited development was the position of women. Young 
women were increasingly allowed access to education and "the women’s question" 
raised in various fora, such as village theatre performances (in particular the position 
of the "new bride"). However, the issue of the purdah was left largely untouched. 
Some did encourage their wives to move outside of the household compound, but this 
seems to have been late in becoming a widespread practice, abandoned finally only 
in the mid-1970s.45
^However, the majority of officials were probably anti-communist, and the CPM 
Land and Land Revenue Minister, Harekrishna Konar, sought ways of circumventing 
his ministry’s officials during the second UF Government’s tenure. Interestingly, 
Waselmaster wrote that an anti-hoarding drive in the Block in 1974 first targeted the 
biggest hoarders — who were all major Congress figures —  and only thereafter minor 
hoarders. See Konar 1979, Ruud 1994a.
45Waselmaster’s widow still practised the purdah in 1993.
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They were more successful (or eager) in other fields. In 1956-57 they started a "night 
school" where they, as the literate members of society, taught elementary reading, 
writing and mathematics to illiterate co-villagers. Another important initiative was 
taken in 1958, when they re-launched the village’s defunct cooperative society, with 
the help of the local BDO, and gave it the grand name "South Damodar Appointed 
Cooperative Agrarian Development Society". A few years later again, a separate 
"Village Development Society" was established as an overall organ for development 
questions, planning and discussions. Then came the Udaynala Village Friendship Club 
which organized visits to other villages and mutual exchange of help and of jatras 
(theatre performances), then a bridge club, a permanent jatra club, and a library with 
some 200 books. And so it went on for the next 10 years. Below is a list of the 
major initiatives.46
1956/57 The night school opened, and a larger school building constructed.
A board established for equitable sharing of sharecropped paddy. 
Village branch of Red Cross established, some money and milk obtained.
1958 Reorganization and revitalization of village cooperative society.
A Primary School Managing Committee established.
1959 The school building again expanded.
1960 Meetings held and a committee for "social development" constituted, 
mainly to be concerned with the building of a road.
Free tiffin for the school obtained.
Collective guarding of ripe paddy fields initiated.
1961 The "Village Development Society" constituted, plus the "Udaynala 
Village Friendship Club".
1963 Village library opened with 200 books, partly bestowed by the 
government, partly private donations.
1964 Political cooperation to end factionalism and to secure the Gram 
Panchayat seats. Two counselling organizations created to supervise 
school work.
1965 First "people’s education day" arranged; Rs 40 collected towards a new 
school.
A building constructed for the cooperative and the development society.
46The dates are mainly from Waselmaster’s diaries.
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A dirt-road constructed towards the canal north of the village.
1966 Brick go-down and office raised for the cooperative.
New school-building raised with tiled roof on land donated by Haksaheb.
1967 New efforts towards a road construction, collection of signatures, 
mapping of land.
1968 Expansion of the school into Junior High School; one month’s pay 
donated by all service-holders. A "Managing Committee" established. 
Proceeds raised through entertainment channelled towards school 
expansion.
These are only the major initiatives and efforts. Waselmaster’s diaries are filled with 
entries on meetings — at least once a week — and incessant discussions back and 
forth outside the more formal fora. In addition to these initiatives, they arranged 
annual celebrations of Rabindranath with recitals of his poetry, songs, and occasionally 
a play. From 1961 onwards, they introduced jatras (see below) to the annual baroari 
(public) celebrations, an annual cultural function for the Bengali New Year with 
poetry recitals, songs and speeches, and lastly occasional cultural functions, jatras, or 
similar functions for specific purposes (fund-raising, specific celebrations). On four 
occasions during the 1960s they organized "people’s education days".
In Gopinathpur, the level of activities was less marked. Particularly innovations such 
as the "Village Development Committee" were never tried out, possibly because of 
less enthusiasm on the part of the Gopinathpur village leadership, all of whom were 
old-timers such as Bhaskar Kes and Paritas Sarkar. The following generation, as we 
shall see below, did engage in some of the same type of activities as the Udaynala 
"young group", but throughout the 1960s and well into the 1970s these activities were 
carried out by individuals of minor political influence. Nonetheless, the ideological 
and political influences so marked in Udaynala did not leave the Gopinathpur leaders
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untouched.47 Initiatives were taken and projects implemented for a primary school, 
a village cooperative society (see Chapter Two), and wells, and they donated land to 
and participated in the building of a road between Gopinathpur and the metalled road 
by S-bazar.
It is among the younger generation in Gopinathpur we find most activity. Jatras were 
one important aspect. Another was the establishment of a village youth club in 1965, 
and a library in 1974. From 1976 to 1984 a volunteer primary school — unpaid and 
unsanctioned — was run by three educated (but ritually incompatible) individuals: one 
CPM-supporting kayastha, the money-lending bamun Bijay Chakrabarti’s only son, 
and one last person who was dule by jati and from a land-poor family. Bijay 
Chakrabarti was against it due to the presence of the dule, and used his political 
influence to deny them government sanction — and thus salaries. After eight years 
they gave up.
Enacting the "modern tradition": bichar
Though Waselmaster’s diaries we get a glimpse of how the "modem tradition" had 
come to be the dominant discourse within Udaynala prior to 1967 and influenced 
decisions in bichars (village courts). The following is a summary of the highlights.
1. It had previously not been unusual that money or means were given to village 
festivals, but from about 1959 onwards, punishment was meted out in money, to
47Major village leader-to-be, Anadi Sarkar, who was affiliated to the left wing of 
the Congress party, was often thought of as a potential CPM supporter and sought 
recruited by Udaynala’s Haksaheb and Najir Hosen.
178
be donated to some project or the other (school construction, cooperative society, 
road).
2. In 1963 a series of test-case bichars was held against Rahim and Hitu Munsi’s 
local "manager", Manuar Ali, for excessive money-lending and confiscation of 
mortgaged land. One sought to stall the confiscation with cooperative money, 
which was not accepted by Rahim. Rahim and Manuar did not attend the bichars 
and refused to abide by their decision. In the end nothing concrete came out of 
the efforts.
3. In 1963 Waselmaster asked his diary, "Who will do a poor man’s bichar?" It was 
difficult to get arbitrators for disputes among the poor and uninfluential because 
such disputes had no effect on the power-balance in the village. The following 
year it was decided that any dispute brought to the attention of the village leaders 
would be addressed.
4. In a dispute over the sharing of sharecropped paddy in 1966, it was decided that 
although the sharecropper may have cheated (as was the allegation) he was poor 
and should receive assistance from the cooperative.
5. As late as February 1972 — as repression was being unleashed in various parts 
of West Bengal — a bichar decided against Hitu Munsi. He had sent police 
against one Sadek who sharecropped 5-6 bighas of Hitu’s lands. The bichar 
decided that Sadek should continue to sharecrop three bighas.
Decisions such as these may well have been seen as parts of ongoing factionalist 
struggles, and the different decisions understood within a very different framework. 
The particular opponent of the "young group" was the money-lending Rahim, whom 
they portrayed as backward, scheming and anti-social. Above all they portrayed him 
and his like (including Manik Bag, Hitu Munsi and his manager) as not part of the 
new discourse. Rahim was not only their political opponent (he was included in some 
institutions because of the influence he enjoyed) but was above all their ideological 
opponent and as such excluded from participation in jatras and other cultural 
functions.
In spite of the possibility of these actions and decisions being interpreted within a 
factionalist framework, we may all the same see the kind of rhetoric employed on
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these occasions, and how arguments were drawn from the "modem tradition". At least 
from as late as 1960 onwards, in Udaynala, and most likely in most other villages in 
West Bengal although perhaps only rarely at such a scale (for instance Gopinathpur), 
a discourse already prominent among the literati and employed by the government was 
employed as justification in disputes and gave impetus to new actions denouncing the 
ways of old. The process was one of learning, of becoming acquainted at close range 
with values radically different from those hitherto dominant, values that affected the 
relationship between man and woman, between low castes and high castes, and 
between landless and landowners.
Though much of the "changes" may have remained at the level of argument and 
rhetoric, we still find a number of efforts to implement ideologies in real life. The 
building of a school, establishment of a cooperative society, female education and 
lesser restrictions on commensality are all developments that characterized the 1960s 
in these two villages — although more so in case of Udaynala than Gopinathpur.
It may be noted that to cause disruption is not appreciated in villages in Bengal, and 
so the argumentation could probably not reach its potential. Instead, other means were 
employed of both portraying oneself as part of the outside society’s ideology and 
advancing the ideology’s points of social criticism. The major means for relegating 
ideas, presenting an ideology, and recreating village leaders into "modem men", was 
the jatra.
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Enacting political literature: jatra
Jatra denotes (the staging of) plays on (temporary) village stages. The tradition of 
jatra is ancient in Bengal, dating back at least to the 16th century and the increasingly 
widespread bhakti-cult to which Chaitanya’s Vaishanvite movement gave rise. Jatra 
remained popular in the countryside over the centuries, mainly using themes from the 
scriptures or devotional themes — "as an associative ritual of religion",48 "operatic 
and hallucinatory, relying on songs and religious fervour for its effects."49
The gap that had developed during British times between the European-style and 
Calcutta-based theatre and the disdained "folk" forms was bridged during the last 
decade of the Raj when leftists, particularly in the Indian People’s Theatre Association 
(IPTA), sought to bring their message to villagers through the medium of jatra, an 
effort that lasted into the 1950s.50 The increasingly radical milieu of Bengali literati 
incorporated "folk forms" into their acting, and their style and plays were staged on 
village stages.51 In spite of its "operatic conventions, melodramatic gestures, and 
hypnotic songs", this effort showed how
48Saha 1978:4.
49Bharucha 1983:7.
50The IPTA’s rise and decline has been treated in great detail in an
M.Phil.dissertation by Shamita Basu (1988).
51Bharucha 1983.
181
The structure of jatra was so resilient that it was able to incorporate radical 
alterations in its subject matter and adopt a contemporary idiom.52
Gods and goddesses became freedom fighters, and demons and villains became 
representatives of the ruling classes, with British officers waving, shouting and 
screaming like the demons of old-style jatra. Radical actors and playwrights wrote 
and enacted plays that were "folk" in form but radical in content. Radical theatre 
adapted to certain requirements, certain expectations to form and style, but found 
ample space for a development of its own themes. Jatra has become an increasingly 
important vehicle for spreading political messages and ideology. Communist- 
ideological themes were received with the same enthusiasm accorded previous 
jatras.53
The IPTA declined and vanished but left an imprint on rural society. A remarkable 
revival of jatra has taken place in West Bengal since Independence. Over the years 
the repertoire has become broader, and standard characters in contemporary jatra 
include the easily recognizable money-lender, the bad father-in-law, the corrupt 
politician and the political goonda. In form the revitalized jatra is "increasingly 
urbanised — raised platforms, theatrical lighting, microphones are not uncommon 
these days..."54 Whereas old-style (pre-IPTA) jatras were performed by professional
52Bharucha 1983:90.
53Interestingly, Basu (1988:212) comments that the decline of the IPTA was in 
part due to "the urban bias which led to the selection of sophisticated themes
unintelligible to the rural folk...".
54Saha 1978:8.
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troupes, post-Independence jatras were increasingly staged by amateur teams of village 
boys. They stage the same plays with the same themes, although the amateurs stage 
somewhat less elaborate plays. Although professional jatra performances are more 
popular (one I visited had an audience of nearly three thousand), the majority of 
performances are staged by amateurs. Udaynala’s no less than five jatras over two 
days in 1993 attracted several hundred spectators, transfixed well into the night. 
Gopinathpur, for its festivities later the same year, had three performances, funded in 
part from the village baroari fund and thus most seriously controlled and supervised 
by village leaders. Amateur staging of plays is nowadays a common occurrence in 
most villages. Jatras have become an integral part of the village main festivals — in 
addition to the pujas, fairs, and visiting relatives — and outsiders, relatives and guests 
are always proudly invited to attend.
But it would be wrong to see this recent development in the forms of jatra as a one­
way influence, from outside, from the educated and already converted. The plays 
were written by educated urbanites but were chosen by the performers themselves. 
The first to start doing jatra in Gopinathpur "50 years ago" were Dasarathi Mandal, 
Sakti and Ranjan Kes, and Bibhuti Chakrabarti — all four in their late teens and from 
the more well-off families. Three of them had some experience of jatra performance 
from nearby villages. Jatra in Gopinathpur did not immediately become standard fare 
at the baroari festivities but was staged on and off over the next decades. With the 
growing-up of the next generation — in particular Sukumar Mandal and the brothers 
Chandi and Sailen Kes — jatra became an annual event from 1965 onwards, with the 
exception of 1969 and 1972.
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All jatra-enthusiasts were also politically active. Dasarathi and Bibhuti died at an 
early age but Sakti and Ranjan became important figures in village affairs in the 
1960s. The Kes brothers (sons of Ranjan) were CPM supporters while Sukumar (son 
of Dasarathi) was in the left-wing of the Congress (although anti-militant). Sailen 
became Gopinathpur’s first CPM panchayat member, and both he and Sukumar have 
become school teachers. Chandi is a professional full-time actor in a Calcutta-based 
jatra troupe.
In Udaynala, the first jatras were staged a little after Independence but did not give 
rise to a local tradition. Comprehensive jatra performances started only in the late 
1950s, by Najir Hosen, Haksaheb, and Bhola Sarkar. Later on many others joined in 
to comprise a few steady groups that staged at least one but more often two 
performances at the annual baroari festivities, plus one or two during the year. The 
"people’s education days" included jatra performances, and occasionally they even 
staged performances in other villages (Gopinathpur 1961, and nearby P. 1962). The 
most prolific actor was Haksaheb, who participated in other jatra troupes, for a period 
also in other districts. All those of the "young group" participated as organizers of 
and actors in jatras — with the exception of Ehiasaheb (and also excluded were their 
opponents, Manik Bag and Rahim).
Among the first locally staged plays in Gopinathpur and Udaynala some were 
"nationalist" but most "historical", i.e. with known "romantic" themes from the history 
of Bengal or India. A few puranic plays were also staged, i.e. with themes from the 
epics. From the late 1950s "social" plays were staged, typically with themes centring
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on casteism, "superstition", arranged marriages, the fate of the "new bride", money- 
lending, and poverty. These themes, as indeed the authors, belonged firmly to the 
"modern tradition" and were perceived as such. A typical jatra has a "happy ending" 
where the "good" forces win against the "bad". Such is also the case of "social" 
jatras, with the addition that both moral lesson and main heroes point towards values 
of equality between man and woman, between high and low, or towards social or 
economic progress. According to Sukumar and Chandi, they were careful to stage two 
plays each year: one historical and one social. The social plays were often regarded 
as a bit tedious and did not provide the colourful entertainment required, and the 
actors were conscious of the need to entertain. A good jatra, in the opinion of Chandi 
and Sukumar (and Utpal Datta), was entertaining at the same time as it conveyed a 
moral, an idea, and particularly a criticism of social conditions. It should enlighten 
the audience and give them something to think about. "A good jatra", said Sukumar, 
"makes people discuss on the way home." They entertained only in order to achieve 
that other aim, to teach.
In this we see another interesting feature. In addition to bringing new ideas and a new 
ideology into village society, jatra also represented a captivating new role for those 
who thus engaged themselves. They formed themselves and identified/were identified 
with the culture of literature, and with the role model of the "modem" social reformer 
bhadralok.
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The bhadralok as a role model: the new village leader
It is remarkable that most heroes in the popular novels — particularly in 
Saratchandra’s works but evident in others as well — were bhadralok. They were 
educated, most often had some landed income (the daily meal was not a concern), and 
occasionally held a service position. For example, Pandit masaVs hero was the 
schoolteacher ("pandit masai") Brindavan, who naturally was educated. So was also 
Debu Ghosh, PanchagranCs village schoolteacher. The hero of Putulnacher itikatha, 
Sashi, was the village doctor, and in Palli samaj, the man to stir things up was the 
liberal Romesh, an educated landlord. Other main characters might be non-bhadralok, 
but the principal characters, the ones who "see" the problems and who seek changes, 
were most often bhadralok. Their education identifies them with a larger set of values 
— familiarity with which can be taken for granted. Moreover, Saratchandra’s central 
concern, writes Mukherjee in her excellent analysis of him, "never shifts beyond the 
bhadralok",55 and most of the novels were written within the politically or socially 
conscious and even explicit discourse of the bhadralok.
Young village men were exposed to this world both through the curriculum (which 
included standard works on or by the famous novelists) and through the influence 
exercised by school or college teachers — bhadralok almost by definition — many of 
whom were of leftist inclination.56 Unfortunately, the material — statistical or
55Mukherjee 1985:107; "The novelist for all seasons".
WoWUL
56A Burdwan and Midnapur survey conducted by Atul fe k H n  the early 1980s 
indicates some of the leftist inclination of the village intelligentsia, by revealing that 
31 per cent of all CPM Gram Panchayat members were "mainly teachers or social
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otherwise — to show the propensity of school or college teachers to be leftist back 
in the 1950s is very limited. Most may still have been more moderate, but the 
number of leftist teachers in West Bengal was sufficient to give rise to a popular 
stereotype. And there is no doubt that teachers did constitute a major channel for the 
flow of leftist ideas into the rural areas. Haksaheb told the following story of how he 
became a communist.
From 5th to 10th [1947-52] I read in a boarding-school. In the beginning I 
was scared and did not like it. A teacher named Shyamal Nandi took care of 
me. He was very good at football, and I liked football. In the evenings he 
assembled some students at his house, served us tea and biscuits, and engaged 
us in long discussions. He was a communist and thought the Congress was 
bad. Many of us became communists under his influence. At that time I did 
not understand much about politics and communism. It was only later, when 
the CPI arranged a meeting in S-bazar commemorating the death of Stalin, that 
I was able to buy and read some communist literature.
A scrutiny of the literature he has read reveals, however, that he has read much more 
Bengali novels and poetry than communist literature. No-one in the village has read 
anything original (in translation) Marx, Lenin, Mao or others. The main source of 
communist literature was the party papers and pamphlets. The main bulk of reading 
material, however, consisted of the Bengali masters.
Then there is the issue of language. Even when villagers did read communist 
pamphlets or newspapers, the information came through Standard Colloquial Bengali 
(SCB) — the medium of the bhadralok. Schooling meant exposure to an environment
workers". In a Midnapur study cited by him, 217 of 515 Gram Panchayat chairmen 
were found to be teachers (Kohli 1983:792).
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that was not socially neutral. The culture and values of the bhadralok were high-status 
both through association with power, high caste, the refined and technically advanced, 
and the abstention from manual labour. And their language was different — and of 
higher status. As Jnanabrata Bhattacharyya and Poromesh Acharya point out, in the 
context of Bengal, literacy was not rank-neutral. Standard Colloquial Bengali, or the 
chalit bhasa, developed from a Hugh dialect into what is now the written form of the 
language and the form used in public or non-local contexts. It is separate from 
dialects, from "peasant language", even from a daily language as used in homes or in 
the para (even by bhadralok).57
Bhattacharyya feels that social usage of standard Bengali reinforces social inequalities.
While serving to unify the Hindu elite, social hierarchies of class, caste and
religion were reinforced by a conscious moulding of the Bengali language.58
Acharya feels that particularly English-medium but also much of the Bengali-medium 
education in contemporary West Bengal is elitist and exclusivist, designed so as to in 
effect deprive the poor and low caste access to higher education.59 Education, even 
mere literacy, was in West Bengal never quite free from its social identity, its 
association with the higher castes, the high-status bhadralok, with social refinement
57Chowdhuri 1960.
58Bhattacharyya 1987:62.
59Acharya 1978, 1986. Acharya (1981) has a particular grudge against 
Rabindranath’s primer, sahaj path. This "poetic" primer is by many bhadralok 
considered essential to a proper "Bengali" education.
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and non-manual labour. For the middle-class peasant sons, schools and colleges were 
much more than literacy. They meant close acquaintance with and possibly entrance 
into a social group, into a cultural world in many respects different from and definitely 
higher than their original village society.60
Below we shall turn to the re-emergence of the jatra, the rustic theatre, during this 
period. Before doing so, let us consider the language used in jatra. All jatras were 
held in the form of the standard (Calcutta-spoken) variety of Bengali — devoid of the 
rusticities of local language. Conscious efforts were made to conform in performance 
to the written form. We may note in this connection some recent changes in local 
dialect; the old verb-ending form for first person (e.g. chinu, I was) was over the 
decades replaced by a more standard ending, namely -lum (e.g. chilum). This has 
become the accepted form within the village, although the older form can still be 
heard — among the uneducated of the lower castes in particular. The new form is a 
standard variation of SCB’s form -lam (e.g. chilam, I was, standard variation but only 
rarely to be found in writing). Other language changes, too, took the same direction, 
from a dialect form towards the SCB.61 The "-lam" variety was at first used in jatras, 
which thus came to represent both the idealized language of the high-status, and the 
radical strand’s obligation to work with "the people".
^ h e r e  is a close association between education and identity. Whereas the 
uneducated are known by various local jati identities (aguri, saotal, namasudra, bagdi, 
etc), the educated are referred to as "Bengali" (bangali), i.e. the people of Bengal, 
those who have no localized identity smaller than the region.
61For instance, the use of the negative ni in both past, present and future (e.g. ami 
karbo ni) was abolished in favour of the SCB form (ami karbo na).
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It is interesting that "elite" villagers should turn to jatras as a medium. They took 
upon themselves this role of teacher at the same time as radicals such as Utpal Datta 
and others were urging for "people’s education" through the medium of popular 
entertainment. From the point of view of the urban bhadralok — a view educated 
villagers no doubt tended to subscribe to — jatra was a lowly form of theatre, 
"operatic and hallucinatory". But within the radical strand, such inhibitions could be 
overcome for the sake of a higher goal. There was in this appropriation of a popular 
form a statement of ideological orientation. Jatra was more than entertainment or even 
education/social reform; it was a willingness to be "part of the people" and to abolish 
pretensions to a higher elite or bhadralok status. Participation in jatra was to break 
with expected behaviour, to renounce the life-style and claims to superiority of their 
(fore-)fathers. It was a "statement" about a willingness to be part of, or not different 
from, the "folk", which in effect meant the "chhotolok", or the non-educated.
However, such a "statement" is interesting in more than one way. As Chakrabarty 
remarks, renunciation is for those with something to give up.62 The breaking away 
from a high-status past was for those with a high-status past to break away from. In 
that way, the performance of rustic folk-theatre by educated middle-class peasants only 
reinforced a basic status difference although in a different mode. Moreover, that 
participation linked them to a larger cultural movement and constituted a part of their 
linking-up to the radical but still high-status universe to which Utpal Datta and others 
belonged. It was a statement about being part of a current debate and movement, of
62"In order to be able to make sacrifices, one needed to possess; he who did not 
possess could not sacrifice. The glory of the renouncer belonged to the ’possessor’" 
(Chakrabarty 1989:152).
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being in the forefront of the discourse, of being more "modem". Jatra linked village 
leaders to that part of society which was most vigilant, most active, most prominent. 
That part was leftist in ideology.63 Leftism was at this time a well-known and 
spreading ideology. Newspapers, schools and schoolteachers, and bureaucrats in 
private participated in a discourse increasingly using leftist ideology to criticize 
existing social conditions and the political set-up.
By enacting their new found identity in the villages, they reinforced their link to the 
urban elite, the high-status bhadralok. Particularly the jatras were important here (and 
still are). Using Turner’s concept of "liminality" and regarding jatras as reflexive 
forms of ritual or art, we may sec the young village leaders as stepping out of an older 
mould of village leader to create a new role, that of the "modem leader". The 
"modern leader" was culturally close to the attractive and high-status culture of the 
world outside, close to the bhadralok in manners, training and ideas. For Turner, 
"liminality" was the "realm of the possible" and "seedbeds of cultural creativity".64 
By entering into the "liminal" space of jatra they portrayed themselves as part of 
another social sphere, that of the bhadralok, and could use jatra to define themselves 
in a close relation to the same outside world of the bhadralok. Not that they quite 
"became" bhadralok — they seem rather to have remained superior chasis (cultivators)
63From my account it may appear that I doubt the sincerity of the individuals’ 
motives: that is not so. I know most of those mentioned here personally and have no 
reason to believe their ideological convictions to be faulty. My concern is with the 
social situation; how were such actions interpreted, what were the precedents and the 
context? I see no contradiction if I say the activists in this were well aware of the 
same factors.
^Victor Turner 1977, quoted in Asheley 1990:xviii.
191
— but they were cast in a mould that at the same time was high-status and pro-poor. 
David Raybin uses Turner’s "social drama" concept to investigate art’s role and found 
in chivalric romances of the French Middle Ages an example of "how art’s symbolic, 
indeed ritualistic, role allows it to be a center for the establishment and ordering of 
a definable, self-aware social unit" — in his case the new nonfeudal nobility, in my 
case the "new" quasi-bhadralok village leader.65
In effect, a new model was established, that of the "modem village leader" as opposed 
to the previous "peasant householder" or "kingly" models. The ideology to which 
these new village leaders aligned themselves — whether mainstream or radical — 
demanded certain sacrifices from them as relatively well-off landowners. In the 
following chapter we shall turn to the large mobilization that took place during the 
late 1960s. Apart from that, and earlier in the 1960s, the new leaders continuously 
sacrificed their time and energy, their potentially comfortable lives, for the sake of 
village welfare. It should also be noted that they on occasions sacrificed some of their 
material capital. In June 1961 Haksaheb donated land for the establishment of both 
a cooperative society building and the school. Throughout the 1960s they donated 
paddy and occasionally money for one or the other project. In 1962 Hanukaji donated 
the large sum of Rs 1000 as the cooperative society’s starting capital. And land and 
money were continuously pledged for the road.
To a large extent, the "modem leaders" continued to act in the mould of the old-type 
village leader, i.e. in all aspects of village affairs, arranging communal activities (such
65Raybin 1990:27.
as the guarding of ripe paddy, cooperative societies, clubs and committees), or settling 
disputes. Such activities did not distinguish the new leaders from the previous 
generations. The same new leaders also had "powers" (land, for instance, or ritual 
superiority) which they continued to enjoy in their individual quests for position. But 
they also sought to build the "confidence" and "symbolic capital" necessary for 
effective leadership with reference to a new ideology and new symbols. As with all 
"symbolic capital" it was costly, and they continued to lose material capital on the 
maintenance of their positions. The donation of land for the cooperative society or 
the school is in many respects not much different from donations to a temple or feast 
for villagers (which we term "largesse" and attribute to the kingly model). Both 
establish the village leader’s credentials as someone with the village’s welfare 
foremost in mind. The major difference is in the rationalization, from the maintenance 
of an established social and ritual order to "progress" and "development".
Indeed, the "new" leader met the same requirements as the older leaders — only more 
so. The requirements of "knowledge", "compassion", involvement, concern and 
respect had been crucial to the selection of a leader from among the "group of equals". 
The "new" leader filled these requirements with his anchorage in an egalitarian 
ideology aimed at social and economic development and political progress.
Conclusion
The meeting of the "modem tradition, Bengali flavour" with villagers caused two 
developments in the villages under study. Firstly, that section of the village leadership
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most exposed to this tradition sought to recreate itself and portray itself as connected 
to or even part of that wider tradition. They sought to give the impression through 
their actions and rhetoric of being different from old-style village leaders and instead 
being part of that high-status world outside. They created for themselves a new 
model: the modem-minded villager, free from superstition, free from the "prestige" 
and "distance" considerations of the past, and knowledgeable and conversant in most 
things new (literature, the ideology of parties, the international scene).
Secondly, by doing so and because of the imperatives of the specific adopted culture, 
the village leaders came to promote particular ideas in village society, ideas that were 
radical. Through their jatras, rhetoric and actions, a discourse was introduced, one in 
which "equality", "anti-casteism", "cooperation" and "progress" were catch-words for 
interaction with all including the poor and low caste. This discourse identified a wide 
range of "problems" in village society. The discourse they engaged in legitimized new 
and possibly even radical courses of action, new social relations, new attitudes to old 
grievances. For the larger society of poor and low caste, jatras addressed social 
problems in a new manner, witliin an ideology different from the one hitherto 
dominant. Through the medium of jatras problems and solutions and moral points 
could be suggested without directly threatening the existing social order.
There is naturally nothing deterministic in this. The impact and response among 
villagers depended on more than jatra performances, as I shall demonstrate in the next 
chapter. However (following Bourdieu to an extent), we may say that these jatra 
performances opened up the field of discussion, and addressed old grievances against
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casteism, poverty and oppression. Addressing such grievances, however unarticulated 
these may have been, brought into question dominant "truths". A new discourse was 
formed within village society. It is important here that the questioning did not take 
place in a void, but in a situation where these issues referred to a broad new and 
persuasive ideology.
Due to limited material, it has not been possible to come very close to the issue of 
how much if at all these "modem" or communist ideas were distorted on the way into 
the villages, or of how much they were adapted or reinterpreted to suit local 
circumstances. We may well imagine that ideas could be misunderstood, only 
superficially adopted, or inconsistently selected from a wide body of literature (which 
in itself was not too consistent). Some of these issues will be addressed in the 
following chapters, where we will see how harbingers of the modem tradition 
willingly adapted to local traditions and how local traditions are never fully 
supplanted.
In many respects the advances made by the "modern tradition" into rural society in 
this pre-UF period were limited and restricted to a narrow section of society. It has 
not been my point to argue that by the jatra performances and the bichars these ideas 
effectively changed village life. There were some changes, but mainly at the level of 
discourse. In other respects the gains were much more limited or entirely absent. 
Few if any in the 1960s had thought seriously about land redistribution, and collective 
tilling of land was perhaps attractive as utopias go but otherwise far-fetched. 
Interaction with lower castes was freer, but not free. The point has rather been to
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show how a new discourse came to influence the activities and actions of village 
leaders in partly setting the agenda for them, and in giving them new arguments and 
a new outlook.
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FIVE 
CASTE, STEREOTYPES, 
AND MOBILIZATION
Introduction
Gyan Prakash discusses how oral traditions, or myths, of certain groups (castes) can 
be regarded as more than irrelevant stories from a past age. They form apologata for 
contemporary social and economic (low) positions, explaining, excusing, and 
attributing alternative qualities to the group.1 Myths of this kind, which are 
historically formed, are of here-and-now relevance, and, following on Prakash, in non­
literate societies myths are (in a wide sense) contemporary statements. However, it 
may be that myths can be regarded as more than apologata growing out of a group’s 
contemporary predicament, that they can be partly amendable to present interests, and 
may be used — manipulated — to serve existing interests. "Histories” rarely come 
in singulars with a neatly definable moral or unitary values. Rather, myths are open 
to contestation and manipulation, to what Sahlins called "mytho-praxis”. He 
comments that:
1 Prakash 1 9 9 0 ^  particularly page 38ff contains a good discussion on the 
historicity of oral traditions. See also Darnton 1991.
Clearly, Maori are cunning mythologists, who are able to select from the 
supple body of traditions those most appropriate to the satisfaction of their 
current interests, as they conceive them.2
According to this understanding, myths can be conveniently remembered or forgotten, 
emphasized or perhaps even to an extent recreated to make a point or advance an 
interest. However, myths are not taken out of thin air but created in history, both 
recent and more distant, and are moulded by both social identity and material 
conditions. Myths both inform practice and are informed by practice, and they form 
part of identities — of self-image as well as social image. Following from such a 
view, myths may have real tangible effects on the behaviour of the self and of others 
towards the self.
This introduction, I believe, is of interest to our understanding of caste. Throughout 
this text I have talked about ’’caste" (or jati) without any clear statement about why 
caste should be important in village politics, of why, or to what extent, people 
belonging to ritually defined groups act in consorted manners in politics. One clue 
to these questions is found in the observation that, in these two village, in spite of 
poverty and low status, certain castes of poor were able to gain some advantages, 
some concessions from the dominant groups. The ability to do so depended on local 
circumstances, even on individuals, but above all on popular stereotypes about the 
castes in question, and the ability of the individual caste groups to exploit these social 
stereotypes.
2Sahlins 1985:55. Obeyesekere’s 1992 critique of Sahlins might have been 
unjustified had Sahlins incorporated his own ideas into his interpretations.
198
Most castes (jatis, or sub-castes) are endogamous, and they have a fairly well 
established (if not uncontested) ritual rank in any given locality.3 Ritual rank derives 
for some castes from the ritual service they locally or historically execute. However, 
the great majority of people belong to castes that only in the vaguest sense have a 
specific ritual occupation (the huge "peasant" or "agricultural" castes), or follow that 
occupation. Moreover, all castes have myths of origin, more or less clearly stated, 
which link them to known epic characters or incidents. Lastly, local castes have a 
regional, often even local, distinct history (which may cause intra-caste divisions and 
the establishment of separate sub-castes). These many elements in a caste’s identity 
do not make up a neat body of consistent claims and arguments defining the caste’s 
place and role in society and ritual. Rather, it is a body filled with claims and counter 
claims, inconsistencies, and great spatial and temporal variation. These variations — 
the scope for interpretation — are partly limited by the restrictions imposed by 
surrounding society, but also partly amendable to changes and initiatives from the 
caste itself. Local initiative and the ability to use local traditions and histories, within 
the limits set by society, give rise to stories (myths, or traditions) that are stable over 
some time. I prefer to call these stereotypes.
My argument is perhaps best visualized. The image of the un-oiled and dark, fierce, 
lathi-waving, and often dangerously drunk bagdi was used in Udaynala by village 
leaders to intimidate opponents, and to keep other villagers subordinated. Their role 
as indispensable supporters for village leaders secured a clout for the bagdis which 
their economic position did not allow. On the other hand, the image of the
3Kolenda 1978, Dumont 1980, Ch. 5.
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untouchable-but-want-to-be-clean muchi evoked not fear but ridicule. Muchis instead 
exploited the potential in the notion that only the protection of all groups, in particular 
those necessary for the ritual order, defines the legitimate leader (re. rajadharma). 
This notion obliged the village leader to protect all including the muchis, or perhaps 
in particular the muchis (as village servants), provided that they, as "subordinates", 
accepted his leadership. These two stereotypes and the respective options available 
made the two jatis react very differently to the CPM’s mobilization efforts.
Close relationships between landowner-village leaders, on the one hand, and labourer- 
followers, on the other, are often termed patron-client relationships. The term implies 
exchanges of some sort, often involving employment, protection, and occasional credit 
in exchange for secured labour, support in disputes, perhaps votes.4 I shall try to 
argue for a more nuanced picture, one of the patron-client relationship as filled with 
different matter, reflecting different norms or different political realities. This is a 
picture where the "client" is not necessarily powerless but can manipulate social 
stereotypes and appeal to different values to strengthen his own position within the 
relationship.
Although all subordinate groups established some "clout" in this manner, groups living 
under equal economic conditions did not pursue equal roles or obtain similar degrees 
of influence in village affairs. The bagdis became lathials (fighters, who fight with 
lathis, sticks) while the muchis became quiet prajas (subordinates, subjects). The
4For a typical example see Nicholas 1963 and 1965. A recent version is found 
in Robinson 1988.
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present chapter will look into the relationship between village leaders and those 
sections of the population to a larger extent (formerly) excluded from open, public 
influence — a relationship, it will be seen, that was extended to the CPM.5
Caste and class, ca. 1960
A breakdown of landownership by jali (tables 5.1 and 5.2) suggests a strong 
correlation between ritual status and landowning status around 1960; the higher jatis 
owned in general sufficient amounts of land to pass as owner-cultivators, while the 
lower jatis were landless. Among some of the low castes one found a few owner- 
cultivator and rich peasant families but in general they were close to landless. The 
jatis muchi, dule and saotal were invariably land-poor. The higher status groups 
(aguri, sekh, etc.), were in general well-off, though these too included a number of 
land-poor families.
5Other groups too exploited stereotypes and cultural constructs in this manner. 
Women, for instance, both as a group and as individuals, were able on occasions to 
exploit an image of women as quarrelsome to embarrass the men (as in the case of 
Milon in Chapter Three). Equally, male adolescents were commonly given an unusual 
leverage in public affairs, using their vigilance and recklessness within the larger 
"game" (see also Risseeuw 1988).
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Table 5.1
Landownership per household, by size group and jati, in percentage of total, 
Udaynala, 1957
Land Clean- Nama-
bighas caste* Sekh sudra Mallik Bagdi Muchi Saotal Total
0-4.9 12.5 13.9 34.8 50.0 54.2 81.8 91.7 35.2
5-9.9 25.0 30.6 4.3 33.3 25.0 18.2 8.3 23.1
10-19.9 12.5 33.3 43.5 16.7 12.5 - - 25.0
20+ 50.0 22.2 17.4 - 8.3 - - 16.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 8 72 23 6 24 11 12 156
Percent 5.1 46.2 14.7 3.8 15.4 7.0 7.7 99.9
* "Clean-caste" includes bamun, kayastha, bene and kalu 
Source: field-data
Table 5.2
Landownership per household, by size group and jati, in percentage of total, 
Gopinathpur, ca. 1960
In Kay-
bighas Bamun astha Aguri Nanit Bagdi Dule Muchi Total
0-4.9 75.0 33.3 7.1 • 53.8 100.0 100.0 44.2
5-9.9 - - 7.1 - 30.8 - - 9.6
10-19.9 - 55.6 28.6 66.7 7.7 - - 23.1
20+ 25.0 11.1 57.1 33.3 7.7 - - 23.1
Total 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 4 9 14 3 13 5 4 52
Per cent 7.7 
Source: field-data
17.3 26.9 5.8 25.0 9.6 7.7 100.0
The economic position of the poor was reflected in their appearance: very simple and 
often tom clothing, commonly a mere loincloth, and shirt-less even in winter. They 
lived in poor and cramped conditions, and to outsiders their para was congested and 
unclean. All lower castes, in these villages the bagdis, muchis and saotals in
particular, were "known" to be energetic producers and consumers of alcohol. Their 
sexual norms were considered immoral by the higher groups, and "typically low- 
caste". The overlap of material poverty, life-style and certain norms also overlapped 
with ritual status.6
"We made ourselves low": an untouchable identity
Muchis were found everywhere in Bengal but nowhere numerically dominant. Their 
numbers in Burdwan and Raina were small; the 1901 Census gives them as 4.9% of 
the Raina thana population, and they were 4.0% of the total population of Burdwan 
according to the 1931 Census.7 In Gopinathpur circa 1960, four of a total of 52 
households were muchi, and in 1993 they made up 14.9% of the total population. In 
Udaynala they formed 4.5% of the population in 1993. They were poor though not 
entirely landless. The live muchi families in Gopinathpur owned among themselves 
21 bighas. In Udaynala their position was worse. Most were landless, one family 
owned 8 bighas, another 5 bighas and the rest minor plots (see tables 5.1 and 5.2).
The muchi jati*s ritual occupation was the carrying away and disposal of cow carrion, 
the preparation of drums and shoes from leather, and the beating of drums during 
rituals. They made shoes and drums from the hides of cow carcasses,8 and these
6See also Ray 1983 and 1987.
7Peterson 1910, and Census o f India 1931 Volume V, Bengal, Part n, Tables, 
^ h e  muchis, however, were not tanners. That task was carried out by another
jati.
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drums were beaten by muchis at Hindu rituals. They performed tasks necessary for 
the well-being of the entire Hindu society and were integral to the ritual hierarchy and 
its maintenance. Together with napits (barbers) and bamuns (priests), muchis were 
one of the three jatis in this area with ritually defined tasks. These ritual tasks were 
seen as highly polluting because of their association with death, blood, and rotting 
flesh. Muchis were further stigmatized because they ate the flesh of dead cows. Even 
Muslims considered them polluting.
Their position at the bottom of the ritual and social hierarchy was excused in a typical 
manner. According to one story, muchis were once kings of this area. Among the 
muchis of Udaynala, two households were rajbanshi, or of royal lineage. But that, 
they say, was before their "fall" and the advent of bamuns and caste Hindus. The 
many stories all suggest that the fall was accidental. One story goes like this:
It was usual for owners of cows to mark these with their individual signs in 
ink. Some muchi ancestor was fooled into stealing cows, but in order to get 
rid of the ink marks, that area of the hide was cut off. Slowly, increasingly 
more hide was cut off, and eventually a cow died from the wound. They 
became untouchable as a punishment for having killed a cow.
Another story said that:
A bamun on his way to the Ganges brought a flower garland for the muchis’ 
ancestor to the river for offering. He brought the consecrated garland back, 
and the muchi-to-be planted a tree in the goddess’s name and offered the 
garland. But he did not manage to keep the tree alive, and as punishment he 
and all his descendants became untouchable.
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The muchis’ general attitude to their present condition is that "we have made 
ourselves low".9 They attribute their fall to accidental circumstances or treachery. I 
did not encounter any general critique of the (Hindu hierarchical) system as such.10
In addition to the severe economic constraints under which they lived and to the 
constant, if not continuous, reminder of their untouchability by members of other jatis, 
muchis were also not able or allowed to operate on the village political scene. 
Paradoxically, the low ritual status offered them some respite from economic duress 
and a limited degree of influence in village affairs.
The distance muchis were required to observe from the divine image (thakur) 
underlined their low position, while at the same time the beating of the drum signified 
the muchis as integral to Hindu cosmology. Their position was ambiguous: they were 
polluting and dangerous but indispensable.11 Without the beating of the drums the 
puja could not be performed, and without scavengers other Hindus could not remain 
ritually pure. The muchis’ subordination as recipients of pollution was necessary for 
the well-being and ritual cleanliness of the whole.12 This ascribed role in Hindu 
cosmology contrasts to other low castes in these villages, and gave muchis a more 
clearly defined position within Hindu society than most jatis.
9nijeke neme diechhi.
1(>This kind of apologata is very similar to what Prakash (-F?8ffa) found.
uFor the "ambiguous position" of Harijans in rituals see Fuller 1992, Ch. 6.
12Gould 1958, Pocock 1962.
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Due to this defined ritual occupation grants of land were occasionally extended to 
muchis as gratuity for their ritual services. Commonly a few bighas of land were 
given them in perpetuity — though the landlord or committee remained legal owner. 
In exchange, muchis performed their ritual tasks. In Gopinathpur, seven bighas of the 
village communal land was set aside for drumming and divided between originally 
two muchi households. In Udaynala two muchi households held 3.5 bighas granted 
by the former zamindar family of the village for the village gajan (a Shiva festival), 
and three bighas had been granted by the Kaji family for a Kali festival discontinued 
in the early 1960s. Drumming can only be done by muchis and so the land grants can 
be held by them only as dictated by custom. They were also normally fed at the 
pujas, given prasad (what had been offered to the deity — mainly food) and some 
extra recompense (cash, paddy, and/or cloth) at the organizer’s discretion. In addition 
muchis were paid for both disposing of cow carcasses and for the shoes they made 
from the hides, and so the meat (which they ate) and the hide (raw material for further 
income-generation) were theirs by custom.
If a village did not have muchi inhabitants, non-resident muchis could be hired for 
special occasions from neighbouring villages. However, there was a sense of prestige 
in having "our own muchis" (amcider-i muchi), a prestige reflected in the widespread 
practice of granting them lands and thereby lying them to the place.
Some 65 years ago Gopinathpur was left without muchis after illness and death in the 
family of muchis that had lived there. The village sought to entice other families to 
settle there, but those approached asked "What will we eat?" The village relied for
some years on hired-in muchis for the necessary tasks, but found this dependence (on 
muchis from the rival village of K.) demeaning and unsatisfactory. A few years later, 
the village received what was to be the core of its baroari (public) land, some 12 
bighas.13 It was decided that one-third should be used to entice a muchi family to 
settle. The year after another three bighas was given to another muchi, a relative of 
the first family.
The presence in the village of muchis was desired but not imperative (they could be 
hired from outside). Resident muchis ensured the ritual purity of the village, but 
above all their presence was a matter of prestige and evoked the image of a 
wholesome, good Hindu village. "Every [caste] Hindu village has muchis", and 
Gopinathpur without the services of "the untouchable" was a bothersome image. The 
villagers preferred to settle muchis than to be rich in communal land.14
In the same way that their low position in society was defined by Hindu tradition, so 
too was this small but secure source of income, and a measure of protection from 
leading villagers. This income was tied to their ritual status, as low but indispensable 
to Hindu society. They were granted some "moral economy" minimum income and
13A dacoit from neighbouring K. had murdered a man but escaped with a lot of 
money. After many years he returned to settle in Gopinathpur where he bought land 
and was protected against revenge from K. After his death the lands lapsed to the 
village community.
14The unusually large lands given — 7 bighas — should probably be seen in 
connection with the age-old rivalry with the village of IC., where people, according to 
one K. informant, had much spite left for "poor Gopinathpur".
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employment — but at leading villagers’ discretion, subject to the benevolence of their 
patrons.
Muchis in village public affairs
As a group and as individuals muchis of Gopinathpur and Udaynala have kept a low 
profile and were never publicly involved in village affairs or spoke at meetings, if they 
attended at all. Historically, the Gopinathpur muchis have always been "known" to 
be aligned with the village leaders, particularly the chairmen of the baroari committee. 
They were "known" to have been so in the sense that this is how village history 
presents them, and this is how they presented and present themselves. Living off 
communal land they were aligned with Bhaskar Kes for the twenty years he was 
baroari committee chairman. During the years when Congress-supported Anadi Sarkar 
rivalled Bhaskar in the 1970s, young Ram Das joined for a while the reformist Hindu 
sect Satsangha in which Anadi Sarkar was prominent.
This "official" alignment with the major village leader was more evident in the case 
of Udaynala, where the division among would-be village leaders was more 
pronounced. Here, too, muchis were "known" to have been aligned with villager 
leaders. While the Kaji family was still important — until the death of Jikukaji — 
the muchis "belonged" to them. The Kajis were wealthy and had a special claim, 
based on history and practice, to the leadership of Udaynala South and the loyalty of 
its inhabitants, including the muchi para.
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When all-village leadership lapsed to Haksaheb and Ehiasaheb of the north mouza, the 
muchis found themselves there, together with Jikukaji’s son Hanukaji. Throughout 
the 1960s the muchis were "known" supporters of the "young group" and not its rival 
Rahim. This support was shown only in a very limited manner. They rarely attended 
meetings, and only Tarapada Das participated in land occupations during the United 
Front years (see below) — and only once. When Haksaheb fled and Ehiasaheb took 
over as main village leader, the muchis did not welcome the developments: 
"Haksaheb", said Nimai Das, "is baniadi [family with prestige to protect], and they 
used to do more [for us]". Haksaheb and Hanukaji had taken the muchi subdued 
support more seriously than did Ehiasaheb, who demanded more explicit support. 
However, Ananda Das came to frequent Ehiasaheb*s house. Ananda was unblemished 
by land occupations and had once come into some trouble because he opposed the 
sexual exploitation of their womenfolk by the village top families — a practice also 
opposed by Ehiasaheb. Through him muchis again had a link to the village leader, 
while others, in particular Tarapada, lay low. Their limited previous involvement 
prevented them from targeting in the aftermath of the land occupations.
During the euphoria of the First post-1977 years of LFG rule, frequent and huge 
processions, demonstrations, and meetings were organized. In these, a few individual 
muchis participated along with members of all other poor jatis, though never with any 
organizational position. Gour-da, of Haksaheb’s entourage, was the lone muchi who 
occasionally attended village meetings or bichars during my visit. As with muchis in 
all public connections, he never spoke up. According to village historian Najir Hosen,
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muchis never spoke at meetings, nor were they expected to. According to Nimai Das, 
"Nobody would have listened".
In this way muchis were "known" to be with this or that village leader. Though the 
leader might well have been disliked, he was not opposed or given an opportunity to 
doubt their general albeit subdued alignment or acquiesence. Other groups, including 
bagdis, as we shall see below, were "out of favour" for periods. The muchis were 
more clearly "in favour" most of the time, occasionally through the good office of one 
or the other of their jati but primarily because they never assumed any position of 
influence on the central village political scene. Their "role" had been defined by 
society as that of the village servant. And through subservience that emphasized this 
role and their special place in village life, and by quietly supporting the major village 
leader as a matter of course, they contributed towards his creation as village leader.
The relationship between economic dependants and landowners, subjects and kings, 
devotees and gods, and children and parents, it has been suggested, constitutes a 
dominant, paradigmatic cultural idiom. This structural relationship is typically 
exemplified, according to Ostor, in situations of request and supplication. When the 
economic dependant asks for a favour he does so in a vocabulary and a manner that 
invokes the imagery of a child asking for indulgence, or of a devotee without whom 
the gods would not be worshipped, evoking the obligation to protect.15 Greenough
l5Ostor Ymr
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makes this view more explicitly valid for the sharecropper-landowner relationship.16 
The proper code of conduct for superiors demands them to both indulge and feed, as 
well as to guide and punish. Such a requirement to feed and protect can be "created" 
by submission: the superior is "appointed". In the case of muchis the element of 
choice was of course limited. Nonetheless, submission had an element of effect 
because of the moral obligations of the (would-be) all-village leader to protect and 
care for all villagers. To support muchis as integral to an ideal society established the 
credentials for would-be all-village leaders as someone who has the interests of all 
groups and the whole group in mind, and sees to the maintenance of a good society 
in the style of a good king. By their submission muchis contributed towards the 
making of that image for individual village leaders.
The muchis’ role in society was somewhat less marked in Muslim than in Hindu 
villages, where they symbolised the good society. To an extent, however, it was also 
found in Udaynala; nearly half the population there too were Hindus, and even the 
Muslims were of course not unfamiliar with the notion. The Kajis’ bestowal of land 
for drumming at the Kajis’ Kali puja symbolized their concern for the well-being of 
their Hindu "subjects".17 Moreover, the specifically religious content is but a 
particular case of a more general construct. A leader of society, as also a householder 
or a king, was ideally responsible for the well-being of all subordinates, including
16Greenough 1982, Ch. 1. See also Inden and Nicholas 1977, Ch. 1.
17For possibly several hundred years the Kaji family sponsored a Kali puja (kajider 
kali), revered the image (although they did not worship), and bequeathed land for the 
expenses. Three bighas of this land were held by village muchis. The image for 
Kajis’ Kali paused in front of the Kaji household, the Kajis kept the door facing the 
site of the puja open throughout the year, and they did not eat beef.
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their religious lives. It was in providing for all inhabitants of a village that one 
morally substantiated a claim to all-village leadership.
This picture of "influence through submission" is contrasted in the following section 
where it will be shown how the bagdis created influence through assertion. By 
juxtaposing the two it is possible to see the extent to which two groups of poor and 
low caste were able to exploit numbers, stereotypes and cultural constructs in different 
ways.
"We are bagdis!": the bagdi stereotype
The phrase "We are bagdis!" (amra bagdi!) is commonly pointed to by bagdis and 
others alike to suggest the pride with which bagdis regarded themselves. Though poor 
(see tables 5.1 and 5.2 above), low-caste ("untouchable", or, in contemporary parlance, 
"Scheduled Caste"), and until recently considered filthy and uncivilized, bagdis were 
thought of as not having hidden or felt any shame about their identity. On the 
contrary, they were regarded as fierce and were feared. One elderly bagdi leader 
(Sankar Dhaure), in a solid case of understatement, called them "mischievous" and 
went on at great length to describe how they used to fight, steal and drink. This was 
not a new self-image. Bagdis were known to be fierce and warrior-like by the British, 
and at least in one report they were termed "Criminal caste" although never officially 
branded as such.18
18J. N. Bhattacharya Hindu castes and sects Calcutta 1896, cited in Satadal 
Dasgupta 1986. The Burdwan Gazetteer (Peterson 1910) held the people of Raina to 
be particularly notorious for dacoity.
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Bagdis comprise a sizeable portion of the population in the area. The 1901 Census 
reported them as comprising 24.3% of the total population (the single largest jati) of 
Raina thana, with "Musalman Sekh" and aguri as number two and three with 
respectively 20.0 and 11.1% of the total.19 In the last census to list caste (the 1931 
Census), bagdis figured as 11% of the total population of Burdwan district, with sekhs 
as the single largest at 18%. The 1921 Census gave aguris as 7.6% of the Burdwan 
population.20 In Udaynala the bagdis comprised 15% of the population in 1957, in 
Gopinathpur 33% in 1960.
Most bagdis were illiterate, and, as opposed to the higher status jatis, their women 
worked in the fields (their own) or as servants in landowner households. Before the 
late 1960s and 1970s, dowry was not common in bagdi marriages as opposed to most 
other Hindu jatis (including muchis). According to some informants, though others 
disagreed, bagdis held relatively liberal views on sex. Sexual intercourse before 
marriage and extra-marital affairs are suggested to have found place with some 
frequency.21 Furthermore, divorce was not uncommon (and not a big deal), and 
bagdis of both villages practised widow-remarriage at least until the 1960s. Sexual 
prowess was an important part of the bagdi image.
19Peterson 1910: statistics 1901-2, Table V, pp. 6-7.
20For 1921 figures: Census o f India 1921 Volume V, Bengal, Part II: Tables. For 
1931 figures: Census o f India 1931 Volume V, Part II: Tables. Aguris, a relatively 
small and geographically confined jati, was dropped in the 1931 census.
21The same was found by Ray 1983 and 1987 for kahars (bauris) in Birbhum.
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They were known to pursue a frivolous life-style, with heavy drinking, brawling and 
much quarrelling. The excesses at their festivities made others stay away. The bagdi 
Ulaichandi celebration was particularly notorious for excessive drinking. Their 
production of liquor was immense, with almost every household producing their own 
liquor — often for sale. Bagdis also had a reputation for being quarrelsome and fond 
of fights, to which numerous stories of disputes, fights and spilling of blood testify.
Bagdis were also "known" to be prone towards small-scale theft, a common practice 
particularly during times of duress. Quite often well-off villagers found that some of 
their ripe paddy had been cut from the fields at night, or that fish had been caught in 
their ponds. Occasionally chickens, goats or husked rice or straw vanished from 
compounds in the main parts of the village. Whether the bagdis were more involved 
in such practices than other jatis is not certain though probable. Waselmaster’s diaries 
contain numerous references to instances of theft and subsequent allegations against 
one or the other bagdi. Some bagdis also acknowledge that their contribution to the 
rate of these activities was quite substantial. Whether or not this was so, the blame 
was more readily put on bagdis than on other low-status and poor jatis. Because of 
this image, bagdis were excluded from the rakh (guarding of ripe paddy fields against 
theft); to an extent it was directed against them. They were included only in the early 
1980s.
Whether this picture is entirely accurate or not is not all-important. What is important 
is that bagdis themselves actively cultivated this image and exploited it vis-a-vis other 
villagers. As landless majurs one would have expected bagdis, like other jatis, to have
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behaved in a subordinate fashion. But instead of being subordinate they were 
insubordinate. They openly defied norms of interaction between superior and inferior, 
between labourer and employing landowner. They smoked in front of employers, 
refused but the bare necessities of respect, and could on occasion even pick an 
argument with landowners and yell at them. During festivities bagdis did not hide 
their drinking even from the eyes of high-status people such as the quasi-aristocratic 
Jikukaji. This tendency to defy superiors, or at least to deny them customary displays 
of respect, is attributed to bagdis only. Other jatis, such as muchis or namasudras, did 
not allow themselves such liberties, it is held.
Myth and history connect bagdis to the peasant-warriors of the ancient and once 
powerful Hindu kingdom of Bishnupur (in today’s Bankura district) — its demise 
followed on the Maratha raids in the mid-18th century. Bagdis* sanskritized name for 
themselves, barga-kshatriya, meaning something close to "cultivating warrior", reflects 
this myth. Some bagdi "surnames" (padabi, "title") suggest particular roles in the 
royal entourage or administrative set-up: Dhaure ("runner", troop), Bag and Pakre 
(who arrests, chaukidar), and Thandar (collector). Until recently bagdis supposedly 
smoked the hookah with members of the royal lineage jati — Mai or Rajbansi Mai 
— a practice which suggests equal ritual status and common origin.22 Their claim to 
the kshatriya-status was, however, qualified by the preposition "barga", suggesting that 
they were not real kshatriyas, not themselves rulers, but peasants called upon to 
defend the realm or dharma. They did not claim to have been kings, only to have 
been farmers who also constituted the army of a king. In the Hindu order of things,
22Peterson 1910.
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they would not have been independent but subject to the king’s rule, albeit subjects 
with an important role to fulfil.
On the other hand, in the claim of not having been mere peasants but peasant warriors 
lies an element legitimizing adherence to practices not normally acceptable for 
peasants (sudrcis). The opportunity to take to arms and ability to use these were 
cherished life-style aspects derived from these myths. In conversations some also 
expressed satisfaction with a valued freedom from perceived Hindu restrictions on 
meat-eating and drinking, and subordination to superiors — which they attributed to 
their kshatriya-status. Though it is common for all low castes to eat meat and drink, 
some bagdis see this in light of their past and their quasi-kshatriya status.23
The way non-bagdis saw bagdis was not all that different from how they saw 
themselves, although they themselves saw these characteristics as positive: physically 
strong, black and beautiful, with curly hair, somewhat uncontrollable, and at the same 
time attractive. As for instance in the following story.24
The god Mahadev (Shiva) has gone to earth but does not return. His wife, 
Parvati, sends some retainers to look for him, and they return telling her that 
he has found a place on earth of such abundance and beauty that he does not 
want to leave. The place is Bengal. She goes out to have a look for herself,
23The "kshatriya-model" as a code of conduct is found to have been followed by 
jatis in many different places. The model is associated with notions of rule, valour, 
physical prowess, and dispensation from rules of ritual piety. See for instance 
Srinivas 1955, Hitchcock 1959, Mayer 1960:63, Mandelbaum 1970b, Ch. 24.
24The story was collected and recorded by "Rajaram’s son Rameswar" in the 
village of Madanagar (Burdwan), in its bagdi-para, in the Bengali year 1264 (1858 
AD), and written on a pilthi (scroll).
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and she sees the abundance, the fertile paddy fields, the ponds filled with fish, 
the trees abounding in fruit. She understands perfectly why he does not want 
to return to her. So in order to have him back, she decides to ruin the place.
One day (the story goes) Mahadev’s nephew is out walking in the fields. 
There he sees a bagdi woman (bagdini) destroying the ripe paddy, ruining the 
fruit trees and emptying the ponds of fish. He rushes over to stop her, but she 
uses f°ul language (&#*$) at him. This scares him, and he runs back to his 
uncle. Mahadev asks his nephew what the woman looked like, was it perhaps 
your aunt? No, answers the nephew, this woman is short, dark with curly hair, 
and has big breasts. Determined to prevent this woman from ruining his 
fields, Mahadev goes to find her. He is very angry and decides to shout at 
her. However, when he sees her beauty he cannot shout at her and only asks 
in a low voice, "Where is your husband?" Her husband, she answers, is old, 
beats his wife, and has gone far away. Mahadev thought the description was 
not unfit for himself. So he offers to fish and harvest for the woman, and does 
so. After the fishing and harvesting, he wants her to cook him a meal while 
he is having a bath and resting. She agrees and says she will go and find 
some ingredients. To tie her to himself and make her come back, he gives her 
a ring. She takes the ring and leaves, but she never returns. Mahadev goes 
looking for her in heaven, where he meets Parvati. Parvati asks him if he has 
given his ring to a bagdini. He admits his errors and stays in heaven.
The story suggests that bagdis are both dangerous and destructive, and at the same 
time irresistibly attractive even to gods. A beautiful but wild and uncontrollable 
people, the story seems to say, the very opposite of the refined and elaborate caste- 
Hindus with their fair skin, values of chastity, and frugal and respectable life-styles. 
This "bagdiness", this image of bagdis as irresponsible, quarrelsome, prone to theft, 
and of dangerous beauty and pride, was shared by bagdis and non-bagdis alike.
Bagdis and dacoity
In addition to their reputation for quarrelsomeness, insubordination, and theft, bagdis 
were also known as prolific in the trade of "dacoity". Dacoity (<dakati, nightly raids 
by small bands) was a fairly widespread practice until the late 1970s in this area.
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Small bands of five to ten would steal out at night and raid valuables from rich 
households — preferably far away from home. Dacoits returned to their home village 
before the break of dawn, and passed the loot on to middle-men who sold it 
elsewhere. Famous gun-touting cases involved two raids into the household of the 
well-off napit Jagatnath Majumdar in Gopinathpur, and once in Udaynala in the house 
of Sobhachacha the money-lender. There were also many other minor cases of 
dacoity.
The bagdis’ central place in the local history of dacoity is suggested by the bagdi- 
dacoit as standard character in jatra (plays performed on village stages) — together 
with other standard characters such as the garib musalman (poor Muslim) and the 
boka bamun (stupid Brahmin). I was given a list of the most famous dacoits of Raina 
thana after Independence, and of the eleven listed seven were bagdis. There was even 
one from the bagdi-para of Udaynala, the locally famous Nitai Singh, active with his 
group of five in the 1940s and 1950s. Other active bagdi groups operated from six 
immediately neighbouring villages. In addition there were two Muslim-led groups, 
one group led by a clean-caste Hindu and one by a saotal. Some of these groups 
ceased to be active in the 1950s, others kept going into the 1970s. Dacoit leaders 
such as these were rarely married (although not childless), and spent all their wealth 
on bribes, on feasting, and on gifts to poorer villagers. Few left any fortune to pass 
on.
These dacoit leaders were the professionals but did not raid alone. With them went 
small groups of people, four, five or ten or more. Most participants in dacoity gangs
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were bagdi, even when the gang was led by non-bagdis. These participants were 
"semi-professionals". To participate in dacoity demanded knowledge and dexterity. 
Physical strength was required for the long marches, most often through mud since the 
best time for dacoity was the dark and muddy rainy season. For a hasty retreat 
through muddy fields dacoits often used stilts. Should the alarm be raised during a 
raid, the dacoits would communicate in codes unintelligible to outsiders. Above all, 
courage was required: to be caught meant a beating, possibly death, at least 
imprisonment, and starvation for the family.
The code of conduct for dacoity prevented raiding in neighbouring villages or hamlets. 
The killing of victims did take place but was avoided if possible as repercussions 
would be severe. An important mark not to be overstepped was the sexual 
exploitation of female victims. An instance of rape during a raid between 1950 and 
1955 in near-by P. led other dacoits to kill the culprit.
According to informants, the non-professional dacoits were motivated by need. It 
could be hunger, debt or expenses for ceremonial feasts. The non-professionals were 
ordinary — albeit hardy and daring — majurs in their daily life. In the general 
climate of poverty, the occasional poor harvest, flood or drought, dacoits enjoyed a 
degree of sympathy, at least among a large number of people. The need and 
sympathy may not have been extended to the whole practice of dacoity. Dacoity was 
not acceptable as a legitimate form of action among the general population. If caught, 
dacoits were always summarily punished (in near-by Kh. one dacoit was caught and 
beaten to death in 1971). At the same time they were shielded by their own
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communities, and to a large extent accepted by their co-villagers. Although 
continuously chased by the police, dacoits were rarely caught during day-time because 
co-villagers would raise the alarm if the police was seen arriving over the fields. 
Equally, police-informants were few and far between. Dacoity was of course in the 
main directed against richer households (although far from always) and could not 
expect much understanding from those sections. Among low-status sections, however, 
dacoits were close to being accepted and occasionally accorded near-hero status. 
People in the bagdi-paras used to tell stories about dramatic events during raids, about 
the exploits of famous dacoits, of their courage and cunning, of the amount of loot 
they got, of close escapes and dramatic deaths. Pride was attached to daring exploits 
and in general to their somewhat reckless reputation. These were stories of daring 
courage, close escapes, fabulous wealth, and largesse. Below follow two examples.
Baldeb Pakre was a big dacoit. He was very dark, and his shoulders were so 
broad he had to walk sideways through doors. His home was in S-pur [in 
Raina], his father’s family was very poor and he had many brothers and 
sisters. When Baldeb was young, his father stole some paddy for his starving 
family, but he was caught by the landlord’s lathials and beaten to death. In 
anger Baldeb set fire to [the straw roofs of] the landlord’s houses and fled the 
village. For many years he lived from begging and majuri in Hugli and many 
other places, where he came to learn about the rich landlords there. He made 
his name as lathial and became part of Gautam Mandal’s [dacoity] gang. After 
G»OLuJtQ.Tn Subhas died, Baldeb became leader of that gang and raided many villages 
there. He became a famous dacoit and all villages were afraid of his gang. 
Then he came back to Raina and raided the household of the man who had 
killed his father. With the loot, he went home to his mother, and gave all his 
sisters more splendid marriages than had been seen in Raina for many years.
Uday Sandra and his brother Amal were big dacoits in Khandaghosh [a thana 
neighbouring on Raina], and the police were always chasing them. But they 
were both very cunning and always got away. One night they were staying in 
the village of R., when the landlord there heard about it. He came with all his 
lathials, but Uday and Amal got away and ran quickly over the muddy fields 
and raided his house. A week later, Amal went to the thana and said, 
"Daroga-saheb, I am tired of running. I will tell you how to get my brother
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and his gang, and you will let me go." The daroga agreed, and Amal said that 
next Monday they will raid the house of the big money-lender Subol 
Chatterjee in B-nagar. On that day the daroga took all his men to B-nagar and 
hid there. But Uday took his gang to the thana, freed his brother, and together 
they raided and burnt the thana.
Sankar Dhaure (who told me these stories) was himself rumoured to have been 
involved in dacoity. And his rival in the para, Manik Bag, allegedly functioned as 
middle-man for a dacoity gang over many years, and at one point even cheated them. 
The mode in which these stories was narrated suggested a broad acceptance of the 
practice. Dacoity stories primarily find justification in poverty but only as an 
introduction to the central themes of heroism, cunning, physical prowess, and largesse. 
We find in the narration of such stories a delight in the ability to fool the more 
powerful, to get hold of their wealth and "distribute" these in frantic spending-sprees. 
The tradition of telling stories of this kind was prominent and made dacoits a valued 
part of low-caste folklore: "Robin Hood" heroes with an unarticulated sense of 
injustice. .
I suspect these stories to be a bit "updated" and adapted to the "political correctness" 
of contemporary society, particularly this targeting of landlords and money-lenders. 
In practice far from all victims were rich. Many were relatively poor, but were raided 
at a point where they had accumulated cash or valuables (such as borrowed money for 
dowry). On occasions, dacoity gangs were "employed" by landlords or others to raid 
an enemy’s household. The pattern would be the same, and it was thus difficult to 
tell that the target had not been picked accidentally. As village historian Najir Hosen 
put it:
221
When someone unknown raids your house and takes your gold, how do you 
know why they picked you? Maybe they were sent by your enemy, or maybe 
they knew you have an enemy and will blame him.
Such use of dacoity, a blending of motives, was a well-known practice. That was the 
case when two major Raina landlords fought each another in the late 1940s. Banerjee 
of N-gram had a long-standing dispute over 150 bighas of land with Subhas Ghosh, 
landlord and zamindar in B. Banerjee allegedly sent a gang of dacoits to raid Ghosh’s 
household. In retaliation Ghosh brought a gang of lathials and majurs to cut and carry 
away the ripe paddy on Banerjee’s lands. Banerjee turned up with his lathials, but 
lost in the ensuing fight. Two days later, Ghosh’s in-laws’ household was raided by 
dacoits, and the straw roofs set on fire. In both cases the dacoits got to keep the loot.
Historically, there were also other informal ways for the occasional redress of 
grievances, including covert action. Their antiquity and entrenchment are suggested 
by the existence of codes of conduct for each. There were different types: danga (big 
fight), marpit (small fight), and lut (looting). A danga was a relatively small affair, 
a big "fight", involving "hundreds", over a limited issue. Dangas did not occur very 
frequently but still constituted a well-established institution, with a code of unwritten 
rules of behaviour and norms. A danga would normally occur in cases of serious 
disputes between villages or major landlords over land or access to water, over serious 
matters of prestige, or when insults had been exchanged between whole village 
communities. Looking into the rationale for each, we find that they were commonly 
justified with reference to material want or moral injustice, just as poverty for many 
was a legitimate ground for participation in dacoity, quite in spite of the suffering of
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other poor. It seems from stories of such forms of action that the motives were rarely 
clear-cut.
Lacking a better term, I shall call these forms "proto-political" — inspired by 
Hobsbawm’s term "proto-nationalism". This term is meant to suggest largely 
inarticulated and/or morally grounded sentiments and traditions that also contained an 
element of economic injustice — of class. The proto-political forms of action, 
whether fights or dacoity, typically fed on several motives, one of which could well 
be poverty. But such action would not necessarily address poverty as such and could 
well target other poor. Although not expressing a sense of class per se but legitimized 
by religious or moral views, these sentiments and traditions could nevertheless later 
on be reformulated into more clearly formulated and ideologically explicit movements 
—  led by political parties — without major changes. Unfortunately, the term proto­
politics suffers from the same shortcomings as Hobsbawm’s proto-nationalism in that 
it refers to what was to come and not purely to the initial situation. Nonetheless, the 
term may still be useful because it enables us to see lines of continuation in what 
appears as sudden ruptures, and at the same time accord the poor and low caste with 
a sense of their own class position, even before "mobilization" during the late 1960s. 
But before reaching this point, we have to address specifically the bagdis’ pre-UF role 
in village politics.
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Bagdis as lathials
The bagdiness image was actively maintained and exploited in village politics by both 
village leaders and bagdis themselves. For the bagdis, it secured them a peculiar place 
in village society and allowed them some freedom from the constraints of 
subordination demanded by mainstream society. They were not "reliable" or 
amendable as labourers, but instead known to be strong and sought after when heavy 
work was to be executed. They were not ideal subordinates but rather needed 
subordinates because of their dexterity with sticks and their physical prowess. Bagdis 
were not employed in spite of their insubordination, but because of it.
The Kaji family has historically been the dominant family in the south mouza of 
Udaynala, which includes the bagdi-para.25 The Kajis were owners of huge lands, 
held official positions, were considered a "prestige family" (baniadi), and held a 
preeminent position in the mouza that was enacted in certain rituals. The Udaynala 
bagdis lived on the Kajis’ land as tenants and functioned as their fighters, or lathials. 
The Kajis’ position was challenged in the 1950’s by the Sekh brothers, Baset and 
Rahim, of the same mouza. Up aid coming and ambitious, they engaged in money- 
lending and village affairs and built their position on land and on debtors among sekhs 
and namasudras. However, the namasudras were not known to be good fighters, and 
though sekhs were, the crucial jati was the bagdis (the sekhs, as befits a "dominant 
caste" were divided in factions). According to village lore, the Sekh brothers tried to
25The mouza of Udaynala South was according to oral tradition granted to the Kaji 
family by Bengal’s Nawab Alivardi Khan (-£32€«).
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win bagdis over with easy-term loans, employment, occasional intervention in 
disputes. In response to these threats and effective challenges from the Sekhs, 
Jikukaji, head of the Kaji family, over the years came to hand over most homestead 
land in the bagdi-para to the bagdis. In addition, the rivalry involved court cases, 
feasts and loans never recovered which altogether cost Jikukaji 50 of the 120 bighas 
he originally held.
The bagdis’ power lay in both their image as fierce and good fighters, and in their 
actual willingness to fight and function as lathials. The role of bagdis in village 
affairs is well illustrated by the two following incidents. The first is famous in village 
lore and is also mentioned in Waselmaster’s diaries (under 19 September 1967). 
Major village leader Ehiasaheb was at this time manager of the village cooperative, 
but it was discovered that he had embezzled 60 kg of sugar from the cooperative and 
sold it in a neighbouring village. Many were very angry with him and a bichar 
(village court) was called. At the bichar itself, held in the school compound, people 
angry with Ehiasaheb shouted at and intimidated him "in a militant manner" (wrote 
Waselmaster). Before the meeting could get properly started, however, they heard 
sounds from behind the school building. A large group of people — who could not 
be seen — were shouting and making intimidating sounds by beating lathis on the 
ground. Everyone knew immediately that they were bagdis and had probably drunk 
a lot — "and everyone knew what the bagdis were capable of when drunk", I was 
informed. The meeting rapidly disintegrated and people went home. The issue was 
left unsolved.
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The second incident took place two years later, and again Ehiasaheb, now as secretary 
of the cooperative society, was discovered to have cheated the cooperative of several 
thousand Rupees. Villagers sought to have Ehiasaheb tried at a bichar, but he avoided 
it. However, the bagdis normally supportive of him were also angry, as they had 
apparently not been in on the deal. Paddy started to vanish from Ehiasaheb’s fields 
at night, and a stack of straw was set on fire. Everybody "knew" these were the 
doings of bagdis. Eventually, Ehiasaheb’s father-in-law, Sobhachacha, paid a large 
sum of money towards the forthcoming festival season in bagdi-para and the problem 
blew over. Whatever grip Ehiasaheb as major village leader had on the bagdis, it was 
tenuous.
As mentioned, proto-politics was readily recognized and identified with the low castes, 
or the chhotolok (the "small people", the opposite of the bhadralok), in particular the 
bagdi jati. Bagdis also came to form the one crucial element in the CPM’s local 
mobilization and land-occupations — more so than any other economically poor jati. 
There was a sense of pride and identity in these activities, where bagdis were 
(self-)identified as different from other jatis, and that created for them a role in village 
affairs, ensured some patronage and closeness to the exercise of power.
When we now turn to the period of the United Front Governments (1967 and 1969-70) 
we find a continuation of the bagdis’ role in local politics, but under another banner. 
The CPM, although led by high-status villagers, aimed at mobilizing exactly the 
sections of the population identified and identifying with proto-politics, and would 
come to rely primarily on "volunteers" and "activists" able to perform the same tasks
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as lathials of old. Although the lines of continuation are not as clear-cut as that, I 
would still argue that this created an identification of interest and sentiment between 
many poor and low-caste and the CPM. To the poor, the CPM became "our" party 
in a broad sense.
Proto-politics and political mobilization
There is nothing unnatural in some mistakes occurring or some excesses being 
caused through over-enthusiasm in a movement involving lakhs ["hundreds of 
thousands"] of peasants out in the drive for recovery of vested and benami 
land [held under false name]. A child learning to walk, stumbles now and 
then. [...] Similarly, there have been some mistakes and excesses during the 
peasants march.26
The speech from which this quotation is taken was given over the radio in 1969 by 
Harekrishna Konar, then Minister for Land and Land Revenue in West Bengal’s 
second UF Government. The speech concerned the success and aims of the CPM-led 
land occupation movement, but also the difficulty involved in preventing a popular 
movement from transgressing finer legal boundaries. Thus, lands owned in excess of 
the ceiling of 75 bighas could be occupied, but in many cases also lands belonging to 
owners of less than 75 bighas were occupied.
The CPM experienced an upsurge of support in the rural areas, as reflected in both the 
election results and in the mobilization. The party came to be regarded as "our" by
26Speech by Harekrishna Konar in 1969. Konar was then chairman of the All- 
India Kisan Sabha (CPM’s peasant organization) and Land and Land Revenue 
Minister. Konar 1979:72-3.
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the poor.27 No doubt, as Konar argued, much of the movement, the CPM-led 
mobilization of peasants during the years 1969-71, unfolded without problems, without 
turning into or ending in "excesses". However, quite regularly the mobilization 
became entangled in "typical village politics",28 where "excesses" did take place.29 
Rather than constituting the odd mistake, these "excesses" seem to represent something 
more permanent and integral to the movement. It is striking how a movement led by 
a reputedly well-organized and disciplined political party such as the CPM was still 
marred by deviations, eruptions of energy in non-ideological directions, and even the 
misappropriation of party symbols for non-political disputes.
During the "food-movement" (1964-5) but particularly during the mobilization and 
land occupation phase from 1969 onwards, the CPM (and other parties although not 
in Burdwan) employed forms of action that were distinctly proto-political — what 
Konar interpreted as "excesses". The movement blended its own general aims and 
targets with those the lower castes and poor in particular were both identified and 
familiar with. Landlords and money-lenders were targeted, a redistribution of wealth 
was sought, and redress of old grievances often accomplished. In addition, much of
27 A characterization is always more powerful when admitted by opponents. 
According to a newspaper report, a leading Congress man admitted the poor had come 
to regard the CPM as "their party". The Statesman 28 February 1972.
V&r\ar
A phrase he. used in commenting on a riot between local land-poor (supporters 
of the CPM) and immigrant landless (supporters of the Forward Bloc) in West 
Dinajpur district. Both groups were Muslim. The Statesman 25 July 1969.
29See for instance the numerous reports in The Statesman (Calcutta daily) during 
the period December 1969 to January 1970.
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the movement appeared as covert, illegal, occasionally violent, and always militant, 
all of which were integral aspects of practices the lower castes identified with.
These "excesses" reflected the views and interests held by those mobilized by the 
movement, views that were not ideologically "correct" but that expressed the very 
(particularistic) sentiments the movement fed on. For instance, in choosing targets for 
the early stages of its mobilization efforts, the CPM in Burdwan was careful to select 
a limited number of "the most unpopular jotedars".30 The movement represented and 
fed on two coinciding aims: the targeting of an "exploiter" class, and the targeting of 
individuals who did not conform to popularly held moral codes of conduct. The local 
party could not offer land on any scale, nor cheap loans, higher majuri, or protection 
from potential repercussions. What it could offer, and did, was a sense of 
identification through involving itself in the manners, aims and concerns of the low 
caste and poor. These concerns would not always coincide with the general 
(ideologically inspired) policy of the CPM movement, but such inconsistencies were 
often enough ignored in local action. The one did not necessarily contradict the other, 
but confusion did arise on occasion and caused "excesses".
Moreover, in the context of the movement in Raina much of the mobilization (such 
as land occupations) took part through covert action, even when formally legal. The 
strong smell of militancy that permeated the mobilization and land occupations 
appears to contradict the bhadralok aspirations of the recently radicalized middle-class 
peasants (see Chapter Four), who emerged as local leaders of the movement. But then
30Interview with Samar Baura of Burdwan CPM, Burdwan 1989.
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the number of local party workers was very limited only a few years earlier. In the 
mid-1960s, the CPM had some support in S-bazar, particularly among the 
schoolteachers there. But they amounted to no more than four or five active 
individuals who never initiated covert or illegal actions but confined themselves to 
demonstrations, meetings, an occasional strike and deputations to local administrators. 
In less central villages, a number of middle-class peasants were closely affiliated to 
the party. However, even these were few and far between, and their impact before 
1967 was limited. In Udaynala Haksaheb arranged election meetings with CPI/CPM 
activists for each general election from 1957 onwards. Apart from these meetings, no 
directly party-related activities ever took place. In Gopinathpur, the party was 
"represented" by the bagdi labourer Sakti Porel, but his "following" comprised only 
his brother and one dule. Communist activities were disallowed both in Gopinathpur 
and most neighbouring villages. The few activists met privately in the fields or in 
other villages, even during the height of the movement.
During the years of food scarcity in the mid-1960s a spurt of political activity took 
place in Burdwan (which contributed towards the CPM’s later "discovery" of its rural 
potential). In Raina there were several instances of looting or similar incidents, and 
even more rumours of the same. Though the food situation in Raina and Dakshin 
Damodar was not particularly precarious, many took the opportunity to rally against 
the Government. Raina’s Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), Dasarathi Tah, 
is alleged to have led a procession of several thousand peasants and looted hoarding 
landlords’ paddy storage in several villages in Dakshin Damodar. Included in this was
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the looting of paddy ready for the market from the land of the Dawn family (who also 
owned land in Udaynala and Gopinathpur).
After a lull in 1966-7, looting was resumed after the instalment of the first UF 
Government. Looting became so rampant that the then Krishak Sabha leader in 
Burdwan, Benoy Chowdhuri, had to repeatedly denounce it at village meetings 
throughout Raina: "Looting is not our ideology". At least officially the party tried to 
prevent its members and supporters from looting or other irregular practices, but it 
proved difficult. Some months after Chowdhuri’s speech, one cloth and ready-made 
shop and one grocery store in the village of S-pur were looted, and the post office in 
P. was burnt down. Efforts were also made to set fire to the Raina police building.
A large gang tried to loot the ration go-down in S-bazar, but this was prevented by 
police forces. Minor cases of looting took place all the time. On the 20th of April 
1968, 360 kg of paddy owned by two Udaynala inhabitants but stored in S-bazar was 
looted and lost.31
It is quite clear that many CPM-affiliated individuals (many of whom later converted 
to the Congress) did participate both in lootings and in dacoity. It was even rumoured 
in 1967 that the locally prominent CPM leader (now panchayat member) Rabin 
Mukherjee assassinated one big dacoit named Ganesh Sarkar. Ganesh Sarkar was 
party-affiliated and had organized and participated in dacoities and looting. In one > 
instance during the food movement he had apprehended and stolen a cargo of paddy
31Mentioned in Waselmaster’s diary. All places mentioned here are within or near 
Raina.
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illegally destined for the market. Ganesh Sarkar sold the paddy locally at below the 
going rate, in the party’s name. The owner of the cargo was one Akbar who was also 
a CPM supporter.
In 1969, a dacoit in the neighbouring thana of Khandaghosh was being chased by the 
police and hid his weaponry at his sister’s husband’s house, Rahim of Udaynala. One 
Ehia tipped off the police, and Rahim was sure this was his old enemy Ehiasaheb of 
Udaynala. His dacoit brother-in-law’s gang consisted mainly of bagdis, and the 
Udaynala bagdis for once supported Rahim against Ehiasaheb. Ehiasaheb’s house was 
"bombed" (a Molotov cocktail perhaps, the straw roof caught fire). However, a week 
later it was accepted that he was not the informer.
In 1970 it was rumoured in Udaynala that Haksaheb’s eldest son was involved with 
party-affiliated dacoits, and that the loot was shared in Haksaheb’s discussion house, 
with Haksaheb’s consent.32 A year later a militant Congress man, Naba Sain, and a 
locally famous CPM-supporting dacoit, had a shoot-out in the village of Alladipur in 
Khandaghosh. Locals hid the dacoit, while Naba Sain fled. Both were wounded and 
there had been casualties on both sides. The village was generally known as 
supporting the CPM, and the following day Naba Sain returned with a large gang of 
Congress strongmen, and they burnt the village to the ground. The affair was a 
famous one, connected to the subsequent killings of Naba Sain and his brother.33
32The information is from a friend and party colleague of Haksaheb.
33The killing of the Sain brothers in 1972 caused large demonstrations and much 
unrest. It reached the Calcutta newspapers and that came to form some of the 
rationale for government-supported persecution of communists.
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Most people in Udaynala believed Ehiasaheb was involved in the burning of 
Alladipur, although he denied this.
Land occupations in Udaynala
Land occupations constituted a more clearly ideologically defined means of action, and 
although for long its legality was unclear, land occupation was during the late 1960s 
a much more public statement than the forms encountered above. Nevertheless land 
occupations too came to have an air of secrecy and militancy that seem to have 
attracted the attention of the people and social groups previously identifying with 
proto-politics.
The occupation of land held in excess of the legal limit (khas-land) or land held under 
false name (benami-lmd) was the most striking aspect of the unrest of the UF period. 
Such land could legally be taken by the government and redistributed to the landless 
and much of it had already been vested in the government. But the Congress 
Governments never put much effort into implementing this legislation.34 During its 
first period in office, the UF and its Land and Land Revenue Minister, Harekrishna 
Konar (CPM), sought to implement these measures through the ministry’s machinery. 
The efforts were largely unsuccessful. During the UF’s second period in office, Konar 
called for the land to be occupied by peasants themselves and for the bureaucrats to
34For evasions see Bandyopadhyaya 1985, particularly appendix VA-B which cites 
P. Bandyopadhyay (Settlement Officer) A study on evasion o f Land Ceiling-X under 
West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1953. See also B. Sen Gupta 1979, Dasgupta 
1984b, Franda 1971a and B. Bose 1981.
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come in afterwards to register the new owners. Following the law, however, lands 
under injunction (i.e. with the courts) could not be occupied or redistributed.35 
Although the legality of such occupation was unclear, the CPM and its leadership 
supported the strategy. Furthermore, in speeches throughout the countryside, Konar 
called peasants to fight the landlords, occupy lands forcefully if necessary, and 
cultivate the occupied lands before the legal matters had been dealt with. The party 
coined the slogan "Peasant, occupy the land, and then cultivate it",36 and the policy 
became perceived as a major aspect of the party’s mobilization efforts, and perhaps 
its most popular aspect.
In Burdwan, the problem for local mobilizers was not merely that occupation was 
legally unclear, although that could and did lead to clashes with the police.37 Another 
problem, particularly pronounced in the beginning of the land-occupation movement, 
was that land occupation was perceived by many as dangerous and even morally 
wrong. The poor hesitated, were reluctant and cautious, and did not press forward.
The first instance of land occupation within Udaynala took place in 1967. A letter 
had reached the village from the panchayat chairman (the only leftist chairman in the 
Block) urging them to occupy vested land. According to Najir Hosen’s account, the
35For the history of land reforms under the UF Governments, see B. Sen Gupta 
1972, Nossiter 1988, Ruud 1994a.
ctakboL dakhaL  
casi tumi daksal karo, dalsettl kare cas karo.
37Jyoti Basu of the CPM took charge of the Home (Police) portfolio in the second 
UF Government. After this, the police increasingly sought to stay out of politicized 
conflicts.
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leftists (including himself) hesitated because they felt that the people were not 
prepared, that "people believed in the ideas of the olden days".38 Only the 
Congressite Ehiasaheb urged land occupation. He wanted to implement the legislation 
of his party, but nothing came of this. When land occupations were finally 
undertaken, two years later, the initiative was given by both those associated with the 
CPM and the village Congressites. A CPM activist brought a list of vested land in 
the four mouzas of Udaynala and Gopinathpur, and by then land occupations had 
become prominent elsewhere in the district. Vested land was open to occupation, and 
the following day a meeting was held with a representative from the Junior Land 
Reform Office (JLRO). The names and plots of 15-16 individuals owning vested land 
in Udaynala and Gopinathpur were checked. The same day people went into the 
fields and occupied the plots by raising the red flag on them. Elsewhere large fights 
took place over such attempts and some people were even shot. But here the targeted 
landowners were absentee, like the Dawns, and clashes did not take place.
Leadership was provided by the prominent and well-off village leaders (Ehiasaheb, 
Hanukaji, Hosen Imam, Waselmaster, Najir Hosen and Haksaheb). Poor villagers 
participated in large numbers, not least people from poor or low-caste households. 
We note a fairly large and enthusiastic participation, on two occasions numbering 
several hundred — quite substantial for a village of 1,200-1,300 — "all with lathis and 
Abdul Alim with his gun". Among the participants there were three "core groups": 
the sekhs of East-para, the saotals, and the bagdis — the latter being the most active.
38Village historian Najir Hosen has written a notebook entitled "Raina’s peasant 
movement". All quotations in tills section are from that notebook.
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From among the remaining jatis of poor — the namasudras, the malliks and the 
muchis — only one or two individuals participated. Altogether some 15 bighas were 
occupied, all belonging to absentee owners.
Somewhat later rumours circulated that the land of Hitu Munsi had been vested. 
There was much discussion about how appropriate it would be to occupy land held 
by a co-villager. Nonetheless, in March 1970 a delegation of important villagers went 
to the JLRO office to have the rumours confirmed. They obtained a signature for 
occupation in spite of bribes paid by Hitu Munsi. Nothing might have come of this 
had not the second UF Government been dismissed a few days later, on the 16th of 
March 1970. A number of villagers went by foot to Calcutta to participate in a protest 
demonstration (among them were Haksaheb and ten or eleven others) while back home 
Najir Hosen, Ehiasaheb and others went into the fields to occupy Hitu Munsi’s land, 
equally in a show of protest, again with guns and red flags.
Other minor plots had been occupied in the meantime, and some of the Udaynala 
people participated in similar operations in adjacent villages. These actions never 
appeared quite safe, and an air of semi-legality seems to have stuck to the practice. 
According to Najir Hosen*s written account, in an incident in 1971 it was decided that 
the ripe paddy on a certain plot in Kh., would be cut "tonight unless there is a clear 
moon". Some women were sent away to relatives for safety.
All occupations were characterized by militant language and militancy (the lathis and 
a gun or two were standard equipment), even when no immediate threat faced them.
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Harekrishna Konar is allegedly to have said in Raina, "You the poor, you have often 
given your life in fights [danga] over land, spilt your blood, for somebody else’s land. 
Now fight [larai koro, "make war"] for your own land, not others’ land". This spirit 
was also found in Udaynala, where the villagers talked in terms of "war", "spilling 
blood", of "force" and "conquering" the land, while waving lathis and shouting 
slogans.
Conclusion
Looting could perhaps be easily interpreted as a more legitimate and direct expression 
of popular sentiments than dacoity. It took place in broad day-light and demanded 
more people than a dacoity raid. But the borderline was thin, and dacoity too was to 
a large extent aimed at popularly accepted targets, even when the raid was part of a 
personal dispute. In the mid-1960s, if not before, the line between the political 
parties, including the CPM, and gangs of dacoits was far from clear — at least in the 
popular perception and in rumours. Rumours contribute towards creating the 
environment in which options are created, and action is taken or forsaken.39 Rumours 
alleging the involvement of locally important party politicians in close relationships 
with dacoits and in looting, created an unstable and fluid situation. Equally, rumours 
contributed towards giving the CPM a more popular image. The party of the 
bhadralok was coming to the chhotolok, so to speak, and was seen as using, even if 
unintentionally, ways and means associated with the poor and the lower castes, with 
quasi-legitimate if desperate action. The party appealed to have stepped down from
39For a lucid account of rumours forming political action, see Amin 1984.
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its pedestal of meetings, petitions and ’’calls" for action, which had so far been its 
main contribution to political life in Burdwan. Instead, its activists were seen as
perception and historically have arisen both from a sense of injustice and from 
political motivation. The new addition was in the concertedness of action, and its 
backing from a party with an obvious pro-poor agenda.
Proto-political practices were previously widespread in redress of morally grounded 
grievances but also in the assertion of one’s interests. This use of proto-political 
action ties in with the quite explicitly "political" — or interested — content of village 
leader-follower relations as they existed. It was difficult to distinguish between 
personal objectives, personal animosities, or particularistic considerations, and the 
broader, or universalistic, aims of the movement. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
multi-faceted or complex patron-client relationships did not characterize all employer- 
employee relations but only those centring on a limited number of village leaders. 
The relationships these built with larger groups of the population were implicitly 
understood as political relations, as "alliances" that could forward the interests of those 
involved. The politics of such groups was part of the same cultural world as proto­
political forms of action, and the latter had often been used in the former.
In the creation of these 4 relationships, we found "caste" to have been 
important. Caste can be understood as any other group society and man use to create 
order, and to which we apply stereotypes, prejudices that extend from the group to the 
individual and eases interpersonal and intergroup relationships. These stereotypes
engaged in familiar, proto-political forms of action — action that could in the popular
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consist of a number of restrictions and obligations, behavioural norms and 
understanding of acceptable transgressions that society applies to each group. An 
example would be adolescent men, who in rural West Bengal may transgress caste 
limits or rules of politeness only to meet with a shrugging of shoulders, "They’re just 
boys".
Caste is different in that it is a ritually defined, and endogamous, and so more clearly 
defined and less subject to nuances. Still, locally caste too is largely understood in 
terms of its stereotypes not its ritual position. This "understanding" is created in 
history, as an accumulation of more or less noteworthy events, persuasive pieces of 
myths or traditions, individual achievements or failures, and material conditions and 
opportunities. It would be impossible to go into the details of the creation of specific 
caste stereotypes. What is interesting in the present context is that these stereotypes 
set parameters for specific castes’ roles in village politics, which again gave rise to 
different opportunities in a situation of changing political alignments and of "calls for 
mobilization".
Muchis could not fend for themselves as fighters, and had come to rely on their image 
as village servants dependent on discretionary benevolence. Through submission they 
were able to assert their interests, although this path had its obvious constraints. 
Bagdis, on the other hand, identified closely with proto-political forms of action, and 
took a great deal of pride in their ability with lathis, their dacoit heroes, and their 
recklessness. This not only gave them an impetus to join the looting and the land 
occupations, but also created a place for them in village politics that could not be
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dismissed by would-be village leaders. In a way, the bagdis* recklessness secured 
them patronage from (old-style) village leaders, and it secured them a special place 
in the CPM’s local set-up.
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SIX 
WEALTH, POWER, AND STATUS: 
CPM-AFFILIATION AS A 
CULTURAL REFORM PROCESS
Introduction
Social aspirations cannot be ignored as a constitutive element in rural and village 
politics.1 This chapter puts forward two arguments about the continued (electoral) 
popularity of the CPM in rural West Bengal. Firstly, the CPM has come to represent 
a path for upward social mobility for groups of poor. Secondly, the CPM has taken 
social ambitions into consideration in its on-the-ground distribution of divisible boons. 
Other factors have also contributed towards the party’s position, such as economic 
reform and land redistribution, political mobilization and organization.2 These were 
important factors and have in general benefited all the rural poor. The noteworthy 
aspect is, however, that not all poor had benefited to the same extent. The distribution 
of benefits in Udaynala and Gopinathpur followed approximately jati divisions — a 
point particularly evident in political representation. Certain favoured groups of poor 
were more active in the CPM than other groups, and were more closely identified with
1A different version of this chapter was presented at the Workshop on agricultural 
growth and agrarian structure in contemporary West Bengal and Bangladesh 
(Calcutta, January 9-12, 1995). I am grateful to John Harriss, Biplab Dasgupta, Ben 
Rogaly, Dwaipayan Bhattacharyya and Glyn Williams for comments.
2For some of the debate on the LFG’s programmes and policies, see Nossiter 
1988, Kohli 1990, Lieten 1990, 1992 and 1994; Sengupta 1981; B. Bose 1981; 
Dasgupta 1984b; Mallick 1992; Webster 1992; Bhattacharya 1993; Acharya 1994.
the party. Their support was reciprocated by the local party leadership which 
considered closely these groups’ economic needs and social status as expressed 
politically and culturally. The party’s local leadership continued to build and maintain 
bonds with groups and individuals, bonds based on both material and non-material 
considerations, "symbolic capital" as I called it, built and maintained with solid and 
sensitive local knowledge (Fingerspitzgefiihl, fingertip feeling), and particularly 
evident in their sensitive handling of various groups’ internal disputes.
The literature on contemporary politics in West Bengal has largely ignored how, in 
addition to its economic and political programmes, the CPM also represents a cultural 
programme. As argued in Chapter Four, the party’s image and local representation 
grew out of the bhadralok’s history and culture, an image and representation that was 
extended to its rural manifestation, with some adjustments. To a large extent, the 
party was still represented and dominated by rustic bhadralok in the early 1990s, 
although, as we shall see, lower-caste representation was fast increasing. More 
importantly, the party continued to represent values that were imbedded in the 
bhadralok tradition, values that were translated into party initiatives, particularly in 
what I call its "civilizational project". By historical association and ideological 
conviction the CPM has come to represent causes such as anti-casteism, social equality 
for the poor, teetotalism, and literacy. The party has sought to implement these 
objectives — successfully to a significant degree — but one should be careful to note 
that these were objectives which followed closely on earlier efforts of cultural and 
social reform (or "sanskritization", a concept I discuss below).
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Because of the limitations in the party’s economic reform programme and because of 
the limited "control" jatis of poor have on the party, it is here, in the social 
implications of the party’s policy, that we need to look for why so many poor and in 
particular this one jati identify themselves with the party.
In this chapter I will show the party’s involvement in local politics, for instance in 
how the local CPM leadership has paid closer attention to the status-ambitions of one 
certain jati, the bagdis, than of other jatis. The attention has led to a favouring in the 
distribution of economic assets, political representation and social status concerns. 
The reason for this particular attention lies partly in local history and partly in 
structural considerations. The bagdis were numerically important, although not all that 
important in Udaynala. In spite of not having a history of close cooperation with the 
CPM, bagdis did have a history of involvement in local politics. This involvement 
was formerly as "fighters" (lathials) of village leaders who depended on this support 
for the continuation of leadership (as argued in Chapter Five). In particular, their 
militancy (or threat thereof) had been a crucial element in intimidating opposition, 
rivals and insubordinate subjects. The local CPM leadership of the LFG era depended 
on this jati for much the same reasons: numbers and activists. Bagdis were 
particularly active in demonstrations, strikes and instances of intimidation of opponents 
during the early years of CPM rule when there was still much opposition to the 
party’s reforms.
Bagdi support has enabled the CPM to "pacify" and control the area in terms of, 
firstly, winning elections and implementing its economic reform programme, and,
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secondly, winning broad acceptance among the poor for the main objectives of its 
cultural programme. Conversely, for the bagdis, their identification with the party has 
firstly led to uneven distribution of certain boons in their favour, and secondly to 
symbolic gestures of recognition of importance by the local party leadership and other 
important villagers. Moreover, a close involvement by bagdis in the CPM’s 
"civilizational project" — which followed closely on their own previous reforms — 
has gained them a higher social position. The same attention has not benefited 
comparable jatis although there is no immediate reason why these should be less 
CPM-friendly.
This chapter will outline the social, political and economic gains made by the poor 
over a thirty-year period, and how these gains show marked differences among groups 
of poor identified by jatis. I will focus primarily on the bagdi and muchi jatis, both 
classified as Scheduled Castes, for whom the difference in treatment comes out quite 
starkly. However, it may need underlining that when I talk about jati I do not intend 
an essentialist interpretation. On the contrary, my own experience in these villages 
and the material presented here show that jati is above all a social construct that can 
be employed by the individuals concerned to obtain advantages; in other words, caste 
is a conscious entity. Here I have concerned myself with jati identities because they 
were important social markers. The status of one’s jati reflected upon oneself and 
constituted part of one’s own identity and status in society. Jati was not the whole 
story of one’s identity or social standing, but it was an important part of the story. 
I have also concerned myself with jati because there were obvious differences in how 
various jatis have fared during the last decade and a half. These differences arouse*
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from the unequal distribution of economic means and political influence, and from 
unequal engagement in and ability to use the mechanisms for social reform on offer 
under the present regime.
Economic changes
Details of amounts of land owned per individual among the different jatis in these two 
villages show a significant levelling of economic inequalities over the last thirty years 
(see Tables 6.1 and 6.2). The 1960 figures show a situation of marked economic 
differences, differences that to a large extent followed social (caste or jati) divisions. 
By 1993 the differences had not disappeared but were much less marked, and certain 
groups of poor had fared quite well. However, the figures also show marked 
variations among groups of poor.
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Table 6.1
Landownership by person and jati, Gopinathpur 1960 and 1993
High
caste* Aguri Napit Bagdi Pule Muchi
Population in numbers Total
1960 71 137 79 203 47 69 606
1993 111 214 165 371 85 165 1111
Land per person (in bigha) Average
1960 2.53 3.18 1.66 0.71 0.38 0.30 1.53
1993 1.30 1.83 1.53 0.85 0.36 0.19 0.99
Percentage of village land owned Total
1960 19.3 46.8 14.1 15.7 2.0 2.1 100.0
1993 13.2 29.1 23.1 28.9 2.8 2.9 100.0
* "High caste" includes bamun and kayastha
Source: field-data
In Gopinathpur the bagdi population has almost doubled its ownership of village land 
over the 33 years period. In 1993 they controlled nearly the same amount as the 
former "dominant caste", the aguris. Over the same period, only the bagdis saw an 
increase in their "land per person" figure, a development contrary to the average trend 
and quite a feat in view of a near doubling of their population. The muchis of 
Gopinathpur have seen a small increase in their proportion of village land, but this 
increase has not been comparable to the increase in population so their "land per 
person" figure has decreased at the average rate.
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Table 6.2
Landownership by person and jati, Udaynala 1957 and 1993
Clean
caste* Muslim
Nama-
sudra Bagdi Muchi Saotal
Population in numbers Total
1100
2006
1957
1993
97 538 217 165
94 1125 299 304
48
91
35
93
Land per person (in bigha) Average
1.15
0.79
1957 1.64 2.14 1.39 0.99 0.35 0.40
1993 1.40 1.20 0.55 0.93 0.60 0.15
Percentage of village land owned Total
99.9
100.1
1957 8.6 64.3 16.4 8.9 0.9 0.8
1993 6.6 67.5 8.3 14.2 2.8 0.7
* "Clean caste" includes bamun, kayastha, kalu, and bene 
Source: field-data
In Udaynala too bagdis have collectively gained control over a much larger proportion 
of village land than they previously held. Their average "land per person" has 
decreased slightly (from 0.99 to 0.93), but this was negligible compared to the all­
village decrease (from 1.15 to 0.79). Only the muchis have fared better, with a near 
doubling of "land per person". However, they still fell short of the all-village average, 
whereas by 1993 the bagdis were better off than average.
In sum, the population increase over the three decades caused a substantial decrease 
in landholding per person (or household). The former "dominant" high-status jatis 
have been most severely affected and have lost their former dominant economic 
position, and they have also lost in terms of land per person. The lower castes have 
in the main gained (with the exception of the Udaynala namasudras, but that was due
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to the decline of a once wealthy family). Among the various jatis of poor, muchis of 
Udaynala seem to have fared the best although still short of the all-village average. 
Their counterparts in Gopinathpur have become relatively poorer over the period in 
question. Bagdis, on the other hand, have done very well in both villages. Where 
muchis in Udaynala have done well, bagdis have reached an above average "land per 
person" figure; where muchis of Gopinathpur have fared devastatingly, bagdis have 
increased their "land per person".
Unfortunately, I do not have figures that can confirm whether this development was 
significantly under way before the 1977 instalment of the LFG or not. However, local 
history does suggest that all major absentee landowners sold their lands after the rural 
unrest and the CPM-led mobilization of the late 1960s — leaving little to be 
redistributed. This may explain some of the changes.3
Redistribution of wealth: majuri, khas and IRDP
The LFG initiated diverse programmes on the rural front: land redistribution, 
sharecropping registration (the so-called Operation Barga), a fairer distribution of 
subsidized loans, and an increase in daily wages. Contrary to the attention the issue 
has received, it does not appear from these villages that land redistribution by itself 
accounted for the changes in landownership. In Gopinathpur only 17 bighas (equal 
to 5.6 acres, or 1.3% of total village lands) were ever confiscated and redistributed.
3Most of the major absentee landowners were originally locals and their lands 
have been included in the 1960 figures of Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
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In Udaynala a more significant 53 bighas (but only 2.8% of total village land) were 
redistributed.
A more decisive instrument in this process of redistribution involved increases in 
majuri (daily wages for agricultural labourers) — a point acknowledged as significant 
and positive even by the local opposition. At the time the LFG took over, majuri 
consisted normally of Rs 2, 1 kg of paddy (chal), 10 country cigarettes {biri) and 
some body oil. At the time the price of paddy varied from Rs 2 to Rs 2.50 pr kg, 
which makes total majuri about 1.75-2 kg of paddy plus the cigarettes and oil. Wages 
were raised under CPM pressure on four occasions between 1978 and 1993, mainly 
against landowner opposition. The situation was particularly bad in Gopinathpur, 
which saw two prolonged strikes (of 15 and 10 days, in 1977 and 1982). Striking 
labourers from Gopinathpur were on both occasions given employment in Udaynala 
(by the party-supporters there) to secure an income for the duration of the strikes. On 
two other occasions, wages were raised after quiet discussions. In 1993 standard 
majuri stood at Rs 12 and 2 kg paddy, with bins and oil being dropped (this was still 
slightly under the official minimum of Rs 14 and 2 kg paddy). The paddy price 
approximated Rs 5.50 per kg in 1993, which made total majuri equal about 4 kg of 
paddy. Calculated in paddy then, majuri has doubled over the 16-17 years in question. 
More significantly, perhaps, was that the number of working days (and thus of 
income) has vastly increased. The traditional aman-crop takes about 20-25 man-days 
per bigha, while the more intensive boro-crop takes 35-40 man-days. The aus-crop 
falls in between. Until the late 1970s the aman-crop was all-important, and the aus 
insignificant in comparison. There was no boro-crop. Recent expansion of irrigation
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facilities plus the high yielding seed varieties (HYVs) have made possible extensive 
boro-crops. Whereas previously labourers were unemployed — "sitting around" — 
for more than six to seven months a year, most were fully employed for at least 9-10 
full months in the early 1990s.
These developments concern non-divisible boons and do not help us to explain the 
variations in land acquisition among different groups of labourers. It is pertinent to 
glance at other aspects of LFG’s redistributive measures, in particular the more 
discriminate redistribution of land and distribution of IRDP loans.
As mentioned much of the originally designated vested land (khas) had vanished by 
the inauguration of the LFG in 1977. However, some land was redistributed during 
the early years of that Government. The general pattern was that land was 
redistributed in minuscule plots, ranging normally between 8 or ten katha to a bigha 
and a half.4 During the second half of the 1980s, the distribution of subsidized loans 
under the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) became increasingly 
important as a means of distribution of wealth. The distribution of khas land in 
Udaynala is given in Table 6.3, and the distribution of IRDPs is given in Table 6.4 
(unfortunately I do not possess comparably reliable figures for Gopinathpur).
^ h e re  is twelve katha to one bigha.
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Table 6.3
Recipients of redistributed khas by jati-group, Udaynala, 1993
Khas recipients
Jati Population % of per 100
group N N total persons
Clean caste* 94 0 0.0 0.0
Sekh 935 40 41.2 4.3
Namasudra 299 12 12.4 4.0
Mallik 190 11 11.3 5.8
Bagdi 304 23 23.7 7.6
Muchi 91 5 7.2 5.5
Saotal 93 5 LI 5 4
Sum 2006 97 100.0 4.8
* "Clean caste" comprises bamun, kayastha, bene and kalu. 
Source: field-data
Table 6.4
Recipients of IRDP by ja ti group, Udaynala, 1993
IRDP recipients
Jati
eroup Population N
% of 
total
per 100 
persons
Clean caste* 94 0 0.0 0.0
Sekh 935 51 40.2 5.5
Namasudra 299 22 17.3 7.4
Mallik 190 12 9.4 6.3
Bagdi 304 27 21.3 8.9
Muchi 91 6 4.7 6.7
Saotal 93 9 L i 9J_
Sum 2006 127 100.0 6.3
* "Clean caste" comprises bamun, kayastha, bene and kalu. 
Source: field-data
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From these two tables we find that the distribution of both khas-land and IRDPs has 
been overwhelmingly in favour of jatis that comprise poor households. Clean-caste 
households have received neither khas nor IRDP.5 Moreover, my information 
suggests that most recipients were poor households. However, there are again 
interesting variations among various groups of poor. Bagdis stand out in both tables 
as having received more khas-grants per population than other jatis, and more IRDP 
loans —  with the exception of the utterly poor saotals (who are classified as 
Scheduled Tribe and come under special provisions).
Both my own observations as well as Raina party activists and Burdwan party leaders 
reveal that favouring of party affiliates in the distribution of khas and IRDP almost 
amounted to an unofficial party line.6 This should not be exaggerated; the tendency 
was rather to disfavour anyone publicly affiliated to the opposition. In general, the 
party line has been to favour the distribution of marginal plots of khas instead of 
"viable" plots, so as to "reach" as many people as possible.7
5After my survey, two clean-caste households received IRDP signatures from the 
panchayat member; one of the recipients was a moderately well-off money-lender. 
Normally, even the poor among the higher castes did not gecieve loans, but then they 
— having perhaps internalized the stereotypes of their caste — tended to support the 
Congress rather than the CPM.
6CPM MP Somnath Chatterjee argued that "Of course people become CPM- 
supporters when there is a question of redistributing land." Interview in Guskara, 
Birbhum, 1989. Mallick (1990 and 1992) argues that well-off families do receive 
IRDPs, but Swaminathan 1990 finds such practices not to be prominent. See also 
Westergaard 1987.
7Baruah 1990 and Lieten 1992:140-1. Sengupta (1981:A-69) calculates that one 
in three landless households have benefited from land redistribution. However, excess 
land has been redistributed in very small plots, from 0.33 to 2 acres, "hardly more 
than homesteads" (Lieten 1990:2268).
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But the question of why bagdis should be favoured against other jatis in the 
redistribution still remains. Were other jatis of poor less inclined towards the CPM? 
The somewhat uneven pattern in the redistribution is again made evident as we turn 
to political representation.
Political representation
The other main aspect of the CPM’s nearly two decades long rule in West Bengal to 
have caught the attention of scholars is the broader political participation as 
represented in the panchayat system of local elected government. In one recent 
contribution to the debate, Lieten writes that in terms of caste composition the 
panchayats in Memari II (also in Burdwan) saw a "remarkable" increase in the 
representation of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST).8 The percentage of 
SC/ST representatives rose to 51.1% — in Lieten’s own words, "well above their 
proportion in the population".9 I have no knowledge of Memari II or the specific 
composition of the SC/ST group there, but the case of "over-representation" is in itself 
interesting. In the Gram Panchayat to which Udaynala and Gopinathpur belong a 
similar trend in representation was evident: increased representation for the SCs and 
decreased representation for "cultivator jatis" and what Lieten calls "bhadralok" jatis 
(see Table 6.5). However, a breakdown of the SC/ST group into individual jatis 
shows that the well-above average representation pertains to certain jatis rather than 
the entire group.
8Lieten 1994:1835.
l ie te n  1994:1835.
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Table 6.5
Representation by jati in S. Gram Panchayat
1988-93 1993-
Namasudra (SC) 1 2
Bagdi (SC) 6 8
Aguri 6 4
Muslim 3 2
Kayastha - 1
Bamun 2 2
Total 18 19
Source: field-data
SCs
We find that-Sse- were well represented, and that an increase in their representation has
taken place. Bagdis, who account for about one fourth of the population in the area
(see Chapter Five), have been over-represented in the panchayats, contributing a third
of the members in the 1988-93 period, and 44% in the period since 1993.
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Table 6.6
Gram Panchayat representation by jati from Udaynala and Gopinathpur, 1978- 
1993+ (in periods)
Percentage of 
village 
population
1978 1983 1988 1993* Total 1993
Gopinathpur
Aguri 1 1 - 1 3  19.3
Bagdi 1 2 3 33.4
Unrepresented groups
High-castes 10.0
Intermediary caste 14.9
Other SC 22.5
Total SC population 55.9
Udaynala
Sekh 1 1 1 1 4 56.1
Bagdi 1 1 1 - 3  15.2
Namasudra - - - 1 1 14.9
Unrepresented groups
Clean-castes 4.7
Other SC/ST 9.2
Total SC/ST population 39.3
* From the originally three Gram Panchayat seats from 1978, an extra seat was 
created in Gopinathpur in 1993. In addition one former Gram Panchayat Member was 
elected Member of the Jela Parishad. Two seats were reserved for women in 1993.
Source: field-data
From Table 6.6 it appears that as a bloc the lower castes have been well represented 
and increasingly so. Combined, the ST/SC have been represented in proportion to 
their share of the total population. However, apart from one representative, elected 
as late as in 1993, all low-caste members were bagdis. The Udaynala bagdis were 
represented for the 15-year period 1978-1993, and from 1988 onwards also in 
Gopinathpur. More than forty per cent of the panchayat members from these two 
villages were from a jati that constitutes one fifth of the total population.
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Representation in the panchayats constitutes only one form of political influence. It 
is worth noting, although space does not permit a detailed outline, that bagdis were 
also well represented in other fora, such as the boards of village cooperative societies 
and in the recently created Gram Committees.10
In terms of actual political influence at an all-village or extra-village level the picture 
seems more varied. Gopinathpur’s former bagdi Gram Panchayat member from 1988 
and from 1993 Jela Parishad member, Shyamsundar, was by all acknowledged as 
articulate and intelligent. As a prominent party member he wielded much influence 
with the party in the area. In addition his brother was full-time secretary of the local 
cooperative society that comprised Gopinathpur and three other villages. On the other 
hand, Udaynala* s two bagdi Gram Panchayat members never wielded much influence. 
The first member, Sankar Dhaure, who sat for one period only, was quasi-illiterate, 
and although powerful within his own para (neighbourhood) he had limited interest 
in and capacity for the affairs of the larger polity. The second member, Biswanath, 
was only 17 when first elected, and his youth effectively prevented much clout with 
senior party workers or administrators even after 10 years as member.
In her study of low-caste and tribal representation vs. control of panchayats, 
Westergaard noted that in spite of fair representation of the poor, "...by and large this 
representation has not resulted in any significant increase in their [the poor’s] control
10For the Gram Committee, see footnote 27, Chapter Two.
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over these institutions”.11 This would seem right for one village here although not 
for the other.
In view of increased representation, what we need to investigate is the social meaning 
of Gram Panchayat representation, the context in which such representation is accepted 
or extended without necessarily being followed by increased control. Firstly, it should 
be noted that panchayat members were not representatives of their individual 
communities as much as the party’s people. As is well-known from the functioning 
of the panchayat system in West Bengal (and most of the democratic world) decisions 
were taken by the party in its own internal meetings, and only presented as a fait 
accompli at the official panchayat meeting. This becomes particularly interesting 
when we know that although ultimately relying on popular support, the individual 
panchayat members were not elected by the people qua individuals but were selected 
by the party and appointed as its candidates. The CPM did normally not select 
candidates that could not be trusted. Most panchayat members had long records of 
party-affiliated work, very often in one of the auxiliary organizations (the Kisan 
Sabha, the SFI or DYFI, the Mahila Samiti, etc.). In an over-simplified but not 
entirely inaccurate description, the panchayat members were primarily the party’s 
people, and the people was represented by the party. People voted for the party more 
than for the individual candidate. The party was strong enough to secure its 
candidates as members, so why did it continue to select candidates from certain jatis 
of poor rather than others?
nWestergaard 1987:109-10.
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The jati in question here, the bagdis, constituted a major proportion of the local 
population; in Udaynala the bagdis constituted one eighth of the total population, in 
Gopinathpur one third. This to a large extent rationalizes representation, although not 
(at least in Udaynala) over-representation among the poor.
Chapter Five showed the role of bagdis in old-style village politics, as a core group 
of lathials for the village leaders, and later on, for Udaynala, how they were drawn 
into the land occupations and general agrarian unrest of the late 1960s, together with 
sekhs (of the east-para) and saotals. In the following period (as covered in Chapter 
Two) they supported Ehiasaheb in his suppression of communists as lathials. In 1977 
they were again coaxed into the CPM camp by Haksaheb, and the former Ehiasaheb 
supporter Sankar Dhaure was made the CPM’s candidate for the 1978 panchayat 
election. During the first eight to ten years of the LFG-era there was a large amount 
of opposition to the party and its policies, in particular to the raises in majuri plus 
various anti-casteist measures. During these years frequent and huge processions, 
demonstrations, and meetings were organized, often with hundreds of participants.12 
In Udaynala, at the beginning of the harvesting season in 1981, demonstrations for 
higher majuri were organized, and a counter-demonstration was held by village 
landowners. The size (and noise — they shouted slogans) of the pro-raise 
demonstration convinced the land-owners to step down. In Gopinathpur the party’s 
authority was underlined in two prolonged strikes on majuri (led by the aguri
12From a study of party activities in Midnapur district, Dwaipayan Bhattacharyya 
(1993) distinguishes distinct phases in the CPM’s policies vis-a-vis rural classes: from 
an early phase of low-class and low-caste militancy towards a later phase (mid-1980s) 
of class cooperation.
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panchayat member Sailen Kes but opposed by most clean-caste and high-caste 
landowners). Bagdis played a crucial role in both strikes, as most majurs were bagdis 
and their solidarity was integral to the success of the strikes.
I have no doubt that in other regions and areas, even where there were bagdis, the 
CPM found itself relying on other groups. But representation, or over-representation, 
constituted an important means of tying bonds, of creating an enduring alliance to an 
active and very useful group. Their numbers and willingness to participate in 
activities such as strikes and demonstrations, made this jati particularly important in 
establishing the CPM’s authority. Their support, as potential lathials, had been sought 
since time immemorial by village leaders, and was more recently sought and 
maintained by local CPM leaders. The loss of their support would be devastating to 
the CPM’s local position and clout.
However, as Westergaard suggested, representation has not necessarily been followed 
by increased control. I would argue that "representation" may be as important as 
"control" in establishing links between party and people. Bagdis were tied to the party 
by being given representation in — not control of — public positions. Considerations 
of jati for the selection of a candidate were important and gave rise to both pride and 
hurt feelings. This was made evident for me in the election process for one of the two 
Gram Committees in Udaynala in late 1993. Gram Committees were officially 
constituted through public elections, but in practice only one list of "candidates" was 
made up by the assembled party people and was "voted" over — yes or no — by 
those assembled. At this particular meeting, sekh Muslims advocated in private during
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the meeting to assure the election of one of theirs, arguing that they (the sekhs) had 
as long a record of party work as bagdis. However, Biswanath, former bagdi 
panchayat member, advocated his candidacy (also in private, to the leading party 
member present, "I will be chairman, will I not?"). Eventually he was made chairman, 
and most sekhs left the meeting before the formal "election".
The sekhs argued entirely along jati lines, "us" and "them". There was never a 
question of allegiance to another party. The Gram Committee chairman did have 
some prerogatives but in reality his powers were nil and void unless backed by other 
sources, such as the party or the panchayat chairman. For instance, the Gram 
Committee drew up the list of candidates for the IRDP loans, but these needed the 
signature of the panchayat member to be successful. Nonetheless, what was important 
for the agitated sekhs was not "control" but "representation". Sekhs in general were 
well represented in the local party set-up and some yielded substantial power, although 
no-one from the east-para enjoyed party positions. Representation in a position such 
as the Gram Committee Chairman would, according to the sekh Muslims of this para, 
would have reflected their importance in the party’s local history, their allegiance and 
support of the party. Representation would have been an acknowledgement from the 
party leadership of this importance. Only one individual would have gained such a 
position, but the implicit acknowledgement would have reflected on all. As indeed 
it did in the case of the "winner", in the same way that his Gram Panchayat 
membership for two periods had reflected on his group.
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We should remember the fact that previously, in the 1960s for instance, public 
political positions, formal or informal, were invariably dominated by the higher castes 
(or high-status Muslims). In the 1990s, on the other hand, the lower castes and the 
poor were at a fast increasing rate given formal political positions and participated in 
public meetings on a par with everyone else. Political representation gains its social 
relevance from these historical circumstances. It was not merely a question of gaining 
influence, of obtaining control over institutions. In some cases representation was 
extended without an automatic sharing of control. This, however, did not necessarily 
give rise to discontent because for a group previously not publicly included in the fora 
of power, public representation in itself was a step forward, an enhancement of status, 
an acknowledgement of importance. Such an acknowledgement could be expressed 
in other ways as well, such as in dispute settlements.
The politics of dispute settlement
Interesting insights into how the relationship between village leaders and groups of 
low-caste poor functioned may be gained from dispute settlement within non-dominant 
castes. Srinivas mentions that dominant caste leaders often performed arbitration in 
other castes.13 The same was found in other parts of India.14 Such intervention, 
however, did not apply to all castes. Particularly those of equal or higher ritual rank
13Srinivas 1959.
14Gough 1955, Mayer 1958, Hitchcock 1959, Dumont and Pocock 1957.
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(e.g. Brahmins), but also some of lower rank, did not accept external arbitration.15 
Bailey argues that in the "traditional system" only the dominant castes had a proper 
"corporate political existence" and could consider the affairs of other castes the affairs 
of the whole village and thus theirs.16 But Mandelbaum rightfully points to a large 
number of cases of the opposite, of villages with several castes managing their own 
affairs.17 Nonetheless, mediation or arbitration from outside was a strong tendency.
We may argue that such intervention was a sign of dominance, and changes in 
intervention pointed to changes in dominance. Put differently, the authority to mediate 
was a function of the specifics of the relationship between the jatis in question. The 
settlement of disputes within or between non-dominant castes was often performed by 
members of the dominant caste. They sought to maintain a monopoly on authority. 
In most cases, non-dominant groups had their own "elders" who saw to smaller 
disputes, but these were often "representatives" of the dominant group. Srinivas 
writes:
This highlights a feature of rural social organization in this area, the council 
of the dominant castes tries to create a structure of authority within each group 
it has to deal with, though its efforts frequently fail.18
15The Khatis in Ramkheri did not accept arbitration by the Rajputs; Mayer 1958.
16Bailey 1960:191.
17Mandelbaum 1970b:365ff.
18Srinivas 1959:12, see also Gough 1955.
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Such a structure represented an extension of the authority of the dominant caste. The 
lesser "elders" managed affairs within their own group, and only when this was not 
sufficient were the "elders" of the dominant caste engaged. Such intervention would 
normally be in support of the lesser elder. External intervention in the village — by 
for instance the police — was generally disallowed, or at least limited to the 
upholding of the existing structure of authority. In Hitchcock’s study, the two village 
leaders (the "mukhia" and the "principal") prevented on occasions police intervention 
in their "realms".19
If this "monopoly on authority" was a major concern in the status considerations of 
all-village leaders, would not an effort to establish a local monopoly on authority also 
be a concern for leaders of lesser groups, for lower, semi-subordinated jatis, given the 
chance? And vice versa, would abstention from interference not constitute marks of 
respect from the all-village leader bestowed on the lesser ally?
From the villages of Udaynala and Gopinathpur we shall see how outside arbitration 
in disputes among members of the bagdi jati was accepted at certain points and under 
certain circumstances, but at other times and under other circumstances it was not. 
The absence of intervention reflects either antagonism, or, quite the opposite, 
recognition by village leaders of the importance of the jati and authority (however 
limited) of the jati’s own leaders to dissolve inner conflicts. When the absence of 
intervention does not reflect antagonism, then it reflects a basic trust, an understanding
19Hitchcock 1959; see also Gough 1955. In Mandelbaum’s words, "A disputant 
who deliberately tries to take his quarrel outside the village for settlement is declared 
guilty of slighting the local patrons" (1970b:360).
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of shared objectives — an "alliance". Together with other elements, such as 
innumerable signs of "equality" (as per the modem tradition), the absence of external 
arbitration for some jatis, when compared with intervention in the affairs of 
comparable jatis of the same village at the same time, reflects a recognition of social 
status. Groups of high social status cannot accept outside intervention while groups 
of low social status can very often not avoid it. The absence of outside arbitration 
thus becomes part of a recognition of a relative social status.
The following section will investigate how disputes among bagdis were solved, who 
the mediators were, and under what circumstances mediation was accepted or 
discontinued. We find that mediation/acceptance of authority was generally parallelled 
by a large degree of intimacy, and rejection of mediation most often reflected a 
situation of enmity. In both Udaynala and Gopinathpur even purely internal bagdi 
disputes were largely sought settled through arbitration and mediation by village 
leaders, i.e. non-bagdis. The authority to mediate was located with the village leaders, 
but village leaders whose authority the lesser group recognized. The arbitrator was 
always someone to whom the group already lent support.
Among the bagdis of Gopinathpur in the 1960s, the two main bagdi leaders, Sakti 
Dhara and Gobardhan, each with their group of family and followers, always sought 
to settle internal disputes themselves. However, their authority was not always 
accepted, by cousins for instance, and non-bagdi village leaders could be approached 
by anyone involved in a dispute. Arbitration very often took place in the presence of 
main village leaders — invariably "dominant caste" aguris, and in particular their ally,
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Bhaskar Kes. Bamun or napit leaders never mediated bagdi disputes, and kayasthas 
only on very rare occasions. During these years no bagdi ever participated in the 
settling of aguri disputes.
In the 1970s the situation changed a little when one kayastha village leader, Anadi 
Sarkar, emerged with the support of the Congress. Gobardhan shifted his allegiance. 
Because both of them were members of a religious reform movement, the Satsangha, 
which does not recognize caste, the bagdi leader often participated as one of several 
village leaders called upon to settle disputes. However, he never attended the 
settlement of purely internal aguri disputes. Bagdis continued to be subjected to the 
arbitration of all-village leaders, in particular the kayastha.
With the arrival of the LFG in 1977, the situation changed radically. The village’s 
main CPM activist (and Gram Panchayat member), Sailen Kes, aguri by caste, ensured 
the presence of two bagdi leaders at all dispute settlements: Sakti Dhara and the Gram 
Panchayat member-to-be, Shyamsundar. When the aguri CPM activist left politics and 
the village, the fronts between the village’s two main communities, aguri and bagdi, 
hardened. In the 1980s and early 1990s most bagdis voted for the CPM while most 
clean castes voted for Congress (and in 1993 for the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya 
Janata Party — BJP). Shyamsundar was respected as Gram Panchayat member, but 
his intervention was not sought in intra-aguri disputes nor in disputes among other 
clean-caste villagers. Only one lone CPM-affiliated kayastha, Kesto Sarkar, attended 
dispute settlements among bagdis, otherwise external intervention was not sought.
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In Udaynala, all-village leaders were in the 1960s often called upon to mediate intra- 
bagdi disputes. One such village leader, Jikukaji, of aristocratic background and on 
whose land most bagdis lived, considered the Bagdi-para part of his "realm", as his 
fathers had done before him. His intervention was a sine qua non of dispute 
settlement among bagdis in those days. His son did not have the same personality, 
and authority drifted to other village leaders, in particular Ehiasaheb and Haksaheb, 
all of same sekh jati. These leaders continued the tradition of intervention and 
dominance, although they depended on bagdi support. Increased political tension in 
the village during the late 1960s led to rivalry over bagdi support between several 
would-be village leaders, and the bagdis came to enjoy a period of "non-intervention". 
However, the repression of communists ended the rivalry, and bagdis again found 
themselves subjected to one single village leader — Ehiasaheb, supported by the 
Congress and whom they supported as lathials. Ehiasaheb eventually had to flee the 
village, and in the absence of any prominent village leader the bagdis again enjoyed 
some autonomy between 1974 and 1977.
In 1977 the absence of clear authority was ended with the unquestioned position of 
the CPM and its local activists. The new main village leader, Haksaheb, had a 20- 
year record of party work and his authority was unquestioned over the entire anchal. 
However, this did not mean the reimposition of outside authority on the Udaynala 
bagdis. The most prominent bagdi leader, Sankar Dhaure, was made Gram Panchayat 
candidate by the party. His track record as Congressite lathial leader and lack of a 
record of cooperation with the CPM did not prevent this. He was effectively put "in 
charge" of the Bagdi-para so that after 1978 only on two occasions has outside
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mediation been required, both times under his young successor, and both times 
concerning a dispute with the one non-CPM family in the para. Absence of external 
mediation represented in the old days an extension of the authority of the village 
leaders of dominant castes to lesser leaders of subordinated castes, and also enhanced 
the local authority of the latter. The same absence of external arbitration during the 
LFG era represented an extension of the authority of the party to lesser groups of 
supporters, and enhanced the position of the lesser leaders.
Throughout this period village leaders mediated disputes among muchis of both 
villages. In Gopinathpur it was previously the aguri village leaders who did this, but 
in the 1990s the bagdi village leaders and panchayat members performed this duty. 
In Udaynala, muchi disputes have always been and were still mediated by sekhs even 
though the muchi-para falls within the seat represented by the bagdis in the Gram 
Panchayat.
The acceptance of authority in dispute mediation is a reflection of a more general 
relationship. The equation of the contemporary local CPM leadership with village 
leaders of the past is not to say there is no difference in political content or 
ideological orientation of dispute management, but that the relationship of authority 
has in many ways remained the same in spite of a change of personalities. The 
mediator is an outsider whose authority is accepted and who wields powers that may 
potentially be put to use. Non-involvement in bagdi disputes symbolizes that bagdi 
leaders are part of the same authority as other (more important) local party people — 
a recognition not bestowed on muchi leaders. This non-involvement in bagdi disputes
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suggested die same acknowledgement of importance evident in the distribution of 
institutionalized positions.
In brief summary, the local village leaders, who were also the local party leadership, 
have taken into consideration a local mode for expressing status differences among 
different groups. This relied on differences in importance for the party (or in the 
party’s perception), but the publicly expressed acknowledgement of this difference tied 
the one jati to the exercise of power. In Gopinathpur this tie has become very real in 
that bagdis have become the party unit there. In Udaynala somewhat less so, but the 
bagdis there were still in symbolically significant ways associated with power. Apart 
from individuals who become influential in the party, representation and subtle signs 
of acknowledgement seem to have enhanced the bagdis* self-respect and their position 
in society.
It might perhaps be argued that the relationship between the CPM and the bagdis was 
a not too extraordinary patron-client relationship with exchange of votes and man- 
support for benefits both material and political. However, the case may not be that 
simple. As stated earlier, most bagdis and a number of other poor low-caste people 
were staunch defenders of the party and identified with it. Bagdis in particular seem 
to have adopted the party’s ideology, and very few among them support the Congress 
or the BJP.20
20During the last panchayat election (June 1993) a number of bagdi and other low- 
caste families supported the BJP. One reason, as outlined in Ruud 1994b, seems to 
be that the BJP was able to offer a ritual recognition, of which the atheistic CPM was 
entirely unable.
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However, there were elements in this adoption of ideology which require closer 
scrutiny. Locally bagdis constitute a backbone in the party apparatus, but they also 
constitute a "success story" in having adapted to the requirements of the party’s 
"civilization project" and having achieved higher social status through cultural reform. 
At the same time they have become more scrupulous in their religious observances.
Cultural reform processes and models
Srinivas’ concept "sanskritization" refers to the reforms engaged in by various jatis to 
enhance their social and ritual status.21 The term, as Fuller has pointed out, confuses 
rhetoric with actual practice (as there is no agreed Sanskritic Hinduism).22 
Furthermore, the ritual-religious reforms are but one type of cultural reform processes. 
Another type has been termed "modernization" or "westernization".23 What is 
generally agreed is that the models aspired to are not universal, All-Indian. Rather, 
the model is locally prominent, a replication of the life-style of a dominant caste or 
some other locally well-known model. These limitations notwithstanding, the concept 
has gained wide currency in the anthropological literature and refers in general to 
efforts of social status enhancement engaged in by whole groups, more often than not 
jatis. It may however be better to term such cultural reform processes exactly that, 
"cultural reform processes", with the provision that they have to be locally and 
historically understood. A cultural reform process aims at a locally well-known model
21Srinivas 1965.
22Fuller 1992:24-8. ^
iggoj-W'tHC
23See Cohn
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— a model that may change over time — with the life-style and/or religious practices 
emulated by that model.
Any such cultural reform process aims at attaining a higher relative status. Attainment 
can be expressed in a number of ways, although always from outside the reforming 
group, in particular by those whose higher status is obviously accepted. Attainment 
can be expressed in terms of ritual services rendered by Brahmins as priests or other 
service castes, or the acceptance of food, wedding invitations or new names by the 
locally dominant caste.24
There were in rural West Bengal three distinct and strong socio-cultural models: the 
bhadralok (the "gentlefolk", the educated), the chasi (the "peasant"), and the majur 
(labourer).25 These were historically formed and corresponded roughly to caste 
divisions (high castes; peasant castes; low castes and tribals), as well as to ownership 
classes (landlords, owner-cultivators, and landless).26 The first two have functioned 
as models for cultural reform. Integral to these were distinct life-styles. The chasi 
was stereotypically a sturdy cultivator of his own lands, frugal, morally upright and 
conscientious in his religious observances. The bhadralok, on the other hand, enjoyed 
a service position or enough land to keep him comfortable in non-manual engagement.
24See for instance Davis 1983.
25See Ray 1983 and 1987, and Bose 1986, Ch. 1.
26The tripartite social, religious and economic division was not as clear as it may 
appear; there was a great deal of overlap and individual household mobility.
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He was not merely literate, but had a lively interest in literary pursuits, poetry, drama 
and songs.
The bhadralok of the landlord kind vanished from the rural scene in the decades prior 
to 1977. The only figure close to that style after the 1970s was the schoolteacher. 
However, as suggested in Chapter Four, during this same period, a blending of the 
chasi model with the pursuits and interests of the bhadralok took place. The well-off 
owner-cultivator sent his sons and increasingly also daughters to school, where they 
were familiarized with the cultural world of educated Bengal. Literacy in the 
extended sense of knowledge of poetry, staging dramas (jatra), and singing Tagore 
songs has come to be deemed necessary ingredients in the ideal life of a chasi. These 
tendencies were also much evident in village life in Burdwan in the second decade of 
LFG rule. Shame on the village that did not stage at least one jatra performance 
during its main festival, that did not have a "function" for Rabindranath’s anniversary, 
or that was still without a library. Both Gopinathpur and Udaynala have a number of 
trained singers, many would-be and some published poets, and a few dramatists.27 
Most of these belong to "peasant castes", not the "bhadralok castes". Few males of 
the peasant castes have not at one point acted in a jatra performance.
27In Gopinathpur there were two poets with published works plus a number of 
people whose writings have been published in newspapers or magazines. One 
individual has become a professional actor in Calcutta. In Udaynala four individuals 
have published collections of poetry or writings of a scholarly kind, an additional three 
have had articles or poetry published in magazines or newspapers. Two have had 
their own plays staged, one of which by a professional troupe. There was no achieved 
singer in either village, but fairly large numbers had been taking training. Someone 
told me that, "In Bengal, you’re not a real man until you have written poetry".
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Such "cultured" activities were at one lime not available to all castes. Some 
discrimination seems to have taken place, though more as a result of difficulties in 
bridging a long-standing social gap than of a conscious exclusion of the lower castes. 
The caste barrier has gradually been removed. A more enduring obstacle for 
participation in such activities, both in the 1960s and in the 1990s, was illiteracy. 
Disability on this front not only precluded participation in activities such as jatra or 
poetry recitals but hampered inclusion in the status group that engaged in such 
activities. In other words, aspirations towards higher status became increasingly 
difficult because a higher status for majurs meant a chasi status — which was 
becoming increasingly literate and "literature-conscious". Literacy became a sine qua 
non of an even marginally improved social status for majurs; it became the hallmark 
of the upwardly mobile.
Bagdi and muchi social changes
Over the last three or four decades a movement has emerged among muchis to 
abandon some of the most polluting and stigmatizing aspects of their life-style and 
image. One of the most stigmatizing aspects of muchi life-style was the consumption 
of beef, an aspect integral to popular perceptions of muchis not sanctioned by 
scriptures. Over this period more and more muchi communities in the area declared 
to have abandoned the practice. As the movement gained momentum it became 
increasingly difficult for beef-eating muchis to marry off sons and daughters. By 1993
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all but one muchi-community in Raina had publicly declared to have abandoned eating 
beef.28
Another aspect of their life-style contributing to a low position was the production and 
consumption of alcohol. Particularly the annual puja-festivities for the rustic and non- 
Vedic Mansa were associated with a large consumption of home-made liquor. Muchis 
in both Udaynala and Gopinathpur had produced liquor for sale, and this became 
particularly profitable during the years of unclear political leadership in the 1970s. 
However, once CPM rule had been properly established, they were requested to end 
production — and they did. Only the consumption of liquor continued, and in 
Udaynala* s muchi-para this caused a drawn-out division in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. The public annual puja became the centre of contention. The group that 
favoured less drinking abstained from the common puja and staged a separate one a 
month later. This lasted for six years until, under pressure from muchis elsewhere, 
they agreed to celebrate a common puja but with less alcohol. During my visit there 
was little alcohol involved, and the drinking routs of the past had almost disappeared.
These efforts have not gained them a higher position within the all-Hindu ritual 
ranking. However, together with the general cultural changes in rural society, this 
made muchis less exposed to openly expressed untouchability. The other side of the 
coin was the ridicule. "The muchi who wanted to be borolok ["big-man", respected]" 
was a great source of non-muchi amusement. To outsiders, muchis as co-villagers
28Though, as Nimai Das said, "There’s no telling what people eat in the privacy 
of their homes".
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were referred to in respectful terms and their para called Das-para (Das being their 
preferred name). But within the village, they continued to be objects of scant respect 
and their para referred to as muchi-para. The myth about muchis once having been 
kings, although known to all muchis, was practically unknown outside their 
community. When I retold the story, it was met with incredulity and laughter.
At the beginning of our period, several bagdi families sought to rid themselves of the 
image of the unruly bagdi. In Udaynala the Bag family and in Gopinathpur the Porel 
and Malik families went through religious reform, literacy, or life-style changes trying 
to make themselves into chasi (peasant) Hindus. In this they were aided by their 
landholdings or, in case of the Maliks, by a service position. The model on which the 
few bagdi families shaped themselves was the clean-caste Hindu chasi: meticulous in 
religious observances, teetotall and vegetarian, always sporting dhoti and shirt (not 
shirtless as was common), and a supervisory rather than participatory engagement in 
cultivation. Cultivation remained crucial in their life-style, as it is to clean-caste 
Hindu chasis.29 Gobardhan Porcl’s wealthy household and large family has been 
leading the sanskritization processes. He himself was "guru" in a Hindu reformist 
sect, the Satsangha, which emphasized thrift, cleanliness, and personalized religious 
observances. The Satsangha’s philosophy was directed towards the "householder" 
(grihastha) who also has to consider the welfare of his family and his land. God is 
worshipped, according to Satsanghi philosophy, through work, through concern for 
fellow human beings, and through fulfilment of one’s social obligations. Through the
29The "model" of the thrifty and frugal peasant, with a vegetarian and introvert 
life-style, was first described by Mayer (1958).
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fulfilment of these religious obligations, Gobardhan took his family away from the 
social world and life-style of most of Gopinathpur*s bagdis, a move which had a great 
impact on the village bagdis’ life-style.
The Maliks followed a different route, one which may better be described as 
"modernization". Originally from a poor household, one young boy was sent to a 
relative in Bihar, where he was educated and eventually obtained a service position. 
Most of his life he stayed away from the village, but over the years bought land and 
provided his six children with some education. One son, Shyamsundar, was for one 
period the panchayat member for Gopinathpur and later Jela Parishad member. The 
second son became full-time secretary of the village cooperative society, while the 
third tends to the family’s 20 bighas of land. The family’s sanskritization consisted 
mainly of education, abstention from drink and meat-eating, and the life-style that 
went with landownership and service positions. They did not observe any religious 
activities except village festivals. All were communists — which connected them to 
the quasi-bhadralok of "the modem tradition", a connection which further enhanced 
their status.
Udaynala had only one sanskritizing bagdi family, the Bags. The Bag family’s 
background was not different from others in bagdi-para, but extensive money-lending 
gave them a platform for cultural reform. They were the first in Udaynala’s bagdi- 
para to refrain from drinking and gambling. Manik, self-taught literate, was an ardent 
reader of the epics (Mahabharata being a favourite), also as the first in the para. They 
took to wearing shirts, gave dowry, and kept the women from outside work. They
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were also meticulous in religious observances, and were the first to bring the Hindu 
religious calendar to the para, and to follow it. The Bag family came to be considered 
the "most Hindu in bagdi-para".
Previously low-caste labourers were served on banana-leaves, sitting in the middle of 
the employer’s courtyard. Payment was dropped onto their hands to avoid touch, and 
they were not allowed near the temple for fear of polluting the deity. These practices 
had vanished gradually over the decades after the 1950s — although more recently in 
the case of muchis than bagdis. By the 1990s, any Hindu was allowed close to the 
temple, any labourer irrespective of his jati seated on the porch and served on plates. 
But the position of muchis was still more ambivalent than that of bagdis. Muchis 
were more explicitly polluting than bagdis and this reflected in everyday behaviour. 
As muchis informed me, while bagdi labourers leave their plates unwashed, muchi 
labourers wash their plates before leaving these for the employer’s household’s women 
to pick up. A bagdi could socialize with anyone anywhere restrained only by an 
inferior economic status. The muchis’ ability to socialize was restrained by both an 
inferior economic status and an implicit, never expressed ritual distance. If touched 
by a low-caste individual high-caste Hindus did not rush off to take a ritual bath 
(snari), but muchis took care to avoid touch and thus putting high-caste individuals in 
an embarrassing situation. The same reluctance was evident in approaching temples. 
Muchis approached one by one, gave offerings and returned to stand at a distance, 
while other Hindus including bagdis lingered around in front of the temple. Bagdis 
were respected as ordinary Hindus whereas muchis were still stigmatized as
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"untouchables". The bagdi reform process’s aim of a higher social status has been 
accepted as legitimate while the muchi effort was ridiculed and scorned.
In a large measure, ritual changes have paradoxically been caused by the arrival of an 
atheistic party. Firstly, the CPM has made it impossible to publicly express 
sentiments of casteism or ritual pollution. Moreover, aspects of the CPM’s general 
policy have indeed directly assisted certain jatis to an improved ritual position and 
higher social status. The CPM’s ideological emphasis on the "upliftment" of the poor 
includes measures that have most of the signs of the "sanskritization" efforts: literacy, 
teetotalism, material improvement, and political representation.
The CPM’s "civilizational project”
In 1981 gambling was abolished from the all-village public celebrations (the baroari 
puja) of Gopinathpur after pressure from Sailen Kes, village leader, CPM activist and 
Gram Panchayat member, and Shyamsundar, "modernized" bagdi leader and Gram 
Panchayat member-to-be. The following year gambling was abolished from the same 
celebrations in Udaynala after an initiative by Haksaheb, prominent local CPM leader 
and Gram Panchayat member. Only in the case of the annual baroari puja of 
Udaynala’s bagdi-para was gambling not discontinued; that move was resisted by (not 
sanskritized or modernized) bagdi leader Sankar Dhaure, Gram Panchayat member.
This pattern was replicated on the issue of excessive drinking. The local CPM 
leadership was instrumental in ending liquor production among both muchis and
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bagdis. The muchis, as mentioned above, yielded without protest. But the bagdis did 
not, and that event and its political circumstances are noteworthy. Having taken part 
in the repression of communists in the early 1970s, the Udaynala bagdis had 
disassociated themselves from local politics in the mid-1970s. Both they and the 
muchis had exploited a local political lacuna between 1974 and 1977 to engage in the 
liquor business. Some time after the 1977 instalment of the LFG, a party of local 
CPM-activists campaigned for the abolition of liquor-production and sale from the 
bagdi- and muchi-paras. But the bagdis put up resistance, and waved lathis and threw 
pieces of dried mud at an anti-liquor procession of local notables approaching their 
para in the autumn of 1977. A few days later, the police was brought in and broke 
the production-utensils. Some months after this incident, a rapprochement took place. 
Sankar Dhaure, the bagdi-leader who previously had collaborated with Ehiasaheb until 
three years earlier, agreed to end all liquor-production in the para and to advocate 
support of the party instead. In the 1978 panchayat elections he was made the party’s 
candidate, was elected and sat for one period. His successor was another bagdi — 
literate but under-aged at the time. The bagdis of Udaynala have since not produced 
liquor for sale, but they were represented in the Gram Panchayat until 1993 and 
received a large share of the boons distributed by the party.
This was not an "exchange" in any normal sense of the word, but an inclusion in a 
sphere of power through the adoption of certain values. On the whole the relationship 
seems governed by exactly such subtle understandings and identification. Over the 
years the bagdis have not only become staunch supporters of the CPM, but they have 
also reformed their life-styles based on the chasi model — a reform made possible
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through the connection to the CPM. These reforms show influences from the 
dominant party’s ideology, but also from previous "sanskritization" efforts. For 
instance, following pressure from the party bagdis in most villages in this area have 
abolished gambling and heavy drinking from fairs and festivals. On the other hand, 
however, money has been diverted into the building of new brick temples, increasingly 
larger and more expensive celebrations with an immense increase in the number of 
sacrificed goats. The Udaynala bagdis 15-20 years back commonly sacrificed 5-10 
goats, with the goddess placed in a temporarily constructed shed. In 1993 they 
sacrificed 32 goats with the goddess placed in a brick temple.
Literacy represents one dramatic change. When I conducted my first round of 
informal interviews in the poor paras of Udaynala, I was told by bagdis that thirty 
years ago, "No one here knew how to read or write. When we received a letter or a 
notice from the authorities, we had to go to the middle paras to have it read to us." 
This was true for most people — the exception being the "sanskritizing" families. By 
the 1990s, most young bagdis and a majority of young muchis attended classes and 
the incident of literacy was increasing rapidly.
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Table 6.7
Education and age-groups, men and women above 16 years of age, of bagdi jati, 
Udaynala and Gopinathpur 1993
Level of Age-groups
literacy/
grade 16-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-90 Total
None 19.4 33.9 49.2 39.1 60.9 35.0
Some* 11.5 22.9 18.5 41.3 26.1 20.8
1-5 26.6 16.9 15.4 15.2 10.9 19.1
6-10 26.6 22.0 13.8 2.2 2.2 17.9
11+ 2.2 4.2 3.1 2.2 - 2.7
Under
education 13.7 4.6
Sum 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.1
N 139 118 65 46 46 414
For asterisk and source see table 6.8.
Table 6.8
Education and age-groups, men and women above 16 years of age, of muchi jati, 
Udaynala and Gopinathpur 1993
Level of Age-groups
literacy/
grade 16-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-90
None 37.5 71.4 73.3 84.0 86.7
Some* 6.3 9.5 10.0 16.0 13.3
1-5 27.1 16.7 16.7 - -
6-10 12.5 2.4 - - -
11+ - - - - -
Under
education
Sum
16.7
100.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 48 42 30 25 15
Total
65.0
10.0 
15.6
4.4
5.0
100.0
160
* "Some" indicates literacy achieved either at a pathshala (older form of informal 
village school, in existence until the 1950s), taught at home (by a relative) or at the 
present-day literacy campaign centres.
Source: field-data
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Table 6.7 shows the level of literacy or grade passed for the bagdi jati of both 
Udaynala and Gopinathpur. In the table both men and women of 16 years of age or 
more are included. The correlation between age and education is striking. The table 
shows that until 40 years ago, less then 20 per cent of bagdis in these villages had any 
formal education. Sixty per cent of those now 56 years old or more are illiterate, 
while one forth know "some" — a category ranging from the ability to write one’s 
name to fairly fluent. Local knowledge suggests however that few bagdis attended 
pathshalas for any length of time; instead a number of the older bagdis have learnt to 
read and write at the village literacy campaign centres.30 The opposite was the case 
for the younger generations. Only one in three received no formal education or had 
been taught at the literacy campaign centres, and an increasing proportion reached 
higher levels, with a little more than one out of four having reached Grade 6 or higher 
(the "Under education" category is to a large extent made up of people who have 
failed lower level exams). Eleven individuals (4.6%) have reached Grade 11 or 
higher, of whom eight are 35 or younger.
Table 6.8 gives the same figures for muchis. The figures reflect the same trend of 
increased literacy and education. However, the development was slower. Until 1960 
no muchi had any formal training, and four in five were illiterate. This situation has 
slowly changed, with remarkable developments only for the last batch, those aged 25 
or below at the time of the survey. This batch reached school-age at around the time
^ h e  state Government and the CPM combined to launch a literacy campaign in 
Burdwan district in 1990. In most villages teaching centres were organized by the 
Gram Committees, kerosene was supplied through the Panchayats, and inexpensive 
material was provided by the Government. Many youths contributed as volunteer 
teachers.
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of the instalment of the LFG. It is noticeable, however, that even this batch contained 
a substantial number of illiterates, more than one in three. Moreover, only three 
individuals have attended the literacy campaign classes. The proportion of illiterate 
muchis in this age-group was twice that of bagdis. And still by 1993 no muchi had 
gone for higher education (which would take them out of the villages).
These developments do not compare favourably with similar figures for the higher 
jatis. Here I will only mention some of the trends for these "dominant castes". 
Among the sekh Muslims, illiteracy was down to 7.3%, with an additional 8.8% 
trained in the literacy campaign centres. The rest, or some 85%, have formal 
education. More than one in ten of the below 35’s have completed class 11 or more. 
Among the three dominant castes of Gopinathpur, the situation was even more 
striking. Illiteracy has been eradicated among the youngest batch, and only a very few 
individuals of these jatis have ever attended the literacy campaign classes. Some 45% 
of the youngest batch have passed class six or more. One in ten or more of those 
aged 55 or less have passed class 11 or more.
Literacy is not merely about the ability to read and write, to know and assert one’s 
rights, to make one’s daily or not-so-daily life less strenuous; as long as literacy is not 
taken for granted, not an ability automatically made available to every member of 
society, then literacy also has a social meaning, a statement about difference and 
status. In rural West Bengal, as in most agrarian societies, it was the well-off who 
were literate. This difference was underlined by a parallel division of life-style,
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between the bhadralok, the chasi, and the majur, with the bhadralok literate, the chasi 
increasingly literate, and the majur archetypically illiterate.
Furthermore, as Poromesh Acharya has pointed out, due to historical circumstances 
schooling and the mode of education in (West) Bengal were attuned to a particular 
style of learning and to the literary interests of the bhadralok — not to the practical 
interests of other social groups.31 The spread of literacy under the aegis of a mass 
party has not changed this markedly.32 The increase in the number of village schools 
(in Udaynala since 1958, in Gopinathpur since 1964) has done much to universalize 
literacy and thus to reduce its social significance. However, it still retained quite a 
lot of potential as a social marker. We should remember that not everyone was 
literate and that the high rate of school attendance was a very recent phenomenon 
indeed. The social significance was evident from the way teenagers who have been 
to school engage themselves in clubs, in jatra performances and in bringing libraries 
and books to their village. Again and again I witnessed how eager youth — 
irrespective of jati but not irrespective of education — engage in "cultural functions" 
where they played music, read poetry (some self-composed) and made speeches about 
the need for a cultural uplift. Literacy was not merely about the ability to read and 
write, it was about being part of a "culture", it was about social belonging and status.
31 Acharya 1981 and 1986.
32Only the material for the current literacy campaign has much improved in this 
respect compared to primary school material. However, even here the interests 
derived from the bhadralok’s literary traditions were evident. For instance, about one 
third of the campaign material’s "Part Two" was devoted to poems by famous Bengali 
poets and to a lengthier story by Saratchandra Chatteijee. saksharatar dvitiya path, 
State Research Centre (West Bengal), Calcutta 1990.
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It is therefore significant that the bagdis have achieved a higher level of literacy than 
muchis, that they have invested relatively more in schooling. We find in this 
investment a closer identification with the objectives of the party they support. A 
higher level of literacy and other signs of cultural reform plus an improved economic 
position have contributed to create for bagdis the outward signs of a chasi, a much 
improved social status than the majur status they previously held. This improvement 
has been further strengthened by the CPM which has shown gestures to this jati which 
suggest a favoured political position.
Conclusion
It has been the aim of this chapter to suggest the linkage of political allegiance to 
cultural reform and social status. Enduring political allegiance of the type found in 
rural West Bengal between the CPM and groups of poor low caste cannot be properly 
understood unless the social significance of representation, cultural reform and 
economic improvements are taken into consideration. The CPM’s ideology has led 
it to include the poor into the public exercise of power, and it has organized drives 
against drink, illiteracy and casteism — practices that stigmatised the poor and low 
caste and that by being eliminated elevated their self-perception and social standing.
All poor, irrespective of jati, have experienced an enhancement in their publicly 
expressed social position as well as their economic well-being and political 
representation. Beyond this, a close link, a "special relationship", has been established 
in this locality between the local CPM leadership and one particular jati. The jati
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received disproportional attention from the party leadership, which has led to an 
improved economic position and a closer relationship with the sources of local power. 
The same jati has, more than comparable jatis, also embraced more closely basic 
tenets of the party’s drives against social malpractices — an embracing which follows 
quite closely on previous efforts of cultural reform. Closeness to the party has made 
possible ambitions they have long nourished.
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SEVEN 
CONCLUSION
The first major point of this study has been to argue for the understanding of the 
CPM’s emergence, entrenchment and position in rural Bengal in light of its ability to 
play the game and be part of village politics. Apart from its obvious implications of 
economic redistribution (or efforts in that direction), a main result of the LFG raj has 
been the involvement of increasingly large groups of people in government, and 
simultaneously an increase in the involvement of the party in the everyday lives of 
villagers. In the 1990s party and government reached down to villages in a more 
tangible and powerful way than thirty years back. Nonetheless, in spite of all its 
economic power and bureaucratic might, the party administration nexus was still far 
from able to control village affairs and was largely excluded from involvement in the 
daily lives of villages. The financial means at the state’s disposal were immense, but 
not that immense, and its administrative capacity was limited to a handful of 
individuals covering areas of thousands of inhabitants. Even after the introduction of 
panchayati raj and mass mobilization villages retained a large degree of internal self- 
rule. And it was from the formation of loyalties and perceptions in the thousand 
villages that parties were directly affected. The CPM’s desire to control villagers’ 
votes obliged it to be part of villages politics.
Important elements in the game of village politics are those I have called symbolic 
capital and Fingerspitzgefiihl. I will not repeat them here, only state that these are
crucial concepts for understanding a face-to-face polity in which no-one in particular 
has extraordinary powers; that is, some may have access to means nobody else has 
access to (such as state resources), but only in extraordinary circumstances will such 
means be of decisive influence in a village because a large number of people are not 
imperatively dependent on such resources, and the limited nature of these means 
cannot at any one point of time reach and be of decisive importance to but a limited 
number of people. The magnitude of state resources may be thus visualized: IRDP 
loans were about 9 thousand Rupees during my visit, and were distributed to 5-6 
families in each village (depending on size) each year; the dowry for a girl of a 
moderately well-off family amounted to 10-15 times that sum, and even for a poor 
family, the IRDP loan could only cover some of the expenses for a wedding.
Other elements equally decisive for the individual villager’s strategic considerations 
included the imperative of a reservoir of symbolic capital (also in the more extended 
sense not used here, i.e. applying to non-leaders as well), and political support (both 
intra- and extra-village).
If political loyalty did not derive directly from economic necessity, the individual 
villager would seek other qualities in the person he would accept as leader. Or he 
might chose not to accept anyone at all, in which case the would-be village leader 
would have to appeal to shared values or innovative norms to mobilize support. This 
would particularly apply in an electoral democracy. Even in villages, where people 
more or less know who votes for what party, there was still no guarantee that votes 
were actually cast for the party people said they supported. Any one would-be village
leader, politician or party seeking re-election, would have to attract support based on 
more than its material capacity.
To take one problem at a time; presuming that the party would like to "buy" its voters 
if it had the (material) resources, we find that it does not, and so has to rely on other 
means of enticing supporters into voting for it. In a status-conscious society such as 
rural West Bengal, one crucial way in which this could be achieved and the lack of 
material resources compensated, was by symbolic gestures (towards) affirming a status 
ambition. Such subtle signs constituted and cemented relationships, whether the 
relationship involved (old-style) village leaders, party activists or individual or group 
actors on the village political scene.
Much of village politics, as I have argued, evolved around non-material issues 
(allegations, theft, disputes), and in particular around "names" and reputations, rumours 
and gossip. Rumours and gossip were crucial parts of village politics, to a large 
extent gossip was what village politics was all about. Reputations were crucial to 
authority, reputations for being powerful, active and considerate. Not that this did not 
require some "real" content, it did. People were able to distinguish real action from 
"faire sembler" action from their larger reservoir of knowledge about the actors 
involved. This is where Fingerspitzgefuhl gains its full meaning, in playing the game 
of real confidence. Bengali villages were not "theatre states", where the symbolic was 
the real. They were states where "resources" other than material were also fought 
over, where elements such as status and signs of status acknowledgement, names and
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reputations, were important because they were much desired and little else was 
available to be fought over.
With this in mind Chapters Four and Five focused on the late 1960s, the main period 
of the CPM’s expansion into the rural areas. The "conversion" to communism as 
represented by the erstwhile CPI and later CPM, was first evident among younger 
members of the middle to rich peasantry. Through family links but more generally 
through exposure to new ideas via education, these sections of the village population 
were familiarized with "the modem tradition" — the ideology of the "modem" world, 
where notions of equality and progress constituted a core to which Nehru paid 
allegiance, to which the government of West Bengal at least paid lip-service, and 
which was fast becoming the dominant ideology. This was an ideology that was 
firmly part of the culture of the high-status, educated and urban Bengali bhadralok 
(gentlefolk) —  the "modem tradition, Bengali flavour". An important strand within 
"the modern tradition" in Bengal was radical and favoured closer ties with the lower 
classes. This radicalism was particularly enacted in jatras (theatre performances) — 
formerly perceived as a lowly form of entertainment — where new views on the 
position of women, inter-caste relations, poverty and development were presented.
This radical strand also justified for a number of (would-be) village leaders a move 
away from typically bhadralok forms of conducting politics (pamphlets, meetings, 
resolutions, petitions) towards what was perceived of as typically low-caste and low- 
class forms — what I called "proto-political" forms of politics. This took place during 
the United Front period, the most restless in West Bengal’s history, and was
289
particularly evident in the close personal contacts many CPM activists with former 
"criminals", in the militant forms of action which replicated low caste or class heroic 
actions — forms of action that had largely the same people as targets and the same 
issues at the forefront.
But this turn appears as more than a move of political expediency to coax the lower 
classes. What we found to have taken place was the dynamics of local society in its 
diversity taking over a political movement. The party gave a semblance of 
organization and justification to the wide range of actions, and certainly coherence. 
But the range and energy of the actions followed proto-political forms of action, as 
did also the mobilization pattern, and the pattern of command. Middle-class peasants, 
some of whom qualified as village leaders, following the logic of their ideological 
convictions and political ambitions, together with large numbers of low-class and low- 
caste villagers seeking the redress of old and new grievances through manners they 
were familiar with and under the banner of the party that allowed them to do so, did 
not constitute "the poor" all of a sudden "called" into action but particular groups of 
the rural population taking advantage of an opportunity to fulfill what had been long 
in coming. The difference was that now the actions were concerted and legitimized 
by an ideological party’s call for mobilization. The party became "ours" in more 
senses than just "for us". It gave justification to "our" actions.
Interestingly the party did not become "ours" to all poor or low caste. The degree of 
identification was limited to certain groups, to certain pre-existing identities. In the 
main only those groups that for a long time had had a decisive influence on village
290
politics were mobilized in the CPM’s movement, and although they from the party’s 
point of view could hardly be described as faithful supporters during the 1970s, they 
were incorporated into the realm of the new powers after 1977 and gained a larger 
share of the frills than other groups of the poor (Chapter Six). The two groups of 
poor and low caste (the muchis and the bagdis) followed two different models in their 
interaction with village leaders, and came to play different roles in the CPM set-up. 
This leads us to two considerations. The varied manipulation of stereotypes, numbers, 
economic clout and cultural constructs — in short, of available material — by groups 
of poor, suggests that "patron-client relationships" were not unitary. That concept 
seems to hide more than it reveals. Instead individual (fluid) groups were able to 
exploit a host of factors to further and preserve their interests. The means varied 
much, and not all groups enjoyed equal amounts of influence. However, in view of 
the CPM’s mobilization, this becomes quite interesting. Would the CPM have been 
able to mobilize had it not engaged in forms of action associated with the stereotype 
of the fierce low-class bagdi? It is not possible here to consider that question with 
regard to all of West Bengal, but it seems certain that it would not have been possible 
in the present area to mobilize large groups such as the bagdis based on a "meek" 
(Gandhian?) attitude.
This leads us to the second main argument of this study, to show how the CPM could 
gain and retain its broad rural support from the early beginnings in the 1960s to the 
mature state of LFG raj in the 1990s. This argument also relates to a point above, 
where I assumed that the CPM was willing to buy its voters if it could. It cannot, so 
it does not, and it involves itself in village politics. But this is not an entirely accurate
picture. The CPM has not infiltrated itself in village politics. The movement — with 
its specific features and the manner in which it functions — grows out of village 
politics. It grows out of village politics just as the movement and the particularities 
of its early phase of mobilization grew out of particularities in Bengali history in 
conjunction with rural society. The CPM has retained its support in rural society by 
being part of it, by allowing its lower echelons to be as much part of rural society as 
they are part of the party machinery. Or, better still, the other way around, because 
such a picture of political calculation ignores the fact that the party was not different 
from society but grew out of it. The lower echelons of the party were members of 
rural society, they were villagers. The higher echelons, or more interestingly, the 
party’s ethos, belong firmly to a Bengali tradition that was different from (both in 
social and in cultural terms) village society, but as two traditions within the same 
society they were not unrelated to one another, nor entirely disassociated. The modem 
tradition grew out of a meeting with Western tradition, while rural tradition remained 
in continuous interaction with the changing modem tradition (through the landed 
gentry and lesser bhadralok, later through schoolteachers, volunteer social workers and 
activists of various political hues, finally through the education of increasingly larger 
numbers of villagers).
I have no intention of arguing for a view of history with no actors, only "cultural 
trends" moving forward. One significant historical element that cannot be explained 
in terms of culture was the "discovery" of the rural scene and the call for mobilization 
of peasants that gripped the CPM in the wake of the Naxalite allure for radical but 
crucial elements within the party. That event proved decisive in the history of West
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Bengal. But it would have been another futile call had there not been an environment 
that could respond positively and intelligently. The response was to mobilize along 
the lines the lower castes and classes readily understood and identified with, 
abandoning the ways and mores of the bhadralok for a while (the political equivalent 
of the IPTA going rustic 20 years earlier). In a way, this was both an instance of 
mobilization and integration of the lower classes and castes into the polity; it 
amounted to an appropriation of the polity by the lower castes. But it was not an 
appropriation on their own terms for long. By the 1980s and 1990s they were turning 
into another variety of the ruling classes, sharing in the latter’s values and interests, 
abandoning their own former ways, the mode of involvement that had characterized 
their participation in politics.
The relationship of the CPM vis-a-vis the lower castes has changed, from an 
involvement of the party in the territory of the lower castes, to an involvement of the 
lower castes in the ways and mores of the dominant social group and ideology — 
although not entirely. The party retains its position, but the relationship receives its 
sustenance, from a continued attention to the social concerns or ambitions of the lower 
castes — in particular those of immediate interest to the party.
A preoccupation in this study has been to avoid portraying villages and villagers as 
recipients of external influences, as objects, not subjects of history. I have instead 
sought to regard villagers as active appropriators of elements from the outside, these 
being either "calls for mobilization", certain symbols of status, political or economic 
opportunities — according to their own needs, concerns and ambitions. This could
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of course never be the full picture. Villagers both react to the larger society that 
exists, as it exists, and they influence it and its formation. They are not the sole 
creators of the larger society, and no society can be understood entirely in terms of 
its local society and history, nor can it be understood without local society.
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APPENDIX
TIME-SPENDING SURVEY
Haksaheb (former panchayat member for Udaynala North): little time spent on his 
fields, over the entire week only three short visits. Mornings spent at home, visited 
by three to five individuals or groups. Before noon: field visits, shopping pesticides 
(near-by S-bazar), twice meetings with Rabiel on the cooperative, thrice to the local 
party office in near-by village (presumably in connection with the takeover bid to 
come in the cooperative), twice meetings with fellow-villagers over the distribution 
of man-power (a shortage of hired-in hands threatened to become a problem). 
Afternoons: largely the same activities with the addition of one bichar. Evenings: 
engaged in gossiping and card-games every evening till late except once.
Rabiel (party worker and de facto panchayat member for Udaynala North): little time 
spent on the fields (he owns very little). Mornings: at home, visited by up to seven 
individuals or groups. Before noon: twice meetings with Haksaheb on the cooperative 
society bid, every day except one to local party office on various issues (cooperative 
society bid, Gram Committee meetings all over the region, general party matters), one 
visit to a near-by village in some party affairs. Afternoons: once with his wife to a 
panchayat meeting (in near-by village), discussions and meetings in Udaynala over the 
insects and the distribution of hired-in labourers. Not to the bichar. Evenings: ditto, 
but mostly at home where he was called upon by people wanting advice or assistance 
(in all six groups or individuals), or around in para for gossip.
Biswanath (former panchayat member for Udaynala South): Mornings spent in the 
para, not at home but at various neighbours*. Before noon: tending the fields,
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weeding or spraying pesticides. Around noon at least two hours every day spent 
gossiping and fishing in the namasudra-para, near Santi’s house. Afternoon: four 
afternoons spent in the fields or in cultivation-related activities, one largely spent at 
home quarrelling with his elder brother, once to the party office, one discussion with 
Santi on the upcoming meeting in the cooperative society, and once a secret meeting 
with Ohab (that everybody soon learnt about). Evenings: two evenings spent in the 
home-para, the other five in the namasudra-para, each evening in card-games.
Santi (panchayat member for Udaynala South): Mornings visited by people, from two 
to five groups or individuals. Before noon: mainly engaged in agricultural activities, 
though thrice to party office for meetings, brought back pesticides for his family and 
two other families on his bicycle. Afternoons and evenings: minimal agricultural 
activities, mainly meetings of various sorts: the cooperative bid, the shortage of hired- 
in labourers, one Gram Committee meeting and one with the volunteer teachers of the 
literacy campaign over lack of kerosene, conducting a survey of IRDP-eligibles. 
Home very late into the night, no card-games.
Shyamsundar (Jela Parishad member and teacher): Mornings: three to seven visitors 
at his home. Midday: as Jela Parishad member and teacher he was naturally quite 
busy, teaching six days a week between 10 am and 2.30 pm (Saturdays to 1 pm) 
except the days he went for meetings of the Jela Parishad. Afternoons: more meetings 
and party-related work, visited three other villages plus two evenings to the party 
office. Remaining two evenings around in the village, talking and gossiping, planning 
the upcoming Gram Committee meeting.
Angsuman (full-time secretary of the cooperative society that includes Gopinathpur, 
brother of Shyamsundar): Mornings: saw visitors together with his brother at their 
joint household. Midday: attended to the cooperative society at the office in near-by 
S-bazar, once to another village, once to Burdwan town. Evenings: one large meeting 
on dispute on the baroari puja, plus planning the puja. Two evenings at home (visited 
by neighbours, relatives, for gossiping), five evenings around in village visiting, 
gossiping, planning.
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Kesto Sarkar. because he was too ill to do any cultivation on the small amount of land 
he owned, he spent his entire day engaged in various village activities. Over the week 
he was approached by an average of four a day (from two to eight) individuals or 
groups who wanted his assistance or advice. Not out of the village, once to the field. 
One afternoon-evening to the weekly Satsangha meeting, other evenings to the other 
meetings in the village (the planning of the Gram Committee meeting, the big baroari 
meeting, the planning meetings on the puja).
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GLOSSARY
The explanations for certain expressions are those of the current political parlance (e.g. 
jotdar used to denote a sharecropper in this area but is now generally recognized as 
referring to a major landholder).
Transliteration: I have used standard transliteration, though without the diacritical 
marks. Terms commonly used in the literature are not italicized or transliterated (e.g. 
bargadar).
adda
gossip or gossiping 
aguri
landholding ritually clean hindu jati, also known as uggra-kshatriya, major jati in 
the Burdwan district 
anchal
area, region; administrative unit of 15-20 villages 
Anchal Panchayat
level above the Gram Panchayat in the pre 1978 four-tier panchayat system 
anyaya
disrespect
apni
you (honorific pronoun) 
atmia-swajan
(litt.) one’s own people; relatives in a broad sense 
bagdi
ritually low hindu jati, also known as barga-khatriya 
baithakkhana
discussion-house
bamun
"Brahmin” in local dialect 
bandha lok
"tied people", pre-engaged labourer for peak agricultural season 
baniadi
prestigious family 
bargadar
sharecropper; the term mostly used for sharecroppers registred under the 
Operation Barga scheme
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baroari
(litt.) public; particularly used for public festivities (baroari puja) or for the 
committees estblished to arrange the pujas (baroari committee)
BDO
Block Development Officer; position in the West Bengal Administrative Services, 
responsible for the Development Block, the lowest rung of the administration 
benami
land held (illegally) under false name 
bene
baniya; ritually high (clean sudra) hindu jati; traditional occupation traders 
bhadralok
(litt.) the gentlefolk, person of education and refinement, in the rural areas the 
elite 
bhagchasi
Sharecropper, more commonly used than bargadar though now often refers to 
non-registred sharecropper 
bichar
village meeting to deliberate in cases of dispute 
bicharak
"judge", deliberator in a bicar 
bigha
Measure of land, normally considered equivalent of one third of an acre, in this 
area closer to one forth of an acre
biri
country cigarette 
boro-lok
"big-people", slightly derogatory or sarcastic expression 
chasi
cultivator, owner-cultivator 
chhotolok
(litt.) the small people, the opposite of bhadralok 
Congress
the Indian National Congress (I)
CPI
Communist Party of India, until 1964 including the CPM 
CPM
CPI-M; Communist Party of India (Marxist); split from the CPI in 1964 
dacoity (dakati)
robbery by gangs
dal
group; "faction" 
daladali
(litt.) the affairs of the groups; "groupism", "factionalism" 
danga
large-scale fight 
daroga
officer in charge of the local police station (thana)
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dharm a
hindu religious concept; duty; right order of things; behavioural code 
dharmagola
communal paddy storage for future periods of scarcity
dule
a ritually low hindu jati, close to the bagdis 
ekghare rakha 
ostracization 
G ram  Committee
village-level committees of the Krishak Samiti; nominally open but in practice 
CPM-controlled 
G ram  Panchayat
the statutory Village Council system; 1. name of lowest (village-level) tier of old 
four-tier panchayat system, 2. name of lowest but area (ancal) level tier 
(comprising 10-15 villages) of present-day three-tier panchayat system, in 
operation since 1978 
grihastha
householder
gujab
rumour
ijjat
(izzat) honour, respect 
imam
muslim scholar; "priest"
IRDP
Integrated Rural Development Project; Central Government scheme controlled by 
state Governments; relatively cheap loans distributed to villagers for purchase of 
small-scale equipment; 50% subsidy for Scheduled Castes and Tribes
ja ti
sub-caste
jatra
theatre performance, amateur or professional 
Jela Parishad
(or: Zilla Parishad) district-level tier of the panchayat system 
JLRO
Junior Land Reform Officer; the Land and Land Reform Ministry’s man at the 
BDO 
jotdar (or jotedar)
major landholder, in contemporary political parlance reserved for big landholders 
employing labourers 
hatha
land-measure; one eight of a bigha 
kayastha
a ritually high hindu jati, traditionally scribes 
khamata
(ksamata) influence 
hhas
excess land, vested in the government
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khet majur
(litt.) land labourer; contemporary term for agricultural labourers 
kirsen
labourer employed on a one-year contract 
Krishak Samity
CPM’s peasant wing, outside West Bengal known as the Kisan Sabha 
lathi
stick; sticks used as weapons 
lathial
(litt.) who carries a lathi, stick; commonly a strong-man of landlord or village 
leader 
len-den
"giving and taking"; a practice of voluntary assistance 
mahajan
(litt.) big people/person; money-lender 
mahajani
money-lending
majur
labourer, oftenmost near-or completely landless 
majuri
the labourer’s daily wages 
mallik
name given here to a section of the muslim community, considered socially low 
mamla
litigation
marpit
small fight 
mas-maine
labourer on month-long contract 
MLA
Member of the Legislative Assembly (of West Bengal) 
morol
(litt.) leader, from mandal; somewhat negative expression 
mouza
"Revenue village", revenue-paying unit from the time of the mughals, more often 
than not a village.
M P
Member of Parliament 
muchi
ritually lowest hindu jati, drummers and shoe-makers, also known as das, ruidas, 
etc.
nam
name, reputation 
namasudra
a ritually low hindu jati, also known as chandal or chorol 
napit
the hindu barber jati, ritually middle to low hindu
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neta
leader; mostly used of political leaders above village level 
nyaya
respect
Panchayat
village council; in the text used as shorthand for the statutory Gram Panchayat; 
lower-case initial used to denote the whole system 
Panchayat Samiti
second tier of new three-tier Panchayat system 
para
neighbourhood, hamlet; socially and/or geographically distinct clusters of houses 
paribartan
development
pathshala
old-type "school" 
patta
land lease
PSP
Praja Socialist Party
puja
hindu worship
raja
king
rakh
guarding the ripe paddy to prevent theft
rid
tradition
sabha
assembly, organization, meeting 
samman
honour, respect 
santal
a "Scheduled Tribe" group 
Satsangha
a hindu reform-movement 
sekh
name here applied to the landholding section of the muslim community, 
considered socially middle to high 
swajati
of the same jati 
Tabligh
short-hand for Tabligh Jamaat, a muslim lay-man organization 
tarun dal
young faction; name given to group of Udaynala village leaders in the 1960s 
thana
police station or police station area
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tui
you (intimate or derisive pronoun); used between close friends, to children, or 
derisively to people of clearly lower status 
tumi
you (common pronoun); used between equals 
unnayan
development, progress 
zamindar
superior landholder, intermediary rent-collectors between cultivators and 
Government introduced by British in 1793 and abandoned in West Bengal in 1953
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